IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.B.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed a termination of parental rights, applying its established standard: questions of law de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable person may accept as adequate" to support a conclusion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). On the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the court reaffirmed that a parent defending a termination petition has no absolute constitutional right to counsel and that due process did not require appointed counsel here because the case was not complex, involved no expert testimony, and the record contained no other evidence that Sheena could not represent herself. See In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 382-84, 115 P.3d 1223, 225-27 (2005); see also NRS 128.100(3) (appointment of counsel for indigent parties is discretionary). The court also noted that Sheena had counsel below. On the failure to explore guardianship, the court relied on NRS 432B.553(1)(b), (2), which requires DFS to make reasonable efforts toward permanent placement and to seek termination when the child has been out of the home for the specified period; DFS was not pursuing guardianship. The court rejected the mental-health-assessment argument because DFS obtained a second, more current assessment that was provided to the court after the initial provider failed to respond. On the merits, the court applied the two-prong termination test under NRS 128.105(1) and In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000): clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one parental fault ground and (2) that termination serves the child's best interest. For parental fault, A.B.'s residence outside Sheena's home for more than 14 consecutive months triggered the token-efforts presumption under NRS 128.109(1)(a), with token efforts being a parental fault ground under NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6). Sheena failed to rebut the presumption; the district court found her testimony not credible, and the Supreme Court deferred under In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 477, 283 P.3d 842, 852 (2012). Evidence of repeated relapses and inadequate means to care for A.B. also supported a finding of unfitness under NRS 128.018 and NRS 128.105(b)(3). The court declined to address remaining parental fault grounds. For best interest, NRS 128.109(2) created a presumption in favor of termination based on the 14-month out-of-home period, which Sheena did not rebut. Independently, substantial evidence under NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.108 supported the best-interest finding because A.B. had bonded with his foster placement and his health and behaviors had improved. The court determined oral argument was unwarranted under NRAP 34(f)(1) and affirmed.

In plain language

This case involves a mother, identified as Sheena B., who lost her parental rights to her child, A.B., after Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) asked a court to permanently end her legal relationship with the child. Sheena had earlier admitted to abuse and neglect of A.B. The trial court agreed with DFS and terminated her rights. She appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking it to undo that decision. The Supreme Court rejected each of her arguments. First, Sheena argued she had ineffective assistance of counsel. The court explained that parents defending against termination petitions do not have an automatic constitutional right to a lawyer, and the appointment of counsel was not constitutionally required here because the case was not complex and did not involve expert testimony. The court also noted she did in fact have a lawyer who advocated for her. Second, Sheena argued the trial court should have considered guardianship instead of termination. The Supreme Court explained that DFS was not pursuing guardianship - it had filed a termination petition - and Nevada law prefers permanent placement and termination once a child has been out of the parent's home for a specified period. Third, Sheena complained that the trial court could not consider her first mental health evaluation because that provider did not respond to DFS's inquiries. The court found no reversible error because DFS obtained a second, more recent mental health assessment that the court did review. Finally, the Supreme Court reviewed whether enough evidence supported the trial court's findings. Under Nevada law, terminating parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one "parental fault" ground, and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The court found that A.B. had lived outside Sheena's home for more than 14 consecutive months, which under Nevada statute creates a presumption that the parent made only "token efforts" to care for the child. Sheena did not rebut that presumption, in part because the trial court found her testimony not credible. The record also showed she repeatedly relapsed into addiction and lacked the means to care for A.B., supporting an "unfitness" finding. As for the child's best interest, A.B. had bonded with his foster placement, and his health and behavior had improved there. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination.