IN RE: PETITION BY COOPER (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed four issues. **Subject matter jurisdiction (UCCJEA).** The court reviewed the district court's subject matter jurisdiction determination de novo, citing Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009), while deferring to factual findings that are "not clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial evidence," id. at 668, 221 P.3d at 704, with substantial evidence defined as "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment," Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). The court explained that the UCCJEA, codified as NRS Chapter 125A, exclusively governs subject matter jurisdiction over child custody, citing NRS 125A.305(2) and Friedman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. 842, 847, 264 P.3d 1161, 1165 (2011), and that the UCCJEA "elevates the 'home state' to principal importance in child custody determinations," quoting Kragen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 49, 555 P.3d 1218, 1223 (Ct. App. 2024). Home state is defined in NRS 125A.085(1). Under NRS 125A.305(1)(a), Nevada has initial-determination jurisdiction if it is the child's home state at commencement; under NRS 125A.325, Nevada may modify another state's determination where it has jurisdiction under NRS 125A.305 and "determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state." Residency is a question of fact, citing Vaile v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 262, 271, 44 P.3d 506, 512 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 497 P.3d 618 (2021). Applying this, the court relied on Farlough's UCCJEA declaration, his affidavit asserting a June 3, 2023 move to Nevada, Cooper's complaint, and both parties' oral representations to find substantial evidence supporting the home-state and non-residence findings. The court declined to second-guess factual resolutions of conflicting evidence, citing Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 366, 212 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009), and noted Farlough's failure to present cogent argument, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). **Stipulation to joint legal custody.** The court applied contract principles to the stipulated custody order. It noted that parties in family law matters may contract regarding child custody and such agreements are generally enforceable absent unconscionability, illegality, or public-policy violation, citing Mizrachi v. Mizrachi, 132 Nev. 666, 671, 385 P.3d 982, 985 (Ct. App. 2016), and that contract principles apply, id. at 677, 385 P.3d at 989. A stipulation is enforceable "when the parties have agreed to the material terms, even though the contract's exact language is not finalized until later," quoting May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005); contract interpretation is reviewed de novo, but whether a contract exists is a question of fact reviewed for clear error and substantial evidence, id. at 672-73, 119 P.3d at 1257. The court cited EDCR 5.601(b), (d) (stipulations made on the record are binding immediately and enforceable once written, signed, and filed) and EDCR 5.601(e) (a court-adopted custody stipulation is construed as including best-interest findings). It also noted, citing Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 421, 216 P.3d 213, 221 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), that parents need not have equal decision-making power in joint legal custody and one parent may have authority over particular areas such as education or healthcare. On the record - Cooper's agreement and Farlough's acknowledgment of "a full agreement" - the court found substantial evidence supporting the stipulation finding and no abuse of discretion. **Procedural due process.** Reviewing constitutional challenges de novo, citing Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007), the court reiterated that "[p]rocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard," id., and that due process is satisfied where parties have "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," quoting Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020). The court found Farlough was served with hearing notices through the court's electronic filing system, citing NRCP 5(b)(2)(E), and that Cooper's motion bore a certificate of service by U.S. mail, with service complete on submission or mailing under NRCP 5(b)(2)(C), (E). It cited Matter of Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 351, 535 P.3d 1154, 1163 (2023), for the standard that notice is sufficient when "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." The court also noted Farlough appeared at the March 2024 and August 2024 hearings where the stipulations were entered, and that any further notice argument lacked cogent argument under Edwards. **Judicial bias.** The court held relief was unwarranted because Farlough did not show the judge's decisions were based on knowledge acquired outside the proceedings or reflected "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible," quoting Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022). It cited In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), for the principle that rulings made during official judicial proceedings generally do not establish grounds for disqualification, and Rivero, 125 Nev. at 439, 216 P.3d at 233, for the rule that the party asserting bias bears the burden.

In plain language

Two parents, Dexter Farlough and Alana Cooper, share two children. In 2016, an Arizona court had given Farlough sole decision-making authority over the children and had identified Arizona as the children's "home state" at that time. By the time this case began, however, the situation had changed: Cooper filed a custody complaint in Nevada in January 2024, stating that she and the children lived in Nevada and asking for joint legal and physical custody. Farlough, in his own filings, also stated that he now lived in Nevada and that he and the children had moved to Nevada on June 3, 2023 - more than six months before Cooper filed her complaint. During several hearings, both parents told the court they all lived in Nevada. The court observed that no one seemed to want Arizona to keep handling the case since everyone had moved away. The parents reached agreements on most issues, including sharing joint physical custody, financial matters, and a holiday and vacation schedule. The one sticking point was legal custody - the authority to make major decisions about the children. The judge proposed that the parents share joint legal custody, but that Farlough would have the final say on medical and educational matters (one child has serious medical and educational needs, and Farlough felt he knew more about them). Cooper agreed, and Farlough said the parents had "a full agreement." The court then put all of this into a written custody decree. Farlough appealed. He raised four arguments. First, he said Arizona, not Nevada, should have decided the case. The Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing out that under the relevant rules, Nevada has authority when it is the children's "home state" (where they have lived for at least six consecutive months) and when no one still lives in the other state - and Farlough's own filings established both facts. Second, Farlough argued the court was wrong to treat the joint legal custody arrangement as something the parties had agreed to. The court rejected this, noting that the record showed Cooper agreed to the proposal and Farlough himself said they had "a full agreement." Third, Farlough claimed he was not properly notified of hearings or of Cooper's motion. The court found that he had been served through the court's electronic filing system and that Cooper's motion showed it had been mailed to him - and that he actually appeared at the key hearings where the agreements were made. Fourth, Farlough argued the judge was biased against him because of his gender. The court found no support for this, explaining that a judge's rulings made during the case generally cannot prove bias unless they show a deep-seated hostility that would make fair judgment impossible. Because none of Farlough's arguments succeeded, the Court of Appeals affirmed the custody decree.