IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF E.I.C. (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of a motion to terminate guardianship for abuse of discretion, citing In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 120 Nev. 157, 163, 87 P.3d 521, 525 (2004). It also noted the district court's "wide discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside judgment under NRCP 60(b)," quoting Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018). The court recognized that ineffective service of process may render a judgment void and subject to being set aside under NRCP 60(b)(4), citing Browning v. Dixon, 114 Nev. 213, 218, 954 P.2d 741, 744 (1998), and that the policy of resolving cases on the merits is heightened in domestic relations matters, citing Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100, 105, 787 P.2d 785, 788 (1990), disapproved on other grounds by NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 218 P.3d 853 (2009). The court first disposed of the appeal on an independent-ground/forfeiture basis. The district court had denied the motion in part because Richard failed to effect proper service of the motion itself. Because Richard did not substantively challenge that ground on appeal, the court held he forfeited any related arguments, citing Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011), and Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 547-48, 513 P.3d 1285, 1286 (Ct. App. 2022) (when a district court resolves a case on multiple grounds and the appellant fails to challenge each alternative ground, those challenges are forfeited, "thereby foreclosing [the] appeal as it concerns the district court's... ruling"). The court concluded Richard did not demonstrate an abuse of discretion in denying the motion on this basis, citing Abreu v. Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 312-13, 985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999). Reaching Richard's substantive arguments, the court addressed his contention that the original guardianship order was void for lack of proper service under NRS 159A.034(1) and that he was entitled to NRCP 60(b)(4) relief. The court found the district court's findings supported by the record: the August 2023 order had found notice sufficient for the original proceeding and found the guardians credible on service, and the district court had already considered and rejected Richard's service contentions. The court invoked the law-of-the-case doctrine, citing Litchfield v. Tucson Ridge Homeowners Ass'n, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 57, 555 P.3d 267, 270-71 (2024) (a legal decision made at one stage of a proceeding should generally remain the law of that case throughout the litigation absent an exception). The court further held that because the guardians were appointed in April 2017, Richard bore the "burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence that the termination or modification of the guardianship of the person... is in the best interests of the ward" under NRS 159.1905(3)(a) (2003); 2003 Nev. Stat. ch. 322, § 110, at 1799. Because Richard's motion focused solely on the 2017 procedure and did not allege facts showing termination was in E.I.C.'s best interest, the district court's finding on that point stood. In a footnote, the court explained that NRS 159A.1915(1)(b) — which now requires a non-consenting parent to show a material change in circumstances and that the protected minor's welfare would be substantially enhanced by termination and placement with the parent — does not apply to guardianships created before it became effective on July 1, 2017, citing 2017 Stat. Nev., ch. 172, §§ 219, 221, at 910, and In re Guardianship of: A.S., No. 73876, 2018 WL 5291457, at *2 & n.2 (Nev. Oct. 18, 2018) (Order of Reversal and Remand). Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court concluded Richard did not show the district court abused its discretion and affirmed.

In plain language

This case concerns a guardianship — a legal arrangement in which a court gives someone other than a child's parents the authority to care for that child. In April 2017, a Clark County family court granted Joelle Reed and Carolyn Louise Reed guardianship over two minor children, E.I.C. and E.M.D. The guardians, who had already been caring for the children, said the children's parents could not care for them. Over the following years, Richard Clements — E.I.C.'s father — repeatedly tried to end the guardianship over his daughter, without success. In September 2025, Richard filed what he called an emergency motion to vacate (cancel) the guardianship. His main argument was that the original 2017 order should be treated as void — legally invalid from the start — because he had never been properly served with (formally given legal notice of) the guardianship petition. He relied on a court rule, NRCP 60(b)(4), which allows a court to set aside a judgment that is void. He claimed the district court had previously acknowledged there was no proof of proper service in the record, argued the court had used an improper standard in rejecting his earlier attempts, and asserted that the court's repeated errors showed judicial corruption in his case. He asked the court to declare all the guardianship orders void and end them immediately, or, if the court reached the merits, to terminate the guardianship or hold a hearing. The district court denied his motion for two independent reasons. First, it found that Richard had not properly served his own motion on the appropriate parties. Second, addressing the substance anyway, the court found that the service issue had already been decided against Richard in earlier proceedings — meaning it was, in the court's words, "res judicata" (an issue already finally decided and not open to relitigation) — and that Richard had not offered facts showing that ending the guardianship would be in E.I.C.'s best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals pointed out that Richard did not meaningfully argue against the first reason the district court gave — his failure to serve his own motion. Because that was an independent ground for the denial and he did not challenge it, the appellate court treated any argument about it as given up (forfeited), which by itself was enough to uphold the denial. The court then went on to address Richard's actual arguments. It reviewed the district court's decision for what is called an "abuse of discretion" — a standard under which an appellate court does not substitute its own judgment but asks whether the lower court acted within its lawful range of choices. The court found that the record supported the district court's conclusions. An August 2023 order had already found that notice for the original guardianship was sufficient and that the guardians were credible about the service issue, and the district court had already considered and rejected Richard's service arguments before. The appellate court also noted that because the guardians were appointed in April 2017, Richard bore the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that ending the guardianship was in E.I.C.'s best interest — and his motion focused only on the 2017 procedure, not on the child's best interest. For those reasons, the court concluded Richard had not shown the district court abused its discretion, and it affirmed.