IN RE: WESTFALL

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court applied the two-prong termination framework of NRS 128.105(1) and In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000), requiring clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one ground of parental fault and (2) that termination is in the child's best interest. Questions of law are reviewed de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014). The denial of the motion to set aside was reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Kathrine Anne P., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 37, 549 P.3d 478, 481 (2024). On the due process / set-aside issue, the court held that service of trial notice satisfied procedural due process under Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007). Because the appellant's address was uncertain, the statutory alternative-service mechanisms applied: personal service on the nearest known relative under NRS 128.060(2)(a) and service by publication under NRS 128.070. The court also relied on the record evidence that the trial judge orally informed appellant of the trial date four times at a November 28, 2023 status hearing and provided the date in writing, holding that an earlier erroneous date in a November 22, 2023 permanency and placement review report did not negate the later, correct notice. On the removal challenge, the court invoked NRS 432B.390(1)(b), which authorizes protective custody when "immediate action is necessary to protect the child from injury, abuse or neglect." The record - illicit substance use, unsafe living conditions including broken glass and staples on the floor, and erratic and aggressive behavior at removal - supported the protective action. On parental fault, the court linked the statutory definitions to record evidence. A neglected child is defined under NRS 128.014(1); an unfit parent under NRS 128.018; and parental unfitness may be established by excessive controlled-substance use that "renders the parent consistently unable to care for the child" under NRS 128.106(1)(d). Failure to comply with a case plan within six months constitutes evidence of failure of parental adjustment under NRS 128.109(1)(b), and noncompliance also supported the token-efforts ground under NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6). The appellant's substance abuse, refusal of drug tests, non-completion of treatment, and failure to substantially complete the case plan supplied substantial evidence on each cited ground. On best interest, governed by NRS 128.105(1), the court relied on the children's placement with the maternal grandmother since removal, their attachment to and thriving in her care, and her commitment to adopt.

In plain language

This case is about a mother, identified as Mary W., whose parental rights to her two children were ended by a Nevada family court. After that ruling, Mary asked the court to undo it; the court refused. She then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, representing herself. The Supreme Court affirmed, meaning the termination stands. Mary raised three main complaints. First, she said she was not properly told when the trial would happen, which she argued violated her right to due process (a constitutional guarantee of fair notice and a chance to be heard). The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that because Mary's address was uncertain, notice was delivered to her adult son and was also published, both methods Nevada law allows when a party's address is unknown. The court also noted that the trial judge told Mary the trial date out loud four times at a November 28, 2023 status hearing, and gave her the date in writing. An earlier report had listed a wrong date, but the court said that mistake did not erase the correct notice she later received. Second, Mary argued that her children were improperly taken from her in the first place, suggesting the removal was tied to her asking for a new caseworker. The court found the record told a different story: Mary had admitted using illicit drugs, the children were living in unsafe conditions (including broken glass and staples on the floor), and Mary was behaving erratically and aggressively when the children were taken into protective custody. Third, Mary challenged the legal conclusions that justified ending her parental rights. Under Nevada law, a court must find both (a) "parental fault" and (b) that termination is in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court found enough evidence on both points: Mary struggled with substance abuse, refused drug tests, did not complete a treatment program, and did not substantially complete the case plan DFS gave her. The children, meanwhile, had been living with their maternal grandmother, were attached to her, were thriving, and the grandmother wanted to adopt them. Because every one of Mary's arguments failed on the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.