IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.J.M., F.M.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed a termination order under the familiar two-prong framework of NRS 128.105(1) and In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000): clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one ground of parental fault and (2) that termination serves the child's best interest. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). Reasonable-efforts argument. The court held that the district court properly waived the NRS 432B.393(1) reunification-efforts requirement under NRS 432B.393(3)(d), which excuses reasonable efforts when a child was previously removed, adjudicated abused or neglected, returned, and "subsequently removed from the home as the result of additional abuse or neglect." The court alternatively observed that the Department in fact made numerous efforts consistent with NRS 432B.393(1)(b) and (2), focused on the children's health, safety, and safe return. Right-to-counsel argument. Citing In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 388, 115 P.3d 223, 225 (2005), the court reiterated that there is no right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings, noting also that NRS 128.100(3) permits, but does not require, court appointment of counsel, and that the district court appointed three successive attorneys and Maryann was represented at trial. Parental fault. Although the court noted Maryann did not clearly challenge fault findings, and that only one ground is required under NRS 128.105(1)(b), it addressed three: - Unfitness under NRS 128.018, supported by repeated domestic violence and substance abuse that prevented adequate care. - Token efforts under NRS 128.109(1)(a), triggered by the children's residing outside the parent's care for more than 14 of 20 consecutive months. The court held the presumption was not rebutted, citing lack of financial support, inconsistent contact, and minimal engagement in services. See In re Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 432-32, 92 P.3d 1230, 1237 (2004). - Failure of parental adjustment under NRS 128.0126, citing In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1428-29, 148 P.3d 759, 766 (2006), based on Maryann's refusal to accept responsibility, only brief engagement with the case plan, and absence of proof of economic or residential stability. The court rejected, as belied by the record, any contention that the district court relied on falsified evidence, deferring to the trial court's credibility determinations. See In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 795, 8 P.3d at 129; In re Parental Rights as to C.J.M., 118 Nev. 724, 732, 58 P.3d 188, 194 (2002). Best interest. The 14-of-20-months presumption under NRS 128.109(2) applied. The court applied In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 217-18, 371 P.3d 995, 1001 (2016), and found Maryann had not shown a "reasonable prospect" of meeting the children's basic needs within a reasonable time. NRS 128.108(3)-(4) factors weighed in favor of termination given the children's integration into A.M.'s home, their bond with her, and her commitment to adopt. See NRS 128.108. The court also rejected the suggestion that the children's failure to testify undermined the best-interest finding, observing that children are not required to testify and were represented by counsel below.

In plain language

This case involves a mother, identified as Maryann B.N., whose parental rights to two of her children were ended by a Nevada family court. The Nevada Supreme Court was asked to review that decision and decided to leave it in place. The children first came to the attention of the Nevada Department of Family Services in 2016, when a younger sibling was born testing positive for methamphetamine. The Department presented evidence that the mother had been neglecting the children by routinely leaving them with other people to meet their basic needs. The children were placed with a person described as "fictive kin" - someone treated like family even though not biologically related - referred to in the opinion as A.M. After 18 months, a court ordered the children returned to their mother, but the children continued to live mostly with A.M. In February 2020, the children were removed from the mother's care a second time after she reportedly hit one of them in the face and, days later, failed to pick them up from school. The Department again placed the children with A.M. and gave the mother a "case plan" - a list of steps, like addressing mental health, domestic violence, and substance abuse problems - to complete so the children could be safely returned. About a year and a half later, the Department asked the court to terminate her parental rights, and the court agreed. On appeal, the mother argued, among other things, that the Department had not made a real effort to reunite her with her children and that she had not always had a lawyer. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments. It explained that Nevada law allows the reunification-effort requirement to be waived when children are removed, returned, and then removed again because of further abuse or neglect - which is what happened here. It also noted that Nevada law does not give parents an automatic right to a free attorney in termination cases, although the trial court in fact appointed three attorneys for her over the course of the proceedings, and she had a lawyer at trial. The Supreme Court then walked through the legal requirements for terminating parental rights in Nevada: the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, both (1) some fault on the parent's part, and (2) that ending parental rights is in the children's best interest. The court found enough evidence in the record to support both. The mother had ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse problems, made only minimal efforts to engage with services, did not financially support the children while they lived elsewhere, and did not show she could provide stable housing or income. Because the children had lived outside her home for more than 14 of the previous 20 months, Nevada law presumes both that she made only "token efforts" as a parent and that termination is in the children's best interest, and she did not overcome those presumptions. Meanwhile, the children were doing well in A.M.'s home, were bonded to her, and A.M. was prepared to adopt them. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the order ending the mother's parental rights.