JONES VS. WILLIAMS (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court dismissed the appeal on two independent jurisdictional/justiciability grounds. First, as to the June 18, 2024 custody order, the appeal is untimely. Notice of entry was served June 19, 2024. Jones filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which was denied October 14, 2024 with same-day notice of entry. No appeal was filed within 30 days of either notice. The May 23, 2025 notice of appeal therefore fails to vest jurisdiction. NRAP 4(a)(1); Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987). Second, as to the May 21, 2025 order denying Jones's motion to set aside, the court declined to decide whether such an order is appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) and instead dismissed as moot. The court reasoned that intervening developments - cross-motions to modify custody, a relocation request, a multi-day evidentiary hearing in progress, a March 20, 2025 temporary custody order, and subsequent temporary orders - mean the parties no longer operate under the June 18, 2024 custody schedule. The parties may present current best-interest evidence in the ongoing evidentiary hearing, and the district court is expected to enter a final, appealable custody order. The court therefore could grant no effective relief on the propriety of the order denying the motion to set aside. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 604, 245 P.3d 572, 575 (2010). In a footnote, the court addressed a deficient notice of nonrepresentation filed by Jennifer Setters and Yadira Santana. The notice cited NRAP 46(d)(3)(A), which applies to criminal cases, rather than NRAP 46(e)(3)(A), which governs civil cases (though both contain the same 14-day post-docketing requirement). The notice was untimely. Because respondent had filed an opposition pro se, the court accepted the untimely notice, directed the clerk to remove counsel, and excused appellant from NRAP 46(e)(3)(A)'s service requirement. The court denied as moot appellant's emergency motions to stay district court proceedings, to reinstate parenting time pending appeal, to unseal records, to waive transcript costs, and to extend the opening-brief deadline.

In plain language

This is a child custody dispute between Angel-Khalil Jones and Unique Fashion Williams. In June 2024, a family court judge entered an order giving Jones only limited, supervised visits with the child, at least until a related dependency case concluded and Jones filed a motion to change custody. Jones asked the judge to reconsider; that request was denied in October 2024. Jones did not appeal within the 30-day window the rules require. In April 2025, Jones filed a different kind of motion - a motion to "set aside" the June 2024 order. The district court denied that motion in May 2025, calling it untimely and successive (meaning it repeated arguments already raised). Jones then appealed in May 2025. The Nevada Supreme Court explains that, to the extent Jones was trying to appeal the original June 2024 custody order, his appeal came far too late. Under the appellate rules, an appeal must be filed within 30 days after notice of entry of the order, and missing that deadline means the Supreme Court has no power to hear the appeal at all. To the extent Jones was appealing the May 2025 order denying his motion to set aside, the court did not decide whether that order was even appealable. Instead, the court found the issue moot - meaning circumstances have changed so much that no ruling from the Supreme Court could provide meaningful relief. By the time the appeal was being considered, both parents had filed new motions to modify custody, the mother was seeking to relocate, and a multi-day evidentiary hearing was already underway. The district court had entered a new temporary custody order in March 2025 (and additional temporary orders since), so the parties were no longer operating under the June 2024 schedule at all. The trial court is expected to enter a final custody order after the evidentiary hearing concludes, and any party unhappy with that final order can appeal it then. The court also addressed a housekeeping issue. Two attorneys, Jennifer Setters and Yadira Santana, filed a notice saying they did not represent the respondent. They cited the wrong subsection of NRAP 46 (the criminal-case provision) rather than the civil-case provision, and their notice was filed late. Because the respondent had already filed her own response without a lawyer, the court accepted the late notice and removed the attorneys from the case. Because the appeal was dismissed, Jones's various emergency motions - to halt the district court proceedings, to restore his parenting time during the appeal, to unseal certain records, to waive transcript costs, and to extend his briefing deadline - were all denied as moot.