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IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.D.R., J.D.R., JR.

23-12419 · 83845 · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · April 21, 2023

Disposition:Affirmed.Termination of Parental Rights

Posture Jennifer K.W. appealed an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division (Clark County), terminating her parental rights to two minor children, A.D.R. and J.D.R., Jr. She argued on appeal that termination should be reversed because the children lacked counsel for the entirety of the termination proceedings, and she also raised challenges to evidence and witness testimony considered by the district court.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

- A parent lacks standing to seek reversal of a termination order on the ground that the minor children were not represented by counsel for the entirety of the termination proceedings, where the children were parties with counsel at the beginning and end of the proceedings and on appeal and did not raise the issue themselves. - Evidentiary challenges not raised in the district court are waived on appeal under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown. - Arguments unsupported by cogent reasoning or relevant authority need not be considered. - A district court does not err in taking judicial notice of documents from a parent's prior protective custody actions where there is a close relationship between those proceedings and the termination case.

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed an appeal from a district court order terminating parental rights. Although appellant did not directly challenge the merits, the court noted that substantial evidence supported findings of parental fault and best-interest by clear and convincing evidence under NRS 128.105(1), citing In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). On the principal assignment of error - that NRS 128.100(2) requires representation of the children throughout termination proceedings and was not satisfied - the court held that the parent lacked standing to assert the children's representational right. Reviewing standing de novo under Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 263, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015), and applying the rule that "a party generally has standing to assert only its own rights" from Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 723, 731, 291 P.3d 128, 133 (2012), the court emphasized that the children were parties, had counsel at the beginning of the proceedings, at the end of the proceedings, and on appeal, and could have raised the argument themselves but did not. Appellant's evidentiary challenges were deemed waived under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981), because she did not object below. The court further declined to address her contention that the district court had an independent duty to ensure compliance with witness disclosures in a termination proceeding, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurant, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006), for the proposition that arguments not cogently argued or supported by relevant authority need not be considered. The court also rejected the challenge to the district court's judicial notice of documents from appellant's prior protective custody actions, citing NRS 47.150 and Occhiuto v. Occhiuto, 97 Nev. 143, 145, 625 P.2d 568, 569 (1981), for the principle that judicial notice may be appropriate where there is a close relationship between the underlying case and the proceeding noticed. The court determined oral argument was not warranted under NRAP 34(f)(1) and affirmed.

In plain language

A Nevada district court ended Jennifer K.W.'s parental rights to two of her minor children. She appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, asking that the termination be undone. Her main argument was that the children themselves did not have a lawyer representing them during every part of the termination case, even though Nevada law requires children to have counsel in these proceedings. The Supreme Court did not disagree that the law requires the children to have counsel; instead, it ruled that Jennifer was not the right person to raise the complaint. In legal terms, she lacked "standing" - meaning the right to bring a particular claim - because the missing-counsel issue belonged to the children, not to her. The children were parties to the case, had counsel at the beginning of the proceedings, at the end of the proceedings, and on appeal, and could have raised the issue themselves. They did not. Jennifer also tried to challenge some of the evidence and witness testimony the district court relied on, but the Supreme Court noted she had not objected at trial. Under longstanding Nevada law, arguments not raised below are generally waived. The court also found her arguments on those points were not supported with cogent reasoning or legal authority. Finally, the court held that the district court was permitted to take judicial notice of documents from Jennifer's prior protective custody cases. Although Jennifer did not directly attack the merits of the termination, the Supreme Court added in a footnote that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of parental fault and that termination was in the children's best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the termination of Jennifer's parental rights.

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