IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.A.T. (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: questions of law are reviewed de novo; the district court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). The petitioner bears the burden of proving at least one ground of parental fault and that termination serves the child's best interest, both by clear and convincing evidence. NRS 128.105(1); In re Parental Rts. as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 762 (2006). Abandonment. NRS 128.012(1) defines abandonment as "conduct . . . which evinces a settled purpose on the part of [a] parent[] to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child." Intent is the decisive factor. In re Parental Rts. as to Montgomery, 112 Nev. 719, 727, 917 P.2d 949, 955 (1996). NRS 128.012(2) creates a rebuttable presumption when a parent leaves the child without support or communication for six months. The presumption applied but was rebutted by substantial evidence: Bryan reasonably believed the extended TPO precluded contact pending treatment he could not afford; he repeatedly sought free legal assistance, see In re Parental Rts. as to L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2024); he sought mediation through the child support action; he paid arrears; and once financially able he retained counsel and completed the required psychological evaluation and counseling. See Greeson v. Barnes, 111 Nev. 1198, 1204, 900 P.2d 943, 947 (1995). Neglect. NRS 128.014(1)-(2) defines a "[n]eglected child." Neglect "must be based upon the treatment of the child while the parent has custody," Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290, 294, 607 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1980), and "must be serious and persistent and be sufficiently harmful to the child so as to mandate a forfeiture of parental rights," Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nev., State Dep't of Hum. Res., 100 Nev. 640, 648, 691 P.2d 849, 855 (1984). NRS 128.106(1) lists pertinent considerations. The record showed S.A.T. was properly cared for in Molly's custody and Bryan paid child support; there was no evidence of neglect. Token efforts. NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6) lists token efforts as a parental-fault ground in four sub-categories. Drawing on In re Parental Rts. as to R.A.S., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 20, 567 P.3d 337 (2025), which distinguished state-filed from private termination petitions, the Court held that termination in a private action based solely on the token-efforts ground under NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)(I) (token efforts to support or communicate with the child) is disfavored. The Court's reasoning: (1) the other token-effort sub-categories (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6)(II)-(IV)) mirror independent fault grounds aimed at preventing harm or risk, while subsection (I) parallels only abandonment - and "settled purpose" and "only token efforts" are contradictory; (2) the ground is "rife for abuse" in private actions where a custodial parent controls access; and (3) Champagne, 100 Nev. at 646-47, 651-52, 691 P.2d at 854, 857, requires "some specific fault or condition directly related to the parent[]" and counsels caution before severing the parent-child relationship. See also In re Parental Rts. as to T.M.R., 137 Nev. 262, 265, 487 P.3d 783, 787 (2021); In re Parental Rts. as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 426-27, 92 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2004); Drury v. Lang, 105 Nev. 430, 432-33, 776 P.2d 843, 844-45 (1989); Pyborn v. Quathamer, 96 Nev. 145, 147, 605 P.2d 1147, 1148 (1980). Applying that framework, the Court held substantial evidence supported the district court's determination that Bryan's lack of communication, considered in context - including Molly's move without updating her address, the extended TPO, and her affirmative steps to limit access - did not establish parental fault sufficient to terminate. The Court also rejected reliance on the NRS 128.109(1)(a) statutory presumption of token efforts, noting NRS 128.109 applies only when a child is placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. See In re L.R.S., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 62, 555 P.3d at 1180. Pleading rule. Although termination proceedings are civil and governed by the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, NRS 128.090(2), the Court held that NRCP 8(b)(6) does not deem unaddressed allegations admitted here. NRS 128.060(1) and NRS 128.090 do not require a responsive pleading from the defending party; under NRCP 8(b)(6), where no responsive pleading is required, allegations are "considered denied or avoided." Combined with the clear-and-convincing standard of NRS 128.090(2) and the policy favoring decisions on the merits in domestic relations cases, Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100, 105, 787 P.2d 785, 788 (1990); Bauwens v. Evans, 109 Nev. 537, 539, 853 P.2d 121, 122 (1993), a parental-fault ground cannot be deemed admitted by failure to deny. Cf. Est. of LoMastro v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 124 Nev. 1060, 1068, 195 P.3d 339, 345 (2008). Mootness. Molly's challenge to the district court's finding that Bryan complied with the TPO's mental health requirements was moot because the extended TPO expired by its own terms on July 18, 2017. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010).

In plain language

Molly L. and Bryan T. divorced in 2014 and shared two children, with Molly having primary physical custody. In 2016, Bryan suffered a serious mental health crisis. After an incident in which Bryan drove off with the children and ended up at a hospital in distress, Molly obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) - a court order keeping Bryan away. The extended TPO required Bryan to stay away until July 18, 2017, or until he completed a psychological evaluation and counseling. Bryan was hospitalized for months, then went to live with his mother in Kansas, and later returned to Nevada believing he was barred from contacting Molly or the children. For several years afterward, Bryan had no contact with S.A.T. According to the opinion, Bryan could not afford the required psychological treatment or an attorney, repeatedly attended free "Ask-a-Lawyer" sessions, tried unsuccessfully to get mediation through the child support case, and reconnected with Molly's adult son Zachary. Meanwhile, Molly took steps that made contact harder: she moved without updating her address in the child support action, cut off ties with Bryan's family, and restricted the children's activities out of fear Bryan might find them. In 2021, Bryan received an inheritance, hired a lawyer, paid off his child support arrears, and completed the psychological evaluation and counseling the TPO had required. Soon after he provided proof of treatment, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. (One child, K.W.T., emancipated and later died by suicide during the proceedings, so the case proceeded only as to S.A.T.) After an evidentiary hearing - including testimony from the doctor who evaluated Bryan that his mental health issues were under control - the district court denied Molly's petition. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court emphasized that a private termination case (one parent trying to terminate the other parent's rights) is different from a state-filed termination case. When the state files, the focus is the child's safety. When one parent files against the other, the child is usually already safe, so courts must look carefully at the petitioning parent's motivations. On abandonment, the Court held Bryan rebutted the presumption: he believed the TPO barred contact until he completed treatment, he could not afford that treatment or a lawyer until 2021, and he repeatedly tried to get help and eventually paid arrears and completed treatment. On neglect, the Court held there was no evidence S.A.T. was inadequately cared for - she was in Molly's care and Bryan paid child support. On "token efforts" - the idea that a parent who barely communicates with a child has shown parental fault - the Court announced a new rule: in private termination actions, courts should disfavor terminating parental rights when the only ground proved is that the parent made only token efforts to communicate with or support the child. The Court reasoned this category is uniquely vulnerable to abuse by a custodial parent who controls access to the child, and that "settled purpose" (the standard for abandonment) is the opposite of "only token efforts." The Court also rejected Molly's argument that Bryan admitted the token-efforts allegation by failing to deny it in his response. Because a responsive pleading is not required in termination cases, an undenied allegation is treated as denied, not admitted, and the underlying facts must still be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the Court declined to address whether Bryan complied with the TPO's mental-health conditions, finding that issue moot because the TPO had long since expired by its own terms.