In Re Parental Rights as to Cca

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Supreme Court of Nevada (Douglas, J., joined by Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ.) addressed "the need for the district court to make express findings of fact in its written order or on the record, when determining whether to grant or deny a petition to terminate a parent's parental rights." The court began with the settled framework: termination proceedings implicate a parent's fundamental rights in the care and custody of his or her child, citing NRS 128.005(1) and (2), Matter of Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 426-27, 92 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2004), and Matter of Parental Rights as to C.J.M., 118 Nev. 724, 732, 58 P.3d 188, 194 (2002). The Legislature's statutory scheme in NRS Chapter 128 is designed to assure parental rights are not erroneously terminated, including the declaration in NRS 128.005(1) "that the preservation and strengthening of family life is a part of the public policy of this State" and the recognition in NRS 128.005(2)(a) that severance of the parent-child relationship is a matter of such importance as to require judicial determination. A petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence both that termination is in the child's best interest and that parental fault exists. NRS 128.090(2); NRS 128.105; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). On appeal, the court will uphold a termination order supported by substantial evidence. Matter of Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 763 (2006). From this framework the court derived the rule at issue: the heightened standard of proof "underscores the importance of the district court's fair and independent fact-finding," and thus the district court in termination proceedings must provide a decision, whether in writing or orally on the record, that includes all the necessary factual findings for the benefit of the parties and proper appellate review, "because without specific findings, this court cannot determine whether the district court's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence." The court grounded this obligation in NRS 128.105(1) and (2) (requiring a finding of best interest and parental fault) and NRCP 52(a) (in bench trials "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law"), and cited Holt v. Regional Trustee Services Corp., 127 Nev. ___, ___, 266 P.3d 602, 608 (2011) (oral pronouncements consistent with a judgment may be used to construe it), along with out-of-state authority: In re Edward B., 558 S.E.2d 620, 632-33 (W. Va. 2001), and Matter of T. R. M., 303 N.W.2d 581, 583-84 (Wis. 1981). Applying the rule, the court noted that the district court made no oral findings because it deferred ruling until receiving written closing arguments, and the written order - drafted by the State and closely tracking DCFS's petition - referenced no specific facts or evidence from the two-day bench trial. The best-interest finding was a single conclusory sentence, and the six parental-fault grounds merely tracked the statutory provisions (see NRS 128.012; NRS 128.0126; NRS 128.014; NRS 128.018; NRS 128.105(2)(e); NRS 128.105(2)(f)). Such recitations "do not constitute sufficient findings because they do not explain, based on the record evidence, why the district court found that the statutory grounds for termination existed." The court cited Perez v. Dept. of Children & Family Serv., 894 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), and Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 86 S.W.3d 353, 356-57 (Tex. App. 2002), on what constitutes a factual finding. Because the district court failed to identify, in writing or on the record, the factual bases supporting its order, the Supreme Court could not conduct substantial-evidence review. It reversed and remanded for the district court to enter its findings, citing Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 673, 691 P.2d 451, 455 (1984). The court expressly made no comment on the merits and elected not to consider the parties' remaining arguments.

In plain language

This case is about what a trial judge must put in writing (or say in open court) when permanently ending a parent's legal relationship with a child. A father's child was removed from his care and placed in the legal custody of the State of Nevada's child-welfare agency, DCFS. DCFS then asked the district court to terminate the father's parental rights - a step that permanently severs the legal parent-child relationship. To win, DCFS had to prove two things by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard of proof, more demanding than the usual civil standard): first, that ending the father's rights was in the child's best interest, and second, that some form of "parental fault" existed - such as abandonment, neglect, or unfitness. The district court held a two-day trial, asked the parties to submit closing arguments in writing, and then issued a written order - drafted by the State - terminating the father's rights. The problem, according to the Nevada Supreme Court, was that the order contained no actual factual findings. On the child's best interest, it said only that "[t]he best interests of [the child] will be served by terminating any parental rights of [appellant]." On parental fault, it listed six grounds that simply repeated the language of the termination statutes, "without explanation as to any corresponding evidence." Because the trial court had also deferred its ruling until after written closing arguments, it never made any oral findings on the record either. The Supreme Court explained that without specific findings, an appellate court cannot tell whether "substantial evidence" - the level of proof needed to sustain the ruling on appeal - actually supports the decision. Merely reciting the statutory grounds does not qualify as findings, because such statements "do not explain, based on the record evidence, why the district court found that the statutory grounds for termination existed." The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back to the district court to enter its findings. Importantly, the court did not decide whether the father's rights should or should not be terminated; as it stated, "We make no comment on the merits of the underlying proceeding."