IN RE: MATTER OF J.B. (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Supreme Court entertained the original mandamus petition because placement orders are not appealable, consistent with In re Matter of J.B., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 550 P.3d 333, 337 (2024). On standing, the court applied the "beneficially interested" standard for writ petitioners, citing Heller v. Legislature of Nevada, 120 Nev. 456, 460-61, 93 P.3d 746, 749 (2004), and NRS 34.170. Beneficial interest requires "a direct and substantial interest that falls within the zone of interests to be protected by the legal duty asserted." Heller, 120 Nev. at 461, 93 P.3d at 749 (quoting Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 461 (Ct. App. 2003)). Relying on Destin v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 42, 574 P.3d 935, 940 (2025), and NRS 432B.550, the court concluded DFS's protective-custody duties - which extend to "initial removal of a child from their parents, the protective custody action, and the child's placement while in protective custody" - confer the requisite beneficial interest to challenge the placement order. On the merits, the court construed NRS 125C.050. Subsection (7) permits a grandparent to petition for reasonable visitation where "the parental rights of either or both natural parents of a child are relinquished or terminated, and the child is placed in the custody of a public agency." Subsection (1) permits an award of grandparent visitation if a parent "[h]as relinquished his or her parental rights or his or her parental rights have been terminated." Because the record reflected only that the parents had signed relinquishments that were "currently being held pending the resolution of this hearing," and DFS was still "scheduling" the relinquishments, no parental rights had been relinquished or terminated when the placement order issued. The statutory predicate for a NRS 125C.050 visitation award was therefore absent, and the district court "manifestly abused its discretion" in granting grandparent visitation under that statute. The court noted that any grandparent visitation in this posture would have to be ordered, if at all, under the court's authority in NRS Chapter 432B, citing NRS 432B.560(1)(c) (authorizing "[a] reasonable right of visitation for a grandparent of the child if the child is not permitted to remain in the custody of the parents of the child"). The court expressed no opinion on the other issues raised, having resolved the matter on this threshold defect.

In plain language

J.B. was taken into protective custody two days after his birth and placed by DFS with Becky and Jay Whipple, a "fictive kin" placement (caregivers treated as family even though not biologically related). After paternity was established, the district court at one point ordered J.B. placed with his paternal grandfather. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that placement in 2024. After further proceedings, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and placed J.B. with the Whipples. But as part of that order, the judge also gave the grandfather "significant" visitation rights and said those rights would continue even if the Whipples eventually adopted J.B. DFS asked the Supreme Court to order the visitation portion vacated. The Supreme Court agreed with DFS. Before reaching the merits, the court rejected an argument that DFS lacked "standing" (the legal right to bring the challenge). Because DFS had protective custody of J.B. and Nevada law gives DFS duties over a child's placement while in protective custody, DFS had a sufficient interest to challenge the order. On the merits, the court explained that the statute the district court relied on - NRS 125C.050 - allows grandparents to seek visitation only in specific circumstances, including when a parent's rights have been "relinquished or terminated." Here, although the parents had signed relinquishment paperwork, the relinquishments had not been finalized when the district court entered the order. Because no parental rights had actually been relinquished or terminated yet, the statutory trigger for grandparent visitation under NRS 125C.050 had not been met. The court held the district court therefore could not grant grandparent visitation under that statute and noted that any grandparent visitation in this posture would have to come through the district court's authority under NRS Chapter 432B. The court directed the district court to vacate the visitation portion of the placement order.