IN RE: MATTER OF N.R.R. AND N.I.R.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review and writ framework. The court reviewed matters of statutory construction de novo, citing In re Guardianship of Rubin, 137 Nev. 288, 491 P.3d 1 (2021), and Manuela H. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 132 Nev. 1, 365 P.3d 497 (2016). Mandamus is available under NRS 34.160 to compel a duty or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 179 P.3d 556 (2008), and lies against a discretionary act only where the court "has manifestly abused that discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously," Walker v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 678, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020). Prohibition under NRS 34.320 bars action outside jurisdiction. Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 635, 289 P.3d 201 (2012). Writ relief requires the absence of a speedy and adequate legal remedy, NRS 34.170, NRS 34.330. Adequate remedy. The challenged order was non-final because it did not resolve all issues in the termination case, see NRAP 3A(b)(1) and Rubin, and no statute or rule otherwise authorized appeal, citing In re Temp. Custody of Five Minor Child., 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). The court therefore exercised its discretion to entertain the petition. Statutory authority under NRS Chapter 432B. The district court had relied on NRS 432B.550(1) when denying reconsideration; the children additionally invoked NRS 432B.590(7). The Supreme Court held neither provision authorized the order. NRS 432B.550(1)(a)-(b) permits the court, after reviewing the agency's report, to continue or place a child in a custodial arrangement "with or without retaining jurisdiction of the case, upon such conditions as the court may prescribe." The court read "conditions" as regulating the custodial arrangement itself in the child's best interests, cf. NRS 432B.480; Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 507 P.3d 588 (Ct. App. 2022); 43 C.J.S. Infants § 153 (2014). A directive ordering the agency to pay money is not such a condition. NRS 432B.590(7), which states the section does not "limit the jurisdiction of the court to review any decisions of the agency with legal custody of the child regarding the permanent placement of the child," is not an affirmative grant of authority but a non-limitation clause. NRS 432B.553, referenced by the district court, likewise did not authorize the order; it requires an agency to create a placement plan for judicial review, NRS 432B.553(1)(a), and does not extend to rental assistance. Agency budgetary discretion. The court contrasted the district court's narrow role with the broad discretion the Legislature delegated to child-welfare agencies. The Division of Child and Family Services requests appropriations and provides block grants and incentive payments to large-county agencies, NRS 432B.180(1)-(2); cf. NRS 432B.2165. NRS 432B.2185(2) provides that an agency receiving a block grant "may use the money allocated for any costs of providing child welfare services without restriction." Citing Crane v. Cont'l Tel. Co. of Cal., 105 Nev. 399, 775 P.2d 705 (1989), the court reiterated that courts lack inherent appellate jurisdiction over agency official acts absent statutory provision for review. See also Malecon Tobacco, LLC v. State ex rel. Dep't of Tax'n, 118 Nev. 837, 59 P.3d 474 (2002); Cal. State Emps.' Ass'n v. State, 108 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Ct. App. 1973). Holding and remedy. By ordering DFS to allocate budgeted funds to rental assistance contrary to agency policy, the district court "purported to exercise an authority it did not possess and interfered with DFS's discretion to administer its budget," acting arbitrarily and capriciously. Mandamus issued directing the district court to vacate the order. The court declined to reach DFS's separation-of-powers, due process, and local-rule arguments, citing Spears v. Spears, 95 Nev. 416, 596 P.2d 210 (1979), and denied the prohibition request as moot.

In plain language

This case arose out of a child welfare proceeding in Clark County. DFS removed two children from their parents because of ongoing domestic violence and placed them with their paternal aunt. For two months, before the aunt became a licensed foster parent, DFS helped her pay rent. Once she became licensed, she began receiving regular foster care subsidies instead. The children's attorney later asked DFS for additional rental help for the aunt. DFS said no, explaining that the agency does not pay rental deposits. During a hearing on a motion to terminate the parents' rights, the aunt asked the judge for financial help. After learning DFS had earlier paid two months of rent, the district court ordered DFS to pay another $1,000 toward the aunt's rent. DFS asked the judge to reconsider; the judge refused. DFS then went to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to throw out the order. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case as a writ petition (an extraordinary request asking a higher court to step in) because DFS had no ordinary right to appeal this kind of mid-case order. On the merits, the court held that no Nevada statute gave the district court the power to order DFS to spend money on rent for a foster parent. The Legislature, the court explained, gave child-welfare agencies like DFS broad discretion to decide how to spend the money the state appropriates to them - the statute even says DFS may use block grant money for child welfare services "without restriction." When the district court ordered DFS to pay rent anyway, it stepped outside its role and into the agency's role. The Supreme Court therefore granted the petition and ordered the district court to vacate (cancel) its rental-assistance order. The court did not decide the constitutional separation-of-powers, due process, or local court rule arguments DFS also raised, because the statutory ruling alone resolved the case.