IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.F.F. (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: questions of law are reviewed de novo; the district court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). Termination requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one ground of parental fault and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. NRS 128.105(1); In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000). Hearsay/weight challenge: The court declined to reweigh evidence, citing Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000), and held that record evidence outside the challenged prior-removal file sufficed to support the parental fault findings. Self-incrimination/case plan challenge: Citing In re Parental Rts. as to A.D.L., 133 Nev. 561, 562, 402 P.3d 1280, 1282 (2017), the court reaffirmed that a parent cannot be compelled to admit a crime as part of a case plan, but found Amanda's case plan was directed to her own substance abuse, not to compelled admission of criminal conduct. The district court's references to Amanda's failure to explain T.F.F.'s amphetamine ingestion went only to her shifting accounts. Statutory presumptions under NRS 128.109: Because T.F.F. had been out of Amanda's care for fifteen consecutive months, the presumption of token efforts under NRS 128.109(1)(a) (triggered at 14 consecutive months) applied. The presumption of failure to adjust circumstances under NRS 128.109(1)(b) applied because Amanda had not complied with the case plan within six months; see NRS 128.0126 (defining failure to adjust). Although the district court may have erred in stating no rebuttal evidence was offered, it properly concluded Amanda did not rebut the presumptions by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Parental Rts. as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 471, 283 P.3d 842, 848 (2012). Neglect and unfitness: NRS 128.014(1) (neglected child); NRS 128.018 (unfit parent); NRS 128.106(1)(d) (excessive use of controlled substances rendering a parent consistently unable to care for the child). Substantial evidence supported findings of neglect, parental unfitness, failure to adjust, and token efforts under NRS 128.105(1)(b)(2), (3), (4), and (6). The court noted in a footnote that only one ground of parental fault is required, NRS 128.105(1)(b), so it did not address the remaining fault findings. Best interest: The presumption under NRS 128.109(2) - that termination is in the child's best interest after 14 consecutive months out of the parent's care - applied. Although the district court may have erred in finding no rebuttal evidence in light of testimony of a parent-child bond, it properly concluded Amanda did not rebut the presumption by a preponderance. The district court considered the factors required by NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.108 and found T.F.F. lacked the capacity to express his desires regarding termination. Record evidence showed an adoptive placement with a maternal uncle, T.F.F.'s autism diagnosis and developmental progress in that placement, and Amanda's lack of engagement with T.F.F.'s treatment or education planning. Holding: Substantial evidence supported the parental fault and best-interest findings; the district court's order terminating parental rights was affirmed.

In plain language

This case is about a mother, identified as Amanda L.F., whose parental rights to her child T.F.F. were ended by a Nevada district court. Amanda appealed that decision, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed - meaning it agreed with the trial court and left the termination in place. In Nevada, before a court can permanently end a parent's legal rights to a child, it must find by "clear and convincing evidence" two things: (1) that there is at least one ground of "parental fault" - a legal reason the parent has failed in their parenting role - and (2) that ending those rights is in the child's best interest. The trial court found both here, and Amanda argued on appeal that those findings were not properly supported. Amanda raised several arguments. First, she said the trial court relied too heavily on hearsay (out-of-court statements) in a file from an earlier removal of T.F.F. from her care. The Supreme Court declined to reweigh the evidence and concluded that, even setting aside the challenged file, there was enough other evidence to support the parental fault findings. Second, Amanda argued the trial court improperly required her to explain how T.F.F. ingested amphetamines - which, she said, would have forced her to admit to a crime. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that her court-ordered case plan focused on her own substance abuse, not on admitting criminal conduct, and that the trial court only mentioned her shifting explanations about how the child ingested drugs, not a requirement that she confess. Third, Amanda challenged the trial court's use of certain legal presumptions. Under Nevada law, when a child has been out of a parent's care for at least 14 consecutive months, the court presumes the parent has made only "token efforts" to care for the child. Amanda conceded T.F.F. had been out of her care for 15 consecutive months at the time of trial. A second presumption - that she had failed to fix the circumstances that led to removal - applied because she did not comply with her case plan within six months. The Supreme Court held the trial court properly applied both presumptions and that Amanda did not rebut them by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also pointed to substantial evidence supporting findings of neglect and parental unfitness: this was T.F.F.'s third removal from Amanda's care based on concerns related to her substance use; T.F.F. was hospitalized after ingesting amphetamines; Amanda continued to deny she had a substance abuse problem despite positive or missed drug tests; and she had not completed anger management classes required by her case plan. On the best-interest question, the court noted that T.F.F. is placed with a maternal uncle who wishes to adopt him. T.F.F. is bonded with the uncle's family, has a sibling-like bond with a cousin, was diagnosed with autism while in the uncle's care, and has progressed from being non-verbal to sometimes forming sentences. Amanda, by contrast, had not engaged with T.F.F.'s diagnosis or treatment. Although Amanda argued the trial court ignored T.F.F.'s wishes, the trial court found T.F.F. lacked the capacity to express them. Because Nevada law requires only one ground of parental fault to support termination, the Supreme Court did not need to review every fault finding. It concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision and affirmed.