IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.L. (TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

By the Court, Stiglich, J. (Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concurring). The court considered a parent's standing to challenge a post-termination placement decision where the parent stipulated to termination of her parental rights but reserved the right to participate in a contested placement hearing. The court held the parent lacked standing and dismissed the appeal. Standing framework: Appellate standing is jurisdictional; only a party aggrieved by an appealable judgment or order may appeal. NRAP 3A(a); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994); Estate of Hughes v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 96 Nev. 178, 180, 605 P.2d 1149, 1150 (1980). To be aggrieved, a personal or property right must be adversely and substantially affected. Webb v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 617, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009). Termination and waiver: Tonya's asserted interest - the parental right to participate in the companionship, care, custody, and management of her child (In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. 209, 371 P.3d 995, 998 (2016); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972)) - was extinguished. She stipulated to termination, expressly waived her right to challenge it, and stated in her briefs that she was not contesting the termination order; arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived. Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011). Termination severs the parent-child relationship. In re Parental Rights as to N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 384, 115 P.3d 223, 226 (2005). Stipulation as contract: A stipulation in a family law case is treated as a contract; parties may bargain for or waive specific rights. Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. 679, 685, 289 P.3d 230, 234-35 (2012). Tonya received exactly what she bargained for - participation in the placement hearing in exchange for stipulated termination and waiver - and did not craft a conditional stipulation tying termination to a favorable placement. Having relinquished her parental rights, she retained no interest that could render her aggrieved by the placement order. The court found persuasive out-of-state authority holding that a parent who does not challenge termination lacks standing to challenge placement. In re K.C., 255 P.3d 953, 956 (Cal. 2011); Cesar V. v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 251-52 (Ct. App. 2001); In re J.S., 272 P.3d 169, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 2012); In re D.B., 483 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); In re Adoption/Guardianship of L.B., 145 A.3d 655, 674 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); Ryder v. State, 917 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. App. 1996). Effect of prior writ denial: The court's prior order denying Tonya's writ petition (Tonya M. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, Docket No. 70931 (Sept. 16, 2016)) did not confer standing. That order correctly held that the right to appeal a final order terminating parental rights (NRAP 3A(b)(1)) is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy precluding writ relief (Rawson v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 268, 396 P.3d 842, 847-48 (2017)); appealability and standing are distinct requirements under NRAP 3A(a). The court expressed concern that the record did not reveal whether Tonya was informed of the standing consequence of her stipulation and encouraged counsel to ensure parents understand the rights they forgo. In a footnote, the court noted the placement order lacked the written findings required by Clark County District Attorney v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 123 Nev. 337, 348, 167 P.3d 922, 929 (2007), but could not reach that issue given the lack of standing.

In plain language

This case decided whether a parent who agrees to give up her parental rights can still appeal the court's decision about where her child is placed. Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) sought to terminate Tonya M.'s parental rights to her child, who had already been removed from her care and was living with a foster family. WCDSS found a family that wanted to adopt the child, but Tonya wanted the child placed with a relative instead. Tonya and WCDSS reached a deal (a stipulation): Tonya would be allowed to participate in a contested hearing about the child's placement, and after that hearing she would give up her parental rights. Critically, she also agreed to waive her right to challenge the termination of her parental rights. Tonya participated in the placement hearing and argued for placing the child with her relative, but the district court instead placed the child with the adoptive family. Tonya then did not voluntarily relinquish her rights, so the court entered an order terminating them. She appealed - but only to challenge the placement decision, not the termination itself. The Supreme Court dismissed her appeal. It held that only a party who is 'aggrieved' has standing to appeal, meaning the ruling must adversely affect a personal or property right. Once Tonya's parental rights were terminated - and because she agreed to that termination, waived any challenge to it, and did not contest it on appeal - she no longer had any legally protected interest in where the child is placed. A parent's interest in the child's placement flows from her overarching parental rights; when those rights end, so does her standing to challenge placement. The Court cited similar decisions from California, Utah, Iowa, Maryland, and Texas. The Court also rejected Tonya's argument that its earlier order denying her writ petition (which had said she could raise the issue on appeal) guaranteed she could appeal now. That order only recognized that an appeal existed as a remedy; it did not decide whether she would have standing. Finally, the Court expressed concern that the record did not show Tonya was warned that giving up her rights would also end her ability to challenge placement, and it encouraged parties and counsel negotiating such stipulations to make sure parents fully understand the rights they are giving up. The Court also observed in a footnote that the district court's placement order had failed to include the written findings required by prior caselaw, though it could not rule on that because Tonya lacked standing.