IN RE: PETITION OF KATHERINE ANNE P.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review. The Court reviews NRCP 60(b) rulings for abuse of discretion, citing Cook v. Cook, 112 Nev. 179, 181-82, 912 P.2d 264, 265 (1996), and Skender v. Brunsonbuilt Constr. & Dev. Co., 122 Nev. 1430, 1435, 148 P.3d 710, 714 (2006). A district court abuses its discretion under NRCP 60(b) if it disregards legal principles. Vargas v. JMorales Inc., 138 Nev. 384, 387, 510 P.3d 777, 780 (2022). Doctrinal framework. NRCP 60(b)(3) authorizes relief from a final judgment for "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." Relying on Pickett v. Comanche Constr., Inc., 108 Nev. 422, 427, 836 P.2d 42, 45 (1992), the Court reaffirmed that NRCP 60(b) relief is available to (1) parties, (2) those in privity with parties, or (3) nonparties whose rights or interests are directly affected by the judgment. Because NRCP 60(b) is modeled on FRCP 60(b), the Court treated federal authorities as persuasive, citing Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 539 P.3d 250, 257 (2023), and Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. 394, 398, 282 P.3d 712, 714 (2012). The Court canvassed Kem Mfg. Corp. v. Wilder, 817 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1987); Grace v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co., 443 F.3d 180, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2006); In re La Sierra Fin. Servs., 290 B.R. 718, 729, 731 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); and Herring v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 82 F.3d 282, 284-85 (9th Cir. 1995), characterizing the nonparty exception as, in the Second Circuit's words, "an exceedingly narrow exception." Application — adoption context. Adoption proceedings are statutory in origin. The Court surveyed authority from other jurisdictions concluding grandparents lack standing in adoption proceedings absent a statutory hook, including In re Marriage of Herreras, 768 P.2d 673, 674 (Ariz. 1989), and In re S.R., 352 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Neb. 1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Artharena D., 571 N.W.2d 608 (Neb. 1997). The Court noted Bopp v. Lino, 110 Nev. 1246, 1250-51, 885 P.2d 559, 562 (1994), recognizing that biological grandparents historically have had no legally enforceable rights with respect to grandchildren after adoption. Statutory analysis. NRS 127.210(3) permits courts to require notice to interested persons who may object to an adoption, but no provision designates grandparents as interested parties entitled to notice. NRS 127.123 by contrast requires notice to a child's legal custodian or guardian. The Court found no Nevada statute conferring an interest or right on grandparents in a grandchild's adoption, citing for comparison In re Adoption of J.J.G., 736 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Miss. 1999), and R.K. v. A.J.B., 666 A.2d 215, 217-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995). Constitutional analysis. The Court held grandparents generally do not have a constitutional interest conferring standing to intervene in adoption proceedings absent a countervailing consideration such as a pre-existing visitation order, citing L.F.M. v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 507 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 593 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 1991); and Faust v. Messinger, 497 A.2d 1351, 1353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Application to Angela and Randall. They were not G.P.'s legal guardians; their pending guardianship petition created only a "prospective interest," distinguishable from the "present and extant rights and liabilities" recognized in Pickett and analogous federal cases. The Court held no statutory or constitutional basis for standing existed and that the prospective interest did not implicate procedural due process. Granting NRCP 60(b) relief to a nonparty without standing was therefore an abuse of discretion. Rule announced. A nonparty's interest is "directly affected" for NRCP 60(b) standing only where the nonparty has "a discrete legal right or interest concretely affected by the judgment"; a prospective interest such as a pending guardianship petition does not suffice; and grandparents do not have standing to move to set aside an adoption involving a grandchild solely on the basis of the familial relationship.

In plain language

This case involves a dispute over the adoption of a child, G.P., among the child's relatives. Before G.P. was born, the birth mother asked the child's step-great-grandmother and great-grandfather, Katherine and Michael, to take temporary guardianship. They agreed and obtained temporary guardianship from a Washoe County court. The child's grandparents, Angela and Randall, then filed their own competing petition for guardianship in the same court. While the guardianship dispute was pending, the birth parents signed written consents to terminate their parental rights and to allow Katherine and Michael to adopt G.P. Katherine and Michael then filed an adoption petition in Clark County, where they live. The Clark County court, unaware that a guardianship case was pending in Washoe County, granted the adoption. When the grandparents Angela and Randall learned of the adoption, they asked the Clark County court to set it aside under a procedural rule (NRCP 60(b)) that lets courts undo judgments in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. They argued the great-grandparents had hidden the existence of the Washoe County guardianship case. The Clark County judge agreed and set aside the adoption. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The central question was whether the grandparents had "standing" — that is, the legal right — to ask the court to undo the adoption at all, given that they were not parties to the adoption case. The Supreme Court explained that only parties to a case, people in close legal privity with parties, or nonparties whose own legal rights are directly affected by the judgment can file an NRCP 60(b) motion to undo it. The Court concluded that being a grandparent, by itself, does not give someone a legal interest in a grandchild's adoption sufficient to challenge it. Nevada's adoption statutes do not list grandparents among those entitled to notice or to object, and grandparents generally do not have a constitutional right to intervene in an adoption absent something extra, like a pre-existing court-ordered visitation right. The Court also held that simply having filed a guardianship petition that had not yet been decided created only a "prospective" interest — a possible future interest — which is not enough to confer standing to attack an adoption decree. Because Angela and Randall were not parties to the adoption, were not in privity with a party, and had no legal interest that was directly affected by the adoption decree, the Supreme Court held the district court should not have entertained their motion. The adoption stands.