IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.J.H.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court applied the two-prong termination framework of NRS 128.105(1): clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one ground of parental fault and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). Questions of law are reviewed de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). Applying that standard, the court held that substantial evidence did not support the district court's best-interest finding. Respondent offered "no specific evidence . . . regarding termination being in the child's best interest," relying instead on her assertion that she could support and care for the child alone. The district court's written finding likewise recited the conclusion without supporting analysis. Because best interest is a mandatory prong under NRS 128.105(1), the deficiency required reversal without reaching the parental-fault prong or appellant's evidentiary challenge. The court also addressed preservation. Although appellant did not oppose the termination petition below, the court held that he was not precluded from arguing on appeal that respondent failed to meet her clear-and-convincing burden, given that "order[s] terminating parental rights [are] subject to close scrutiny." In re A.L., 130 Nev. at 918, 337 P.3d at 761. Oral argument was deemed unwarranted under NRAP 34(f)(3).

In plain language

This case concerns a father whose parental rights to his child were terminated by a Nevada district court. He appealed that decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. Under Nevada law, before a court can permanently end a parent's legal relationship with a child, two things must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" - a heightened standard of proof. First, the court must find at least one "ground of parental fault" (some specific failing by the parent recognized in the statute). Second, the court must find that ending the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court concluded that the second requirement was not met here. According to the opinion, no specific evidence was offered at trial about why termination would serve the child's best interest. The mother's case essentially rested on her contention that she could support and care for the child on her own. The district court's written order likewise stated only that termination was in the child's best interest, without offering supporting reasoning. Because the "best interest" finding lacked evidentiary support, the Supreme Court reversed the termination order and sent the case back to the district court. The court noted that even though the father had not opposed the termination petition in the district court - which normally limits the arguments a party can make on appeal - he was still allowed to argue on appeal that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof, because termination orders receive "close scrutiny" on review. Because the best-interest finding alone was enough to require reversal, the court did not reach the father's other arguments about parental fault or about the admission of evidence at trial.