IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.J.B.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: Questions of law are reviewed de novo; the district court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence — evidence "a reasonable person may accept as adequate" to support a conclusion. In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014); Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The Court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the district court's. Matter of T.M.R., 137 Nev. 262, 267, 487 P.3d 783, 789 (2021). Framework: Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one statutory ground of parental fault and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. NRS 128.105(1); In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). Unfitness — NRS 128.105(1)(b)(3); NRS 128.018: The Court relied on continuing methamphetamine use, a domestic-violence arrest less than a month before trial, the district court's adverse credibility finding regarding Eddie's denials and minimization, and DFS's inability to reunify after nearly three years. See In re N.J., 125 Nev. 835, 845, 221 P.3d 1255, 1262 (2009); In re J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 477, 283 P.3d 842, 852 (2012); NRS 128.106(1)(h). Failure of parental adjustment — NRS 128.105(1)(b)(4); NRS 128.0126: Eddie did not substantially complete his case plan within three years; under NRS 128.109(1)(b), failure to complete a case plan within six months may evidence failure to adjust. He failed outpatient treatment after Westcare, missed drug tests, tested positive during proceedings, did not engage in domestic violence treatment, and had two pending domestic battery charges at the time of trial. Token efforts — NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)(III): Because A.J.B. resided outside Eddie's care for more than 14 of 20 consecutive months, the district court properly applied the NRS 128.109(1)(a) presumption of token efforts, which Eddie failed to rebut. See In re Parental Rts. as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 432-33, 92 P.3d 1230, 1236-37 (2004). Best interest — NRS 128.105(1): The NRS 128.109(2) presumption that termination is in the child's best interest applied based on time out of the home. Eddie did not rebut it; he failed to engage with services and had not addressed substance use, domestic violence, housing, or employment. The court considered NRS 128.107 factors, including under NRS 128.107(4) the unlikelihood that additional services would lead to reunification within a predictable period. The record also showed A.J.B.'s bond with a prospective adoptive family willing to preserve the child's relationship with the foster family. Ineffective assistance of counsel: A right to effective assistance in termination proceedings exists only where there is a constitutional right to counsel, determined case-by-case under due process. In re Parental Rts. as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 382-86, 115 P.3d 223, 225-27 (2005). Because the case was not complex, did not involve expert testimony, and nothing showed Eddie could not represent himself, due process did not require appointed counsel and no right to effective assistance attached. Collateral arguments: Challenges to the mother's termination were irrelevant; she was not a party and her appeal had been resolved. See Matter of A.J.B., No. 84130, 2022 WL 17829806 (Nev. Dec. 15, 2022) (Order of Affirmance). Judicial-bias claims were waived because Eddie did not move to disqualify the judge within NRS 1.235's time limits, see Brown v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 105 Nev. 409, 412, 777 P.2d 361, 363 (1989), and the record reflected no bias. The Court also denied Eddie's October 4, 2024 motion for new trial.

In plain language

This case is about whether a Nevada district court properly ended a father's legal relationship with his child. In October 2019, Clark County's child-welfare agency removed A.J.B. from Eddie B.'s custody after a social worker reported he was acting erratically and threateningly. The agency gave Eddie a "case plan" — a list of things he needed to do to get his child back — including addressing violent behavior and drug use, finding stable housing and a job, and showing he could meet his child's basic needs. After nearly three years, the agency asked the court to permanently terminate Eddie's parental rights. The trial judge agreed, and Eddie appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing himself. The Supreme Court affirmed. To terminate parental rights in Nevada, a court must find by "clear and convincing evidence" both (1) at least one ground showing the parent is at fault, and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found enough evidence in the record to support all three of the trial court's fault findings: that Eddie was an "unfit parent" (he kept using methamphetamine and was arrested on domestic violence charges less than a month before trial); that he failed to make the changes needed to get his child back (he didn't complete outpatient drug treatment, missed drug tests, and didn't engage in domestic violence treatment); and that he made only "token efforts" — a legal presumption that applies when a child has lived outside the parent's home for more than 14 of 20 consecutive months. The Court also agreed that termination was in A.J.B.'s best interest. A statutory presumption favoring termination kicks in once a child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 months, and Eddie did not overcome it. The child is bonded to a prospective adoptive family that would also let the child maintain a relationship with the current foster family. The Court rejected Eddie's other arguments. His ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument failed because, in termination cases, the right to effective counsel exists only where there is a constitutional right to counsel — and here, the Court concluded due process did not require appointed counsel because the case was not complex and did not require expert testimony. His complaints about the termination of the child's mother's rights were irrelevant because she was not a party to this appeal and her case had already been resolved. His judicial-bias argument was waived because he never moved to disqualify the judge below.