LAMB VS. LAMB (CHILD SUPPORT)
83 Nev. 425, 433 P.2d 265 (1967) · 5307 · Nevada Supreme Court · November 13, 1967
Disposition:Affirmed. The court affirmed both the order adjudging the father in contempt and the order denying his motion to modify the decree.Child SupportDivorce, Property & AlimonyPosture Appeal by the father from a district court order adjudging him in contempt for failure to pay court-ordered child support and denying his motion to modify the divorce decree (to reduce child support and set visitation) on the ground that he was then in contempt. The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed both rulings.
Statutes cited
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
Batjer, J. The father appealed an order adjudging him in contempt and denying his motion to modify the divorce decree while he was in contempt. A 1963 property settlement agreement requiring $200 monthly child support had been adopted and incorporated into the 1964 decree; after a prior contempt adjudication and purge, the father again accrued substantial arrears and, facing a second order to show cause, moved to reduce child support and set visitation, asserting changed circumstances (remarriage, financial reverses). The evidence showed he had paid only $125 over five months while grossing about $540 monthly. (1) Following Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187 (1876), the court held the proceeding was for civil contempt and did not constitute imprisonment for debt under Nevada Constitution Article I, Section 14, because money ordered paid as alimony or child support is not a 'debt' within the meaning of the constitution (citing Ex parte Phillips, 43 Nev. 368, 187 P. 311 (1920); In re McCabe, 53 Nev. 463, 5 P.2d 538 (1931)). (2) Substantial evidence supported the findings that the father had not paid as required, had the ability to pay, and was in contempt; courts possess inherent power to protect and enforce their decrees by contempt beyond the legislature's power to abridge (McCormick v. District Court, 67 Nev. 318, 218 P.2d 939 (1950)). (3) Denial of the motion to modify was a proper exercise of discretion under NRS 125.140(2) (Goodman v. Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 236 P.2d 305 (1951)), and, additionally, a party in contempt of the court's lawful orders may not obtain the court's aid on his own demands (MacDonald v. Superior Court, 104 P.2d 1071 (Cal.App. 1940)). Affirmed.
In plain language
In a 1964 divorce, the father agreed to pay $200 a month in child support, and that agreement became part of the divorce decree. He repeatedly fell behind. He was found in contempt in July 1966, then paid enough and made arrangements to be cleared ('purged') of contempt in August 1966. By November 1966 he was again about $2,820 behind. He filed papers explaining his remarriage and financial troubles and asked the court to reduce his child support and set specific visitation. At a December 1966 hearing, the evidence showed he had paid only $125 over five months while earning about $540 a month. The court found he had the ability to pay, held him in contempt again, and gave him 30 days to catch up or go to jail. It also denied his request to reduce support. He appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It rejected his argument that jailing him for unpaid support would be unconstitutional 'imprisonment for debt.' The proceeding was civil contempt, and money owed as alimony or child support is not a 'debt' under the Nevada Constitution. There was enough evidence that he could pay and did not, and courts have inherent power to enforce their orders through contempt. The court also held it was proper to deny his request to reduce support, both as a matter of discretion and because a person who is in contempt of the court's orders cannot ask the court for help on his own demands.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.