KAGAN VS. KAGAN

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviews child support orders for an abuse of discretion. Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 588, 80 P.3d 1282, 1290 (2003). A district court abuses its discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence, Miller v. Miller, 134 Nev. 120, 125, 412 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2018) - substantial evidence being evidence a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Discretionary determinations receive deference, but "deference is not owed to legal error, or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). On the modified support amount, the court held that the district court's failure to make oral or written findings concerning April's monthly gross income hindered appellate review. Although the court could work backward from the finding that April's base child support obligation was $510.84 to infer a monthly gross income of $2,322 (under NAC 425.140(2)(a), the base obligation for two children is 22 percent of the first $6,000 of income; $510.84 / 0.22 = $2,322), it could discern no formula - whether based on the paycheck stubs attached to April's financial disclosure form or on counsel's representations at the hearing - that yielded a $2,322 monthly gross income. See NAC 425.115(3) (in joint physical custody, the district court must determine both parties' base child support obligations); NAC 425.140 (formulae for base obligations keyed to obligor's monthly gross income). Because the findings neither clarified the income calculation nor indicated any basis for deviating from the guidelines under NAC 425.150(1), the court could not conclude the modification was supported by substantial evidence and reversed and remanded for additional findings, including an explanation of how April's monthly gross income was calculated. See NAC 425.120(1) (requiring determination of monthly gross income by considering information relevant to the obligor's earning capacity, without specifying a formula). The court further directed that, because it was unclear whether the district court considered whether modification was required by changed circumstances and was in the children's best interest, the district court should make findings clarifying those issues on remand. See Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 7, 501 P.3d 980, 985 (2022) (a district court may modify a child-support order if there has been a change in circumstances and the modification is in the child's best interest), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 48, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). On the arrears, the court reviewed the due process claim de novo. See Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020) (deprivation of due process is a constitutional issue reviewed de novo). The record showed April sought assistance from the Clark County District Attorney Family Support Division (DAFS) to enforce the obligation. See NRS 125B.150(1) (requiring the district attorney to assist custodial parents in establishing and enforcing support obligations). DAFS prepared an audit showing $6,663.02 in arrears, which April asked the court to reduce to judgment. At the hearing, the district court declined to consider Albert's arguments that he had satisfied his obligations, adopted the DAFS figure, and directed Albert to raise concerns with DAFS. The court held this violated Albert's procedural due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the arrears were reduced to judgment and payment ordered - a deprivation of his property. See In re Guardianship of Jones, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. ___, 531 P.3d 1236, 1244 (2023) (procedural due process requires "notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard"). The court reversed that decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted that, because the district court relied on the modified support amount to compute the overpayment credit, the overpayment amount may need reevaluation on remand depending on the resolution of the modification motion.

In plain language

Albert and April Kagan divorced by a stipulated (agreed-upon) decree. They shared joint physical custody of their two children, and Albert was ordered to pay April $906 per month in child support. Later, Albert asked the court to lower his payments, saying more than three years had passed since support was last set and that his income had dropped by more than 20 percent. April did not argue against changing the amount in principle; instead, she disputed what the new figure should be and claimed Albert owed her back-owed support (called "arrears"). After a hearing, the district court lowered Albert's monthly support to $644.16. It also found that Albert owed $6,663.02 in arrears. Because Albert had been paying at the old, higher rate while his motion was pending, the court found he had overpaid by $1,407.36 and credited that against the arrears. That left $5,255.66 in arrears, which the court turned into a formal money judgment, ordering Albert to pay it off at $90 per month. The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back for two main reasons. First, on the amount of support, the court could not tell how the district court arrived at April's monthly income. Working backward from the figures used, the appeals court could see the district court had treated April's monthly gross income as $2,322 - but no matter which source of income information it looked at (April's paycheck stubs or statements her lawyer made at the hearing), the appeals court could find no formula that produced $2,322. Because the district court did not explain its math or state any reason for departing from the child support guidelines, the appeals court said it could not confirm the modified amount was supported by adequate evidence. Second, on the arrears, the appeals court found a due process problem. Albert had tried to argue that he had actually satisfied his support obligations, pointing in part to filings April made in a separate bankruptcy case that seemed to contradict her arrears claim. But at the hearing, the district court declined to consider Albert's arguments, simply adopted the $6,663.02 figure from an audit prepared by the Clark County District Attorney Family Support Division, and told Albert to raise any concerns with that agency directly. The appeals court held this denied Albert a meaningful chance to be heard before the court turned the arrears into a judgment - a deprivation of his property. The court sent both issues back to the district court for further findings and further proceedings. It also noted that because the overpayment credit depended on the modified support amount, the district court may need to recalculate the overpayment on remand.