IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.A.S.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court began with a doctrinal framing distinguishing privately initiated termination petitions from those initiated by the state under NRS Chapter 128. While both fall within NRS Chapter 128 without statutory distinction (citing NRS 432B.5901), the Court identified three areas of difference: (1) state petitions presuppose a child in need of protection (citing In re Parental Rts. as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 92 P.3d 1230 (2004); In re Parental Rts. as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 148 P.3d 759 (2006); In re Parental Rts. as to A.P.M., 131 Nev. 665, 356 P.3d 499 (2015)); (2) state-initiated cases provide case plans and reunification services (citing In re Parental Rts. as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223 (2005); NRS 432B.393(1)), while private petitions do not; and (3) the salient best-interest factors differ in the private context, where the child is typically already safe and cared for. The Court instructed district courts to "use caution and common sense" when reviewing private petitions. Standard of review: Termination requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) the child's best interest and (2) parental fault. In re A.J.G., 122 Nev. at 1423, 148 P.3d at 762; NRS 128.105(1). The Court will affirm if substantial evidence supports the district court's clear-and-convincing determination. In re D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 428, 92 P.3d at 1234. Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable person may accept as adequate to" support a conclusion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Only one ground of parental fault need be supported. NRS 128.105(1)(b). Abandonment. NRS 128.012(1) defines abandonment as conduct showing "a settled purpose ... to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child"; intent is decisive and may be shown by facts and circumstances. Matter of Parental Rts. as to Montgomery, 112 Nev. 719, 727, 917 P.2d 949, 955 (1996). NRS 128.012(2) creates a presumption of abandonment when a parent leaves a child in another's care without support and without communication for six months. The presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance. In re Parental Rts. as to L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2024); NRS 47.180(1). The Court held that Shianna rebutted the presumption: she visited Logan's home, attempted phone and Facebook contact, and sought information through his stepmother, while Logan moved, changed his number, and blocked her. The Court reaffirmed that a parent's failure to seek judicial intervention to modify custody cannot support an abandonment finding. In re L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d at 1181. Nonsupport is not synonymous with abandonment. Sernaker v. Ehrlich, 86 Nev. 277, 280, 468 P.2d 5, 7 (1970). Incarceration alone cannot establish parental fault. In re Parental Rts. as to J.L.N., 118 Nev. 621, 628, 55 P.3d 955, 959-60 (2002). Contesting termination "may indicate that the parent does not have a settled purpose to forego all parental custody." Greeson v. Barnes, 111 Nev. 1198, 1204, 900 P.2d 943, 947 (1995). Neglect. "[A] finding of neglect must be based upon the treatment of the child while the parent has custody: neglect is not established when the child is left by the parent in an environment where the child is known to be receiving proper care." Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290, 294, 607 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1980). Because R.A.S. was in Logan's care and known to be receiving proper care, neglect was unsupported. The Court declined to consider Shianna's 2019 conduct as too remote. Unfitness. NRS 128.018 defines unfitness as a parent who, "by reason of the parent's fault or habit or conduct toward the child or other persons, fails to provide such child with proper care, guidance and support." The Court announced that, although prior precedent had not squarely addressed temporal scope, "district courts may consider both [past and present], but ... a parent's prior unfitness may only be considered to the extent that it demonstrates a current, severe, and persistent inability to care for the child," citing In re D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 430, 92 P.3d at 1235. Because unfitness is "the other side of the neglect coin," Champagne v. Welfare Div., 100 Nev. 640, 648, 691 P.2d 849, 855 (1984), the unfitness finding failed for the same reasons as the neglect finding. Token efforts. NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6) authorizes a parental fault finding based on token efforts to "support or communicate with the child," "prevent neglect of the child," "avoid being an unfit parent," or "eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury to the child." The Court criticized the district court's failure to identify which provision it relied upon and held that, given Logan's affirmative steps cutting off contact, the token-efforts finding lacked substantial evidentiary support. Because no parental fault ground was supported by substantial evidence, the Court did not reach the best-interest analysis or the evidentiary challenges and reversed the termination order.

In plain language

This case involves a father asking a Nevada court to permanently end the mother's legal relationship with their young son. The father, Logan, and the mother, Shianna, dated from 2017 to 2019 and had a son, R.A.S., in 2018. After they broke up, Shianna - who was struggling with substance abuse - left R.A.S. in Logan's care so she could enter a 30-day rehabilitation program. When she finished the program in early 2020, she tried to find her son. According to her testimony, Logan had moved to a new home, changed his phone number, and blocked her on the social media account he shared with his now-wife. Logan's stepmother told her she did not have updated contact information. Shianna later relapsed, was placed on probation, absconded, and spent several months in jail in 2022. By the time she was released, she had not seen her son since December 2019. After her release, Shianna moved in with her sister, worked as a nanny, had another child whom she has cared for full time, and later started work as a dental assistant. In June 2023, Logan filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated her rights on four grounds and Shianna appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Court used the opinion to draw an important distinction between two kinds of termination cases. Most termination cases are filed by the state because a child is in danger; in those cases, parents are typically offered services and case plans, and termination is treated as a last resort. Nevada's statutes, however, also allow private individuals - like another parent - to file termination petitions, and the statutes do not distinguish between the two kinds of cases. The Court emphasized that private termination cases involve different motivations and circumstances and instructed district courts to handle them "carefully and with a watchful eye for these distinctions." Applied to Shianna's case, the Court found that none of the four parental fault grounds was supported by substantial evidence. On abandonment, the Court acknowledged that Shianna had not seen her son since 2019, which created a legal presumption of abandonment, but found Shianna had rebutted that presumption: she tried to find Logan and R.A.S. in multiple ways, but Logan had moved, changed his phone, and blocked her online. The Court said it was "difficult to discern what more Shianna could have done." On neglect, the Court explained that neglect is judged by how the parent treats a child while the child is in the parent's care; because R.A.S. was in Logan's care and was being properly cared for, Shianna could not be deemed to have neglected him. On unfitness, the Court held that this concept is closely tied to neglect; for the same reason, the unfitness finding could not stand. On token efforts, the Court found that Shianna's inability to locate Logan and R.A.S. - because Logan had cut off contact - undermined the conclusion that she had made only minimal effort. Because at least one ground of parental fault must be proven, and none was, the Court reversed the termination order without reaching the best-interest analysis or the evidentiary issues.