IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.I.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court reviewed the termination order under the substantial-evidence standard. See In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 795, 8 P.3d 126, 129 (2000). Although the appellant did not challenge the parental-fault or best-interest findings, the court noted in a footnote that substantial evidence — including witness testimony and judicial notice of the appellant's incarcerations — supported them. On the right-to-counsel/ineffective-assistance claim, the court applied the framework from In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223 (2005), which holds that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require appointment of counsel in all termination proceedings. Instead, courts balance the private interests, the State's interest, and the risk of erroneous decision. The court found a low risk of error here: no expert testimony was offered (a relevant N.D.O. factor); appellant was present and able to testify; and the supporting evidence consisted of court-mandated DFS reports (admissible under N.D.O., 121 Nev. at 384-85, 115 P.3d at 226) and judicially noticed criminal convictions (relevant under the framework of In re Parental Rights of J.L.N., 118 Nev. 621, 628, 55 P.3d 955, 960 (2002)). Because appellant had no constitutional right to counsel, his ineffective-assistance claim necessarily fails. N.D.O., 121 Nev. at 386, 115 P.3d at 227. On procedural due process, the court applied the three-factor test from In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 212-13, 371 P.3d 995, 998 (2016): (1) private interest, (2) risk of error in the state's procedure, and (3) countervailing governmental interest. Citing Chaparro v. State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 68, 497 P.3d 1187, 1195 (2021), the court reiterated that "[u]nusual, historic circumstances can require unusual, temporary accommodations" in evaluating COVID-era procedures. The court found the procedural safeguards adequate under the M.F. factors: judicial familiarity with rules and the correct standard of proof; notice; opportunity to testify; representation with private attorney-client communication; and right to appeal. 132 Nev. at 214, 371 P.3d at 999. The court also invoked the prejudice requirement of State v. Autry, 103 Nev. 552, 556, 746 P.2d 637, 640 (1987), noting appellant identified no additional evidence he would have offered with more preparation time. On the denial of continuance, the court applied abuse-of-discretion review under Zessman v. State, 94 Nev. 28, 31, 573 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1978). Given prior continuances, appellant's initial nonparticipation, and the absence of a continuance motion before the May 17, 2021, trial date, the court found no abuse of discretion. The appeal was decided on the pro se brief and record without response or oral argument under NRAP 46A(c) and NRAP 34(f)(3).

In plain language

This is an appeal by a father whose parental rights to his child, L.I., were ended by a Nevada family court. The child had earlier been found to be neglected under Nevada's child-welfare law (NRS Chapter 432B). After a trial, the judge found the father at fault as a parent — specifically, that he had failed to adjust his circumstances and had made only "token efforts" to address the problems — and concluded the child's best interest was to stay with a family hoping to adopt her. The father, representing himself on appeal, did not challenge the substance of those findings. Instead, he argued that the process was unfair: he said COVID-era jail lockdowns and only a thirty-minute meeting with his lawyer the day before trial left him too little time to prepare. He also argued the trial should have been postponed. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed. On the lawyer issue, the court explained that parents in termination cases do not automatically have a constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Whether they do depends on a balancing test weighing the parent's interests, the State's interests, and the risk that the case will reach a wrong outcome without a lawyer. The court found no special complexity here — there was no expert testimony, the father attended trial and testified, and the key evidence (state child-welfare reports and records of his criminal convictions and incarcerations) was the kind of evidence that would have come in regardless. Because the father had no constitutional right to counsel in this proceeding, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could not succeed. On the broader due-process complaint about pandemic-era limits on attorney access, the court applied a similar three-factor balancing test. It noted that during COVID-19 "[u]nusual, historic circumstances can require unusual, temporary accommodations." The court found the trial judge knew the rules and applied the correct standard of proof, the father had notice, was able to testify, was represented by counsel (with whom he could confer privately even when in custody), and retained his right to appeal. The father did not identify any additional evidence he would have presented with more preparation time. The court also pointed out that the father had stretches of time outside custody when he could have worked with counsel or complied with his case plan but did not. Finally, the court held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not continuing the trial, especially given prior continuances and the fact that the father had not moved to continue the May 17, 2021, trial date (though he had moved to continue an earlier February 2021 setting).