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KRAMER VS. KRAMER (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

96 Nev. 759, 616 P.2d 395 (1980) · Nevada Supreme Court · September 11, 1980

Disposition:Reversed; the order modifying the modified decree of divorce was reversed because the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the property distribution.Divorce, Property & Alimony

Posture Jerome Kramer appealed from an order modifying the distribution of community property established in a modified divorce decree entered in January 1976. In March 1979, more than three years later, Frances Kramer moved to modify that decree on the ground of intrinsic fraud; when Jerome failed to file a timely opposition, the district court deemed his right to object waived and awarded his interest in the disputed property to Frances. Jerome contended the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree.

Statutes cited

Key holdings

- A divorce decree cannot be modified or set aside except as provided by rule or statute. - The property-rights statute permits later modification of a property division only by the parties' written stipulation and does not confer continuing jurisdiction over property rights, in contrast to the continuing jurisdiction over child custody and support. - Absent specific statutory authorization, NRCP 60(b) governs motions to modify a divorce decree's property division and requires filing within six months; a decree becomes unmodifiable as to property six months after entry. - A party's failure to timely oppose a motion cannot supply a district court with jurisdiction that is substantively lacking.

Practitioner summary

Batjer, J. A decree of divorce cannot be modified or set aside except as provided by rule or statute, Lam v. Lam, 86 Nev. 908, 478 P.2d 146 (1970). NRS 125.150(5) (later renumbered (6)) governed subsequent modification of orders adjudicating property rights, permitting modification only by the parties' written stipulation whether or not the court retained jurisdiction; it did not provide for continuing jurisdiction over property rights. Had the Legislature intended continuing jurisdiction over property, it would have said so expressly, as it did for child custody and support in NRS 125.140(2). Absent specific authorization for continuing jurisdiction, NRCP 60(b) governs motions to modify property rights established by a divorce decree, and such a motion must be filed within six months, McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96 Nev. 455, 611 P.2d 205 (1980). Because Frances filed her motion three years after entry of the decree, the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the property distribution; the decree became unmodifiable (except as to custody and support) six months after entry, Schmutzer v. Schmutzer, 76 Nev. 123, 350 P.2d 142 (1960). The husband's untimely opposition could not procedurally supply jurisdiction that was substantively lacking.

In plain language

Jerome and Frances Kramer went through a divorce, attempted a reconciliation (exchanging quitclaim deeds on two properties), and then divorced for good. A divorce decree in July 1975 gave each spouse one property; a modified decree in January 1976 instead made both properties community, owned equally as tenants in common. More than three years later, in March 1979, Frances filed a motion to modify the 1976 decree, claiming intrinsic fraud. Jerome failed to file a timely opposition, and the trial court treated that as a waiver and awarded Jerome's interest in one property to Frances. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding the trial court had no power (jurisdiction) to modify the property division so long after the decree. A divorce decree can only be changed as allowed by rule or statute. The statute governing property rights allowed later modification only by the parties' written stipulation; it did not give courts continuing jurisdiction over property rights - unlike the separate statute that gives courts continuing jurisdiction over child custody and support. Absent that authority, the general rule (NRCP 60(b)) applied, which required any such motion to be filed within six months. Because Frances filed three years late, the court lacked jurisdiction, and Jerome's failure to timely oppose could not create jurisdiction that was substantively missing.

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