IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W. AND A.M.W. (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review. The court reviews guardianship determinations for abuse of discretion, citing In re Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 348, 535 P.3d 1154, 1161 (2023), and In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36-37 (2007). Procedural due process challenges are reviewed de novo. D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 349, 535 P.3d at 1161. Liberty interest of custodial-relative guardians. The opinion converts dicta from D.M.F. into a holding: a custodial relative who serves as a court-appointed guardian "has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of a child under their protection akin to, but not entirely coextensive with, the rights of a parent." D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 351, 535 P.3d at 1162. The court relied on Simuro v. Shedd, 176 F. Supp. 3d 358, 384 (D. Vt. 2016), and Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024-25 (2d Cir. 1982), as cited in D.M.F. The court grounded the liberty interest in U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(2). The court expressly declined to opine on the scope of any substantive due process rights, holding only that the potential impact on substantive rights triggers procedural protections. Notice framework. Applying Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), as quoted in D.M.F., the court asked whether notice was "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." The court contrasted D.M.F. (notice insufficient where an NSRG 5 order did not signal contemplated removal/termination) with In re Guardianship of Jones, 139 Nev. 139, 147-48, 531 P.3d 1236, 1244-45 (2023) (notice sufficient where prior petitions, court orders citing NRS 159.335, an evidentiary hearing, post-hearing briefing, and renewed requests for sua sponte removal cumulatively apprised the protected person that removal was open for consideration). Application to notice. The July 13, 2024 NSRG 5 order flagged "significant concern" but did not direct investigation of substitute guardians or signal that removal or termination would be considered, paralleling D.M.F. rather than Jones. Sara's reunification petitions did not request removal or termination, and no prior order had referenced that possibility. Sara's July 24 petition for removal and termination was filed one day before the hearing, and the district court issued no citation as required by NRS 159A.1855(1)-(2) (removal) or NRS 159A.1905(4) (termination), and there is no indication that petition was even set for hearing. Notice was therefore constitutionally inadequate. Opportunity to be heard. Citing D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 353, 535 P.3d at 1164, the court reiterated that "[a] full and fair hearing requires that the change in custody be supported by factual evidence and the party threatened with the loss of parental rights must be given the opportunity to rebut the evidence presented against them." The seven-minute July 25 hearing, where the court announced its ruling at the outset and rebuffed counsel's attempt to be heard ("I understand you've stood up, but I've made my orders."), did not satisfy that standard. Inadequate notice independently undermined any opportunity to address the court's concerns meaningfully. D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 354, 535 P.3d at 1165. Sara's argument under Deegan v. Deegan, 22 Nev. 185, 37 P. 60 (1894), raised for the first time at oral argument, was deemed waived under Rives v. Ferris, 138 Nev. 138, 146 n.6, 506 P.3d 1064, 1071 n.6 (2022); the court additionally observed, citing Jones, 139 Nev. at 144 n.3, 531 P.3d at 1242 n.3, that Deegan predates D.M.F. and did not address procedural due process requirements for termination of a minor guardianship. Mootness as to A.L.R.-Q. Because A.L.R.-Q. has reached the age of majority, the matter is moot as to her. NRS 159A.023(1); NRS 159A.191(1)(d); Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). Remedy. Departing from D.M.F.'s reverse-and-remand disposition, the court vacated and remanded with directions to permit briefing and hold an evidentiary hearing in light of Dr. Holland's confidential NSRG 5 reports. The court treated representations in Sara's petition concerning the contents of those reports as accurate for purposes of appeal, invoking the appellant's responsibility for the record under Cuzze v. University & Community College System of Nevada, 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), and noting that NRAP 10(c)(2) provides mechanisms to supplement the record. The court drew an analogy to the retrospective-hearing remedy in Goad v. State, 137 Nev. 167, 185, 488 P.3d 646, 662 (Ct. App. 2021). Custody pending remand. Citing Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 455, 352 P.3d 1139, 1146 (2015), the court left Sara with physical and legal custody pending the district court's decision but preserved the district court's authority to enter temporary or emergency orders. Required findings on remand. The opinion underscores that the order under review lacked the findings required for sua sponte removal or termination based on an NSRG 5 communication. Per D.M.F., 139 Nev. at 355-56, 535 P.3d at 1165-66, the court must find that one of the enumerated conditions for removal exists under NRS 159A.185(1) and conduct a best-interests analysis under NRS 159A.186(2). Under NSRG 10(A), termination requires specific findings on the protected person's current health and welfare, the continued necessity of guardianship and the existence of less-restrictive alternatives, and whether maintaining the guardianship serves the protected person's best interests. Examples of grounds the allegations could support include NRS 159A.185(1)(f) (intentional failure to perform a duty) and NRS 159A.191(1)(c) (guardianship no longer necessary).

In plain language

The Ruckles had been serving as court-appointed guardians of their three granddaughters since January 2022, when a district court found that the children had been living with their mother, Sara Q., in squalid conditions and were thriving in the Ruckles' care. Over the next two years, Sara petitioned the court to begin reunification therapy - therapy designed to repair the relationship between a parent and her children - and the court eventually ordered the Ruckles, Sara, and the children to participate with a therapist named Dr. Stephanie Holland. Disagreements arose over the wording of the therapist's consent paperwork, and the therapy was slow to begin. Dr. Holland sent the court two confidential reports under NSRG 5, a rule that allows a guardianship judge to receive certain communications about a guardian's conduct or a protected person's welfare. After receiving the second report, the court issued a July 13, 2024 order expressing "significant concern" about the Ruckles' compliance with their duties, ordered the children to undergo psychoeducational testing, expanded Sara's visitation, and set an NSRG 5 hearing for July 25 to address the issues raised in Dr. Holland's report. One day before that hearing, Sara filed a petition asking the court to remove the Ruckles and terminate the guardianship. The court did not issue the formal "citations" (legal notices) that Nevada statutes require when such a petition is filed, and there is no indication the petition was set for any hearing. At the July 25 hearing, which lasted only seven minutes, the district court announced - without taking evidence, hearing argument, or directing briefing - that it was removing the Ruckles as guardians and terminating the guardianship. When the Ruckles' lawyer tried to speak, the judge said, "I understand you've stood up, but I've made my orders. I am terminating the guardianship today." The court told counsel he could file a motion for reconsideration. A written order followed in October 2024. The Ruckles appealed, arguing that they had a constitutional right to procedural due process - basic fairness, including notice and a chance to be heard - before a court could strip them of guardianship, and that they did not get either. The Court of Appeals agreed. Building on the Nevada Supreme Court's 2023 decision in In re Guardianship of D.M.F., the Court of Appeals expressly held that a custodial relative who serves as a guardian has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the child, and is therefore entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court may, on its own initiative, remove the guardian and terminate the guardianship. The court found the notice given here was inadequate. The July 13 order flagged concerns but did not signal that removal or termination was being considered. Sara's last-minute petition came too late and was not accompanied by the statutorily required citations. And even if notice had been adequate, there was no meaningful opportunity to be heard because the district court issued its ruling at the start of a brief hearing, without briefing, evidence, or argument. Rather than simply reversing, the Court of Appeals vacated the order and sent the case back. Because Dr. Holland's confidential reports were not in the appellate record - and because Sara's petition described serious allegations including alleged emotional, psychological, and physical abuse and educational neglect - the court directed the district court on remand to permit briefing, hold an evidentiary hearing, and make the specific findings required by Nevada statutes and the NSRG before deciding whether removal or termination is warranted. In the meantime, the children will remain in Sara's physical and legal custody pending the district court's decision, although the trial court retains authority to enter temporary or emergency orders if circumstances require. The Court of Appeals also noted that the matter is moot as to the eldest child, A.L.R.-Q., because she has turned 18.