JACOBS VS. JACOBS (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Zenoff, J. On the husband's appeal from a divorce decree that, in lieu of periodic alimony, ordered him to convey his interest in the parties' jointly held home to the wife 'for her future support, maintenance and security,' the court affirmed. The court distinguished Thorne v. Thorne, 74 Nev. 211, 326 P.2d 729 (1958) (support neither raised nor adjudicated) and Zahringer v. Zahringer, 76 Nev. 21, 348 P.2d 161 (1960) (support not ordered). It held that NRS 125.150, subsection 3, provides statutory authority for the trial court to set aside a portion of the husband's separate property for the wife, provided an actual need for support is shown and the setting aside is not used as a vehicle to do equity between the parties (the rule applicable to community property). Tracing the long history of protective provisions permitting a court to set apart such portions of the husband's property for the support of the wife and children as is just and equitable, the court construed subsection 3 as authorizing application of the husband's separate property to the wife's required needs when sought and when actual need is shown by the evidence. Gwynelle's need was genuine given her advancing age and declining health, and the court declined to disturb the trial court's disposition of the homestead, finding no abuse of discretion. A footnote noted that, although NRS 125.150(4) provides that alimony ceases on the payee's death or remarriage unless otherwise ordered, the decree's effect was to make the award of the husband's interest permanent, consistent with the trial judge's evident intent.

In plain language

Ray and Gwynelle Jacobs married in 1956. They had no children together but raised two of Ray's children from a prior marriage. Over the years Gwynelle became the family's main breadwinner, paying off Ray's debts and eventually working full time, while Ray worked only sporadically. The financial strain and marital discord damaged her health, requiring an operation and treatment for a nervous condition. When they divorced in 1966, the couple's home was held in joint tenancy, and the main dispute was what to do with it. The trial court did not order monthly alimony, but instead ordered Ray to sign over all of his interest in the home to Gwynelle, stating it was set aside for her 'future support, maintenance and security.' Ray appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that a subsection of Nevada's alimony statute (NRS 125.150(3)) lets a trial court set aside a portion of the husband's separate property for the wife, but only when support is sought and the wife shows an actual need - unlike community property, this cannot be used just to even things out between the spouses. The court found Gwynelle's need was genuine given her advancing age and declining health, so setting aside Ray's interest in the home for her support was within the trial court's discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court affirmed.