IN RE CUSTODY OF GULICK (CHILD SUPPORT)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. Reviewing an order modifying custody and support under a Maryland divorce decree, the court identified three errors and reversed. First, ruling on the father's November 18 motion the following day, without affording the mother the ten days to respond allowed under First Judicial District Court Rule 13 and absent any emergency, was error. Second, the district court erred by relying on a URESA order (entered by another Nevada district court, capping support at age 18) to modify the father's support obligations under the divorce decree; NRS 130.280, as amended in 1981, provides that a URESA support order does not nullify or supersede a previous support order, and even under former NRS 130.280 a URESA order did not supersede a prior order unless the URESA court specifically so provided (Peot v. Peot, 92 Nev. 388, 551 P.2d 242 (1976)). Third, the court erred by applying Nevada's age of majority (NRS 129.010) without first determining whether the decree's support provisions derived from a settlement agreement, because a support obligation arising from a settlement agreement incorporated into a decree is unaffected by the statutory age of majority (Bingham v. Bingham, 91 Nev. 539, 539 P.2d 118 (1975); cf. Norris v. Norris, 93 Nev. 65, 560 P.2d 149 (1977)); there was also no evidence of changed circumstances (Dawson v. Dawson, 95 Nev. 821, 603 P.2d 691 (1979)). On remand, the court directed the district court to identify the basis for jurisdiction (NRS 125A.050) and to determine whether Nevada is an appropriate forum (NRS 125A.070), as the child resides in Maryland.

In plain language

After Sandra Salins and Lewis Gulick divorced in Maryland, disputes over their son's custody and support continued in Nevada. Lewis asked a Nevada court (the First Judicial District) to change custody of their son to Sandra and to eliminate his child support obligations under the Maryland decree. Sandra opposed him, pointing out that a Maryland court had already transferred custody to her and that under the Maryland decree Lewis owed support until the son turned 21. She had also started a separate support-collection case (a URESA case) in a different Nevada court (the Ninth Judicial District), where, in her absence, the district attorney agreed that Lewis would only owe support until the son turned 18. Lewis then filed a new motion adopting that 18-years-old support cutoff, and the First Judicial District Court granted it the very next day, without giving Sandra a chance to respond. The court transferred custody to Sandra, adopted the URESA support terms, and ruled Lewis owed no support past age 18. It denied Sandra's request to reconsider, relying on Nevada's age of majority of 18. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, finding three errors. First, deciding the motion in one day, without letting Sandra respond within the time the local rule allowed and with no emergency, was improper. Second, the court wrongly used the URESA support order to modify the divorce decree - Nevada law says a URESA support order does not nullify or replace an earlier support order unless it specifically says so, and this one did not. Third, before applying Nevada's age of 18, the court should have determined whether the Maryland decree's support terms came from a settlement agreement between the parents; if support arises from a settlement agreement built into the decree, the obligation is not automatically cut off at the statutory age of majority. There was also no evidence of changed circumstances justifying a modification. The court sent the case back and told the trial court to also confirm its jurisdiction and whether Nevada was the appropriate forum, since the son now lived in Maryland.