JEFFERY VS. BECKWITH (CHILD CUSTODY)
25-32417 · 89155-COA · Nevada (SCOTN/COA) · July 24, 2025
Disposition:Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. (The court states it "affirm[s] the district court's physical custody determination, but we reverse the court's custody decree as it pertains to child support and health insurance, vacate the decree with respect to arrears, and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this order.")Custody & RelocationChild SupportPosture Michael Jeffery appealed from a custody decree entered by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County (Judge Michele Mercer). The decree awarded the parties joint legal custody and awarded respondent Merlaina Beckwith primary physical custody, and it imposed child support, constructive child support arrears, and a health insurance obligation on Jeffery. On appeal, Jeffery challenged the primary physical custody award, the exclusion of two of his witnesses and the admission of one of Beckwith's witnesses, the child support and arrears awards, the health insurance requirement, and alleged judicial bias.
Statutes cited
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
**Custody — standard and framework.** The court reviewed the custody determination for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous." Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence—"evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The sole consideration is the best interest of the child, NRS 125C.0035(1); Ellis, and the court must consider all twelve factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), with a written decree containing findings tied to the ultimate determination, Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450-51, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015). **Application to custody.** The court found the district court's written order and hearing transcripts demonstrated due consideration of the issues and evidence. The abduction factor favored Beckwith based on Jeffery withholding the eldest child in 2022 and failing to return the children after spring break 2024; credibility findings were adverse to Jeffery (failure to pay for the drug test he demanded; claim of inability to afford tickets while purchasing an additional ticket for his wife). While joint physical custody is preferred if certain conditions are met, NRS 125C.0025(1), the parties' residence in separate states precluded that arrangement. See Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 173, 535 P.3d 274, 286 (Ct. App. 2023). The court declined to reweigh evidence or reassess credibility. See Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1183, 14 P.3d 522, 523 (2000); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244. **Evidentiary rulings.** Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with broad discretion to admit or exclude. Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. 770, 776, 406 P.3d 476, 481 (2017). NRS 48.035(2) permits exclusion of relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The exclusion of Jeffery's wife and brother was upheld as cumulative of Jeffery's own testimony and exhibits; the court cited NRS 47.040(1) (error may not be predicated on a ruling excluding evidence unless a substantial right is affected). As to Smith's testimony, Jeffery failed to object at the hearing and thus forfeited the challenge. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). Although Beckwith did not disclose Smith, nondisclosure may be excused if harmless, NRCP 37(c)(1), and Jeffery failed to show a different result might reasonably have been reached, Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010); see also NRS 47.040(1). **Child support.** Child support decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 7, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 43, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023); abuse occurs where findings lack substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018). Parents have a duty of support, NRS 125B.020(1), and a physical custodian may recover a reasonable portion of costs from the non-custodial parent, NRS 125B.030. Base support is set by formula under NAC 425.140, adjustable under NAC 425.150 based on eight enumerated factors, including transportation costs under NAC 425.150(1)(e). Under Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 867 (2024), "the district court may not impose transportation costs separately without determining the impact on the overall child support obligation." Because the district court imposed support under NAC 425.140(3) and NAC 425.115 based on Jeffery's $4,000 gross monthly income but ordered the receiving parent to pay travel expenses in a separate section without incorporating those costs, the court reversed and remanded, expressing no opinion on whether an adjustment is warranted. Martinez was published after entry of the decree. **Due process.** Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007); "Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020). Jeffery had notice (Beckwith requested support in her answer and motions) and an opportunity to be heard; the claim failed. **Arrears.** Under NRS 125B.030, district courts have discretion to award arrears. However, the decree found that in August 2023 the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Welfare and Supportive Services filed a notice and finding of financial responsibility, indicating a preexisting obligation. Because accrued support becomes a judgment by operation of law that may not be retroactively modified, NRS 125B.140(1)(a), and the record was silent on the amount of the preexisting obligation, the court vacated the constructive arrears and remanded for findings; if the amount is unchanged, the original order may be reinstated. **Health insurance.** NAC 425.135(1) requires child support orders to include medical support provisions. The decree required Jeffery to provide private health insurance while acknowledging the court received no evidence on the issue, and the parties' filings reflected an expectation of Medicaid coverage. The court concluded the order was not supported by substantial evidence, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242, and reversed and remanded. **Judicial bias.** Relief was denied because Jeffery did not show bias from an extrajudicial source or "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022); In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789-90, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988); Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano, 138 Nev. at 6, 501 P.3d at 984.
In plain language
Michael Jeffery and Merlaina Beckwith were never married but have three children together, born in 2013, 2014, and 2016. In September 2023, Jeffery, who then lived in Texas, filed a case in Nevada asking for sole legal and primary physical custody. Beckwith, who lived in Nevada with the children, asked for sole legal and sole physical custody, parenting time for Jeffery during spring and summer breaks, and back child support. Before the final hearing, the district court made temporary orders. It gave Beckwith temporary primary physical custody, named her the school-year parent, ordered her to take a drug test (which Jeffery was to pay for), and required the parents to communicate through an app called Our Family Wizard. Beckwith took the drug test, but Jeffery never paid for it, and the test was eventually destroyed. A major dispute arose over the 2024 spring break. Jeffery took the children to California during his parenting time and did not bring them back, causing them to miss school. According to the record, he had moved from Texas to Sacramento without telling Beckwith and intended to keep the children until she booked flights for them. The court repeatedly ordered him to return the children at his own expense. He initially said he could not afford tickets, then revealed he had also bought a plane ticket for his wife. By the time he returned the children, they had missed 21 days of school. At the final evidentiary hearing, the court heard from both parents and from Myrna Smith, the 70-year-old family friend the children lived with. Jeffery argued he should have primary custody because Beckwith interfered with his communication with the children, lacked stability, and could not keep the children safe. Beckwith admitted she had interfered with communication in the past but said she had improved, and admitted she "might not be great with stability," which she attributed to being a single parent with no financial support from Jeffery. The court did not let Jeffery's wife or brother testify, finding their testimony would repeat evidence the court had already heard. The district court found both parents "mostly credible" and both fit to parent, but found that both showed poor judgment and contributed to conflict. It found that the "abduction factor" favored Beckwith because Jeffery had withheld the eldest child for months in 2022 and had failed to return the children after spring break in 2024. The court concluded that if both parents lived in Clark County they would share joint custody, but because Jeffery lived in California, it was in the children's best interest for Beckwith to have primary physical custody. On appeal, the Court of Appeals kept the custody decision in place. It explained that it does not re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility, and that the district court's decision was supported by adequate evidence and was not based solely on Beckwith's Nevada residency. The appeals court also upheld the district court's decisions to exclude Jeffery's two witnesses (their testimony would have been repetitive) and to allow Smith to testify (Jeffery did not object at the hearing and did not show the outcome would have changed). The appeals court did, however, send several money-related issues back to the district court. On child support, a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision (Martinez) held that a court cannot separately impose travel/transportation costs without figuring out how those costs affect the overall child support amount. Because the district court ordered the receiving parent to pay travel expenses in a separate part of the decree without folding that into the child support calculation, the appeals court reversed the child support award and sent it back. It emphasized it was not deciding whether the support amount should actually change. On child support arrears (past-due support), the court found that the record suggested there was already an existing child support obligation in place for the same time period, and under Nevada law, past-due child support that has already come due generally cannot be changed after the fact. Because the record did not show the amount of that pre-existing obligation, the appeals court vacated the arrears and sent that issue back for findings. If the amount turns out to be the same, the original order can be reinstated. On health insurance, the district court had ordered Jeffery to provide private health insurance even though it acknowledged it received no evidence on the issue, and the parties' filings suggested both expected the children to use Medicaid. The appeals court reversed that requirement and sent it back because it was not supported by the evidence. Finally, the court rejected Jeffery's claim that the judge was biased, explaining that unhappiness with a judge's rulings during a case is generally not enough to show bias, and that Jeffery had not shown the kind of deep-seated hostility that would make a fair decision impossible.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.