IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO P. B.-B. (FAMILY)
25-41331 · 91185 · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · September 22, 2025
Disposition:Appeal dismissed.Other Family LawPosture Theresa S. appealed from a First Judicial District Court (Carson City) stipulation and order in which she consented to the adoption of the minor child P.B.-B. and which dismissed without prejudice a petition to terminate her parental rights. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the notice of appeal sua sponte for jurisdictional defects.
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
The court dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits. Two independent defects supported dismissal. First, the notice of appeal was untimely under NRAP 4(a)(1) and NRAP 26(c). Written notice of entry of the challenged order was served by mail on June 2, 2025, and the notice of appeal was not filed until August 15, 2025 - beyond the 30-day appeal period. Citing Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987), the court reiterated that an untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. Second, the court observed that appellant did not appear to be aggrieved by the challenged order. Under NRAP 3A(a), only an aggrieved party may appeal. Citing Vinci v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 115 Nev. 243, 984 P.2d 750 (1999), the court noted that a party who voluntarily stipulates to the entry of an order is not aggrieved and may not later attack the order as adversely affecting that party's rights. Because the underlying order was a stipulation and order in which appellant consented to the child's adoption, she was not in a position to appeal it.
In plain language
This case involves a mother, identified as Theresa S., and a child welfare proceeding concerning her young child. In the district court, Theresa S. signed a stipulation - an agreement filed with the court - in which she consented to the child's adoption. As part of that agreement, the State's separate petition to terminate her parental rights was dismissed without prejudice (meaning it could potentially be refiled later, though it was not pursued at that time). After the district court entered the stipulation and order, Theresa S. tried to appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of her appeal. Instead, it dismissed the appeal for two independent reasons related to its own jurisdiction (its legal authority to hear the case). First, the appeal was filed too late. Under Nevada's appellate rules, a party generally has 30 days from the date written notice of entry of the order is served to file a notice of appeal. Notice was mailed on June 2, 2025, but Theresa S. did not file her notice of appeal until August 15, 2025 - well past the deadline. A late notice of appeal does not give the Supreme Court power to hear the case. Second, the court noted that Theresa S. did not appear to be an "aggrieved party." Nevada law allows only an aggrieved party to appeal, and a party who voluntarily agrees to an order ordinarily cannot later challenge it on appeal. Because Theresa S. had stipulated to the order she was now trying to attack, she likely lacked standing to appeal. For both reasons, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without addressing any underlying issues about the adoption or termination proceedings.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.