LARSON VS TRAUTMAN (FAMILY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of Larson's NRCP 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion, stating it will uphold the district court's decision to grant or deny an NRCP 60(b) motion if sufficient evidence in the record supports it, citing Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 513, 835 P.2d 790, 792 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Epstein v. Epstein, 113 Nev. 1401, 1405, 950 P.2d 771, 773 (1997), and Smith v. Smith, 102 Nev. 110, 111-12, 716 P.2d 229, 230 (1986). The court identified the NRCP 60 grounds at issue - mistake or excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence not discoverable with reasonable diligence in time to move for a new trial; and fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct - per NRCP 60(b)(1), (2), (3). The court framed the settlement as a contract, noting that "its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of contract law," quoting May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005). It noted that while contract interpretation is reviewed de novo, "the question of whether a contract exists is one of fact, requiring this court to defer to the district court[']s findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not based on substantial evidence," quoting id. at 672-73, 119 P.3d at 1257. Applying that framework, the court held that the parties attended a judicial settlement conference, reached an agreement, and placed the agreed-upon terms on the record, thereby entering a binding agreement later reduced to a written, enforceable decree, citing EDCR 5.601(b), (d) (providing that a stipulation adopted by the court is binding immediately and becomes enforceable once written, signed, and filed). On the newly-discovered-evidence theory, the court found that the information about the Madrids' financial involvement in the Bagnoli property came from Trautman's deposition, which was available to Larson before trial and before the settlement, and therefore did not satisfy NRCP 60(b)(2)'s requirement that the evidence could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. Larson conceded at the motion hearing that he learned of the Madrids' involvement from that deposition testimony. On the fraud theory under NRCP 60(b)(3), the court held Larson failed to demonstrate fraud because the information underlying his allegations - both as to the Madrids' involvement and as to the characterization of the dog - was available or known to him when he entered the settlement. The court relied on federal authority interpreting the identical federal analog, holding that the fraud must "not be discoverable by due diligence before or during the proceedings," quoting Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pac. & Arctic Ry. and Nav. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1991)), and citing Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005), for the persuasive value of federal cases in interpreting the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. On the fairness/undue-influence theory, the court found the record showed Larson did not object to the fairness of the agreement at the settlement hearing, agreed to the terms, and was willing to abide by them, citing Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. v. Bullock Insulation, Inc., 124 Nev. 1102, 1118-19, 197 P.3d 1032, 1042-43 (2008), and Harrison v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 564, 570, 376 P.3d 173, 177 (2016) ("It is the contracting parties' duty to agree to what they intend."). Because Larson failed to provide a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed the missing transcript supported the district court's determination, citing Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007). In a footnote, the court acknowledged that Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 471, 469 P.3d 176, 180 (2020), requires a district court to address and make express findings regarding the factors set forth in Yochum v. Davis, 98 Nev. 484, 486, 653 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1982), overruled in part by Epstein, when denying NRCP 60(b) relief, but held Larson forfeited the issue by not raising it, citing Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011). On judicial bias, the court held relief was unwarranted because Larson did not show any alleged bias originated outside the proceedings and the challenged decision did not reflect "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible," quoting Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022), and citing In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789-90, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988), and Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). In a footnote, the court rejected Larson's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, noting there is generally no right to effective assistance of counsel in civil cases, citing Garcia v. Scolari's Food & Drug, 125 Nev. 48, 57 n.7, 200 P.3d 514, 520 n.7 (2009), and Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985), and observed that any legal-malpractice claim was not properly raised in the appeal, citing Hewitt v. Allen, 118 Nev. 216, 221, 43 P.3d 345, 348 (2002).

In plain language

Andrew Larson and Paulene Trautman entered a domestic partnership in 2016. In September 2022, Trautman filed to terminate the partnership. Larson responded by asking the court to divide what he considered shared property, focusing on a home on Bagnoli Court, and he brought a counterclaim against Trautman's parents, Janice and Paul Madrid, who were part-owners of that property. Larson claimed he had a community property interest in Trautman's share of the home. The case started going to trial, but after the first day, the parties went to a settlement conference and reached a deal. They read the terms of that deal into the court record. Under the agreement, each side would keep their own personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and debts. Trautman and her parents would keep their interests in the Bagnoli home. Trautman would keep the pets and pay Larson $17,000 from her retirement account through a special court order (a QDRO - a qualified domestic relations order, which is a document used to divide retirement benefits). The agreement also said the decree would include broad waiver and release language. After the settlement, the parties could not agree on the exact wording of the final decree. Trautman's attorney submitted a proposed decree reflecting the terms read into the record. Larson refused to approve it or offer changes. The court adopted and entered the decree anyway, finding it matched the agreed terms. Trautman's lawyer then sent over a proposed QDRO, which Larson's attorney approved. Even so, Larson filed a motion to set aside the decree, arguing the terms did not match the agreement and that he had not yet received his money. His lawyer later withdrew, and Larson continued on his own. He filed a second motion to set aside, now claiming the settlement was unfair, that he wanted a larger share of the assets, and that he had learned "new, extremely material information" - specifically, that the Madrids had not actually paid toward the Bagnoli home and so (in his view) had no real ownership interest. He also argued he should get one of the dogs, pointing out that Trautman had called the dog an emotional support animal at trial but a "pet" in her deposition. The district court held a hearing and denied his motions. It found that, according to the settlement transcript, Larson had not objected to the fairness of the deal, had agreed to the terms, and had been fully questioned ("canvassed") by the settlement judge. It found nothing showing that the Madrids' financial role in the home was a reason Larson agreed to the settlement, and noted the information about the Madrids came from Trautman's deposition, which Larson already had before the settlement. The court also found Larson had accepted the $17,000 payment, and that his complaint about the timing of the payment was not a reason to undo the decree. The court characterized Larson's complaints as "buyer's remorse," which it found was not enough to set aside the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that a settlement agreement is a binding contract, that the parties had read an agreement into the record and reduced it to a written decree, and that the record supported the district court's findings. Because Larson knew or could have known the information he called "new" before settling, he could not show fraud or newly discovered evidence. Because he did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the settlement hearing, the court presumed that the missing transcript supported the district court's decision. The court also rejected Larson's claims of judicial bias and his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.