IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF C.A.C., A.M.C., AND C.A.C. (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The opinion addresses which standard governs a parent's petition to terminate a pre-2017 guardianship: the post-2017 statute, NRS 159A.1915, with its heightened "substantially enhanced" showing for non-consenting parents under subsection (1)(b), or the pre-2017 statute, NRS 159.1905(3) (2003), which required only a clear-and-convincing showing that termination is in the ward's best interests. The court framed the question as one of retroactivity. Quoting Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 813, 821, 313 P.3d 849, 854 (2013), the court reiterated that a statute is retroactive if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past." Drawing on Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 273 (2012), and Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994), the essential inquiry is "whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." Applying that standard, the court held that NRS 159A.1915 attaches a new legal consequence - the heightened "substantially enhanced" showing - to Amanda's 2016 nonconsent. Because the statute implicates a parent's "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children," Harrison v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 564, 569, 376 P.3d 173, 176 (2016), and parallels the Maine Supreme Court's reasoning in Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 976 A.2d 955, 961 (Me. 2009), it is substantive, not procedural or curative. Substantive statutes are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent for retroactivity. Sandpointe, 129 Nev. at 820, 313 P.3d at 853. Here the Legislature provided the opposite: 2017 Stat. Nev., ch. 172, §§ 219, 221, at 910 expressly limits the 2017 amendments to "any proceeding or matter commenced or undertaken on or after July 1, 2017." See also In re Guardianship of: A.S., No. 73876, 2018 WL 5291457 (Nev. Oct. 18, 2018). The court rejected respondents' notice argument premised on prior caselaw. Although NRS 159A.1915 "parallels" the test articulated in Murphy v. Murphy, 84 Nev. 710, 711, 447 P.2d 664, 665 (1968), and although Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 711, 138 P.3d 429, 431 (2006), extended Murphy to parent-nonparent cases, Hudson concerned joint legal and primary physical custody rather than a general guardianship (citing NRS 159.079 (2013) and the functions of guardians). Moreover, Murphy was overruled in part by Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 146-47, 161 P.3d 239, 240 (2007). Because Hudson's animating rationale was parity between parent-parent and parent-nonparent custody tests, and Ellis changed the parent-parent test, the court could not say Hudson clearly extended NRS 159A.1915's later-codified standards to guardianship terminations so as to put Amanda on notice in 2016. See Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564, 572-73, 257 P.3d 396, 401-02 (2011). The court considered the constitutional argument under NRS 159A.1915 sua sponte, citing In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 469, 283 P.3d 842, 847 (2012), and Gordon v. Geiger, 133 Nev. 542, 545 n.3, 402 P.3d 671, 674 n.3 (2017), but did not reach the equal-protection or due-process challenges given the retroactivity disposition. On remand, the district court is to apply NRS 159.1905(3) (2003). The Supreme Court affirmed, applying the substantial-evidence standard from Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009), the district court's findings that Amanda demonstrated a material change in circumstances and a return to suitability. The remaining question is whether termination is in the best interests of all three children. The court also rejected respondents' challenge to the form of the order (drafted by Amanda), citing Div. of Child & Fam. Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 445, 451, 455, 92 P.3d 1239, 1243, 1246 (2004).

In plain language

This case is about a mother trying to end a court-ordered guardianship - an arrangement where other adults (here, Clifford C. and Nancy C.) have legal authority to care for her children - so she could regain custody of her three children. The guardianship was put in place in 2016. Amanda agreed to it for her oldest child but objected out loud to it for the two younger children. She then missed a follow-up court date, and the judge established the guardianship over all three children. In 2021, Amanda asked the court to end the guardianship. By then, Nevada had passed a new law, NRS 159A.1915, that took effect in 2017. That law treats parents differently depending on whether they originally consented to the guardianship. Parents who consented only need to show two things: (1) circumstances have materially changed, and (2) they are once again suitable parents. Parents who did not consent must show those two things plus a third, harder thing - that ending the guardianship would "substantially enhance" the child's welfare. The district court treated Amanda as a non-consenting parent for the two younger children. It found she had met the first two requirements but had not shown the children's welfare would be "substantially enhanced" if returned to her. It denied her petition. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that applying the 2017 statute to a guardianship created in 2016 was an improper retroactive application of the law. When Amanda objected to the guardianship in 2016, the heightened standard for non-consenting parents did not yet exist, so it was not fair to attach that new legal consequence to her past conduct. The Legislature, the court noted, specifically said the new statute applies only to proceedings begun on or after July 1, 2017. The court rejected the argument that earlier Nevada cases (especially Hudson v. Jones from 2006) had already imposed the same standard. Hudson dealt with a different kind of custody situation, and the case it relied on (Murphy v. Murphy) was later overruled by Ellis v. Carucci in 2007. So Amanda was not on notice in 2016 that her objection would trigger the heightened showing later codified in NRS 159A.1915. The court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to evaluate Amanda's petition under the older law - NRS 159.1905(3) (2003) - which asks whether termination is in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court's findings that Amanda had shown a material change in circumstances and was again a suitable parent, leaving only the best-interests analysis for the children to be redone on remand.