IN RE: MATTER OF A. ST. A.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The petition was brought as an original writ proceeding because a district court placement order in an NRS Chapter 432B case is not appealable; writ review is the appropriate vehicle. See Philip R. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 223, 226, 416 P.3d 242, 246 (2018). Mandamus issues "to compel the performance of an act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Matter of J.B., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 550 P.3d 333, 337 (2024); see also NRS 34.160; Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). The petitioner bears "the burden of demonstrating that [our] extraordinary relief is warranted." Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). The court first addressed Aundrea's reliance on NRS 432B.390(6), which establishes a familial placement preference when a child is "placed in protective custody pending an investigation and a hearing." Because Aundrea filed her motion after the initial protective-custody hearing, NRS 432B.390(6) did not govern. Instead, the operative provision was NRS 432B.550(6), specifically NRS 432B.550(6)(b)(1), which gives preference first to a family member "who is suitable and able to provide proper care and guidance for the child," followed by a licensed foster home. The court reaffirmed that NRS 432B.550(6) "creates a familial preference" but "is not intended to remove the district court's discretion in placement proceedings." Clark Cnty. Dist. Att'y, Juv. Div. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 337, 345-46, 167 P.3d 922, 927-28 (2007). The statute "creates a familial placement preference, not a presumption," and placement decisions "must be guided by careful consideration of the child's best interest." Id. at 348, 167 P.3d at 929. Under that framework, the district court "must first determine whether the relative [ ] seeking custody of a child [is] sufficiently related to the child, then the court must determine suitability." Id. Applying these standards, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously abuse its discretion. The district court found Aundrea sufficiently related, applied the statutory preference, and then assessed her suitability under NRS 432B.550(6)(b)(1). It considered the suitability of her home, the child's best interest, and the legislative goals of providing "a stable, safe and healthy environment for the child considering all of the circumstances surrounding the placement." In re Guardianship of N.S., 122 Nev. 305, 313-14, 130 P.3d 657, 662-63 (2006) (quoting Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.F., 815 A.2d 1029, 1038 (2003)). The court also weighed preservation of the child's relationships with his biological siblings, who reside in Nevada, an interest recognized in Clark Cnty. Dist. Att'y, 123 Nev. at 348, 167 P.3d at 929 ("Preservation of familial relationships is an important consideration in determining what is in the child's best interest for placement purposes"). The court rejected Aundrea's argument that the district court was required to await the updated ICPC report, noting that several continuances had already been granted and that Aundrea cited no authority obligating the district court to await such a report before ruling. Concluding that the district court had conducted the proper analysis under NRS 432B.550 and made sufficient findings on the child's best interest, the Supreme Court denied writ relief.

In plain language

This case is about where a young child, identified only as A. St. A., should live while Nevada's child-welfare system handles his case. The Clark County Department of Family Services took the child away from his parents at birth and placed him with a licensed foster family in Nevada. The child's maternal grandmother, Aundrea G., who lives in California, asked to have him placed with her instead. Because Aundrea lives out of state, the Department had to use a process called the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to evaluate her home. The first ICPC report raised several concerns and only approved her for short-term placement. Based on that report, the district court decided to leave the child with his foster family for the time being. Aundrea then formally moved to have the child placed with her permanently. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and asked the Department to obtain an updated ICPC assessment focused on whether Aundrea was suitable as a long-term adoptive resource. While waiting for that updated report, the district court also held a trial on terminating the parents' rights, but it held off issuing the termination order until the placement question was resolved. After several continuances, the updated report still had not arrived, and the district court ruled that it was in the child's best interest to remain with his foster family. Aundrea asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing a lower court to do what the law requires or to correct an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion. She argued that as a family member she had priority over the foster family under Nevada's child-placement statutes. The Supreme Court denied her petition. The court explained that the specific statute Aundrea relied on, NRS 432B.390(6), applies only to placements during the very early protective-custody stage, before the initial hearing. Because A. St. A.'s case had moved past that stage, a different statute, NRS 432B.550(6), governed. That statute does give a preference to family members, but the preference is not absolute - the district court still has discretion and must focus on the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found that the district court properly considered Aundrea's relationship to the child, the suitability of her home, the child's best interest, and the fact that the foster placement allowed the child to maintain regular visits with his biological siblings, who all lived in Nevada. The court also noted that nothing required the district court to wait indefinitely for an updated ICPC report, especially after multiple continuances had already been granted. Justice Stiglich dissented in a one-line statement and would have granted the petition.