F-Law
← Case library

JACKSON VS. JACKSON (CHILD SUPPORT)

111 Nev. 1551, 907 P.2d 990 (1995) · 27153 · Nevada Supreme Court · December 19, 1995

Disposition:Order vacated and remanded for either written findings of fact justifying a deviation from the statutory formula or a redetermination of the amount of child support.Child Support

Posture Appeal by William R. Jackson from a district court order modifying child support from $450 to $1,000 per month on the custodial parent's motion. Randy challenged the district court's jurisdiction, the absence of findings justifying a deviation above the statutory cap, and the potential consideration of the custodial parent's cohabitant's income.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

- A motion to modify child support is properly construed as a request for review under NRS 125B.145(1)(b), which imposes no time-bar, regardless of an inaccurate citation to NRCP 60(b); the district court has jurisdiction to hear it. - Under NRS 125B.070(1)(b), the $500-per-child cap applies even where the statutory percentage of income is higher, and a court may deviate above the cap only upon specific findings of fact under NRS 125B.080(6), including the amount that would have been established under the formula. - As a matter of first impression, a nonmarital cohabitant's contributions to a parent's rent and household expenses may be considered under NRS 125B.080(9) 'relative income,' because such contributions can significantly increase the parent's available income, even though community-property principles do not apply to unmarried cohabitants.

Practitioner summary

Per Curiam. The court vacated and remanded a child support modification, resolving a jurisdictional challenge, a findings requirement, and a question of first impression regarding a cohabitant's contributions. Jurisdiction. Although the custodial parent styled her motion under NRCP 60(b) and filed it more than six months after the decree, the court held it was properly construed as a request to review and modify support under NRS 125B.145(1)(b), which imposes no time-bar on a parent's request for review utilizing the NRS 125B.070 formula (see Scott v. Scott, 107 Nev. 837, 840, 822 P.2d 654, 656 (1991)). The district court thus had jurisdiction notwithstanding the inaccurate rule citation. Statutory cap and findings. Under NRS 125B.070(1)(b), the obligation for one child is 18 percent of gross monthly income 'but not more than $500 per month per child,' making $500 the cap even where 18 percent is higher. A court may exceed the cap only upon specific findings of fact under NRS 125B.080(6) - setting forth the basis for the deviation and the amount that would have been established under the formula - grounded in the NRS 125B.080(9) factors (Lewis v. Hicks, 108 Nev. 1107, 1111-12, 843 P.2d 828, 831 (1992); Barbagallo v. Barbagallo, 105 Nev. 546, 552, 779 P.2d 532, 537 (1989)). Because the district court awarded $1,000 without the requisite findings, the award could not stand. Cohabitant's contributions (first impression). Distinguishing Rodgers v. Rodgers, 110 Nev. 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994) (community-property interest in a new spouse's income considered under 'relative income' only on deviation), the court held that where the parent and cohabitant are unmarried, community-property principles do not apply, but, following Harris v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 661 (1992), a nonmarital cohabitant's contributions to rent and other household payments may be considered under NRS 125B.080(9) insofar as they affect the parent's expenses and thereby the parent's relative income. Vacated and remanded for written findings justifying any deviation or a redetermination of support.

In plain language

William ('Randy') and Kristine Jackson divorced in 1994; Kristine had physical custody of their infant daughter, and the parties agreed Randy would pay $450 per month in child support. Later, learning of Nevada's formula (18 percent of income for one child), Kristine moved to modify the support, pointing out that Randy earned about $6,000 per month. The district court increased support from $450 to $1,000 per month. Randy appealed on three points. First, he said the court lacked jurisdiction because Kristine's motion, filed under a rule (NRCP 60(b)) meant for relief from judgments, came more than six months after the decree. The Supreme Court rejected this: regardless of Kristine's mistaken citation, her motion was properly a request to review and modify child support under NRS 125B.145(1)(b), which allows a parent to request review at any time, with no time bar. Second, Randy argued the $1,000 award exceeded the $500-per-child statutory cap without the required findings. The Court agreed. The statutory cap for one child is $500 even if 18 percent of income is higher, and a court may deviate only if it makes specific written findings of fact under NRS 125B.080(6) - including stating what the formula amount would have been. The district court failed to make those findings, so the award had to be vacated. Third, and as a question of first impression, Randy argued the income of Kristine's live-in boyfriend should count in weighing the parties' 'relative income.' The Court agreed that it could be considered - not because they were married (they were not, so community-property rules did not apply), but because a nonmarital cohabitant's contributions to a parent's rent and household expenses can effectively increase that parent's available income, which is relevant under NRS 125B.080(9). The Court vacated the order and remanded for the district court either to make proper findings justifying a deviation or to redetermine the amount.

Read the full opinion →

This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.