LIKUA VS. GOMEZ (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Standard of review.** Child custody decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). Factual findings are affirmed if supported by substantial evidence — "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Id. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. The court presumes the district court properly exercised its discretion in determining best interest. Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence and draw all favorable inferences toward the prevailing party. Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 238, 955 P.2d 661, 664 (1998). **Due process.** Due process protects fundamental liberty interests "including the interest parents have in the custody of their children." Gordon v. Geiger, 133 Nev. 542, 545-46, 402 P.3d 671, 674 (2017). It "demands notice before such a right is affected," and a party "threatened with loss of parental rights" must have an "opportunity to disprove evidence presented." Id. at 546, 402 P.3d at 674 (citing Wiese v. Granata, 110 Nev. 1410, 1412, 887 P.2d 744, 745 (1994); quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1020, 922 P.2d 541, 544 (1996)). The court rejected Likua's procedural and substantive due process arguments, observing that the parties fully briefed and argued the disputes, presented documentary evidence and testimony subject to cross-examination, and gave closing arguments, and that the evidentiary burden rested on Gomez as the moving party and never shifted to Likua. Cf. Wiese, 110 Nev. at 1413, 887 P.2d at 746; Moser v. Moser, 108 Nev. 572, 576-77, 836 P.2d 63, 66 (1992). The three excerpts Likua cited reflected ordinary joint-legal-custody obligations — a coparent's right to know where the child resides "even when the child is in the other parent's physical custody," Falconi v. Sec'y of State, 129 Nev. 260, 272, 299 P.3d 378, 386-87 (2013), and the expectation that parents "be able to cooperate, communicate, and compromise to act in the best interest of the child," Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 420-21, 216 P.3d 218, 221 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 501 P.3d 980 (2022). **Custodial modification framework.** The sole consideration is the child's best interest. NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 1139, 1148 (2015); see NRS 125C.0045(1)(a). A movant must show "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano, 138 Nev. at 5, 501 P.3d at 983, abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). The movant bears the burden on both prongs. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 150-51, 161 P.3d at 242-43. **Application — changed circumstances.** The court found substantial evidence of a substantial change: a decline in preschool attendance, poor academic proficiency, and behavioral and focus problems documented by instructors — analogizing to Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244 (4-month academic slide constituted a substantial change). It also relied on Likua's habitual interference with Gomez's in-person and remote parenting time. See Martin v. Martin, 120 Nev. 342, 346, 90 P.3d 981, 983 (2004) (substantial or pervasive interference with a noncustodial parent's parenting time constitutes a substantial change), abrogated on other grounds by Ellis. The court noted that oral pronouncements, while generally ineffective as a substantive matter (Nalder v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 200, 208, 462 P.3d 677, 685 (2020)), can assist in construing a vague or ambiguous order when consistent with the disposition (Holt v. Regil Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 895, 266 P.3d 602, 608 (2011)). **Application — best interest.** The court rejected Likua's argument that the district court was required to revisit each prior best-interest finding and explain how the status quo shifted, noting she cited no supporting authority. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). To the contrary, Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 159, 418 P.3d 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2018) recognizes that district courts may review evidence underpinning prior rulings. The district court made specific findings on all twelve factors under NRS 125C.0035(4), consistent with Soldo-Allesio v. Ferguson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 565 P.3d 842, 848-49 (Ct. App. 2025), finding three factors — (4)(c), (e), and (g) — supported modification, two neutral, and seven inapplicable. The court declined to address an argument about PJ's unborn half-sibling under factor (4)(i) because it was not raised below. See Durango Fire Prot. v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. 658, 661, 98 P.3d 691, 693 (2004). **Relocation analysis.** The court observed that NRS 125C.007 was "technically inapplicable" because Gomez, the noncustodial parent already living in Nevada, initiated relocation back to Nevada, not away from it. See NRS 125C.006(1); NRS 125C.007. Because neither party nor the district court recognized this and inapplicability was not argued on appeal, the court treated the relocation statutes as instructive, consistent with the purpose described in Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 381-82, 812 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1991) (preserving the rights and familial relationship of the noncustodial parent; removal is a "separate and distinct issue" from custody, though "some of the same factual and policy considerations may overlap"). The district court found Gomez satisfied all three threshold provisions of NRS 125C.007(1)(a)-(c) by a preponderance, incorporating its best-interest findings for the second provision (NRS 125C.007(1)(b); cf. Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 64-70, 507 P.3d 588, 593-97 (Ct. App. 2022)), and made specific findings on each of the six factors under NRS 125C.007(2)(a)-(f), with four favoring relocation, one (subpart (2)(d)) disfavoring it, and the catch-all (2)(f) inapplicable. The findings were supported by substantial evidence. **Attorney fees.** The court declined to reach Likua's challenge to the denial or deferment of community funds for fees. The December 2024 decree and the April 2025 order addressing fees were not designated in her notice of appeal, which designated only the January 2025 modified custody order. See NRAP 3(c)(1)(B); Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d 458, 459 (1960). The court noted that a post-judgment fees order may be separately appealed as a special order after final judgment (Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000)) and that a premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction (NRAP 4(a)(6)). **Judicial bias.** Because the court affirmed and did not remand, Likua's request for reassignment to an alternate judicial officer was moot. Cf. Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 169, 182, 535 P.3d 274, 292 (Ct. App. 2023). The court added that even on the merits the claim would fail because the alleged bias did not stem from an extrajudicial source and did not show deep-seated favoritism or antagonism. See Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022).

In plain language

This case concerns a long-running custody dispute over one child, PJ, born in December 2018. The parents, Maila Likua and Paulino Gomez, married in 2016, lived together in Mesquite, Nevada, and separated in February 2022. Gomez filed for divorce, and a three-year custody battle followed. Early on, the court split the financial issues from the custody issues. In June 2022, the parents agreed to share legal and physical custody on an alternating three-week schedule until a custody trial could be held. After that trial, the court's first custody order (September 2023) gave the parents joint legal custody but gave Likua primary physical custody and permission to move PJ permanently to Molokai, Hawaii, while Gomez kept substantial parenting time. Gomez asked the court to reconsider; that request was denied, and he appealed. While that appeal was pending, Gomez asked the trial court for permission to change custody again, claiming Likua had taken PJ out of preschool and left Hawaii without telling him from April to mid-May 2024, and had concealed the child's whereabouts. Because of the seriousness of those allegations, the trial court issued what is called an "indicative ruling" (a signal that it would reconsider if given the chance), and with the supreme court's approval, the case was sent back to the trial court to address custody and relocation again. After a second custody hearing in November 2024, the trial court reversed course: it gave Gomez primary physical custody (with Likua keeping substantial parenting time) and allowed PJ to move back to Nevada. The court found that PJ's school attendance had dropped, his academic performance lagged behind his peers, and he had ongoing behavioral and focus problems. It also found that communication between the parents had broken down and that Likua had repeatedly interfered with Gomez's parenting time, including on Father's Day 2024, and had traveled with PJ without telling Gomez. On appeal, Likua first argued that the trial court unfairly placed extra duties and burdens on her as the primary custodial parent, violating her right to a fair process. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that both parents fully briefed and argued their positions, presented evidence and witnesses, and made closing arguments. The court noted that, because Gomez was the one asking to change custody, he carried the burden of proof, not Likua. The three passages Likua pointed to simply described the ordinary obligations of a parent who shares legal custody — such as keeping the other parent informed of the child's location and honoring scheduled parenting time, including required FaceTime calls. Likua next argued that the trial court got the changed-circumstances and best-interest analyses wrong. The Court of Appeals applied a deferential standard, meaning it would not second-guess factual findings supported by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept them. It found that PJ's academic decline and Likua's interference with Gomez's parenting time were enough to support a substantial change in circumstances, and that the trial court had made specific findings on each of the twelve best-interest factors, three of which favored modification. On relocation, the Court of Appeals made an unusual observation: the relocation statute technically did not even apply here, because Gomez (the parent seeking the move) was the non-custodial parent already living in Nevada, and the move was back to Nevada rather than away from it. But because no one raised this point and the trial court treated the statute as a guide, the appeals court reviewed the relocation analysis as instructive and found the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Finally, the court declined to address Likua's request for community funds to pay attorney fees, because the orders that actually denied or deferred those fees were not the ones she listed in her notice of appeal. The court also declined to address her claim of judicial bias, finding it moot because the case was being affirmed rather than sent back, and noting that even on the merits the bias claim would fail.