LOVETT VS. CHRISTENSEN (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

• -On an unopposed NRAP 12A motion, remand was warranted for the district court to enter a new permanent custody order where the district court's order reflected the parties' on-the-record stipulation to permanent sole legal and physical custody in appellant with no parenting time for respondent.
• -Although appellant requested only a limited remand and stated she was not foregoing her other arguments on appeal, dismissal of the appeal was appropriate.
• -The dismissal does not prohibit appellant from appealing the order entered on remand, provided she is aggrieved by the order and it is otherwise appealable, per NRAP 3A(a) and NRAP 3A(b)(7).

Practitioner summary

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order modifying child custody, resolved on an unopposed NRAP 12A motion for limited remand. Because respondent filed no opposition and the time to do so had passed, the motion stood unopposed. The record before the court consisted of appellant's motion and the attached July 31, 2026, district court order. That order recited that the parties had stipulated on the record to appellant having sole legal and physical custody with respondent receiving no parenting time, and that they intended a permanent order. The district court, acting on the stipulation, temporarily granted appellant sole legal and physical custody and encouraged appellant to seek remand so a permanent order could be entered. Applying NRAP 12A, the court concluded that remand was warranted for the district court to enter a new permanent custody order. Although appellant requested only a limited remand and stated she was not foregoing her other appellate arguments, the court concluded that dismissal of the appeal was appropriate. In a footnote, the court clarified the effect of dismissal on appellant's future appellate rights, noting that nothing in the order prohibits appellant from appealing the order entered on remand, provided she is aggrieved and the order is otherwise appealable. The court cited NRAP 3A(a) for the proposition that a party aggrieved by an appealable judgment or order has standing to appeal, and NRAP 3A(b)(7) for making final orders arising out of matters pertaining to child custody appealable.

In plain language

This case involves a dispute over custody of a minor child between Vanessa R. Lovett and William Christensen. Lovett had appealed a district court order that modified child custody. While the appeal was pending, she asked the Court of Appeals to send the matter back to the district court temporarily - a step called a "remand" - so that the lower court could enter a new, permanent custody order. According to a district court order dated July 31, 2026, which Lovett attached to her motion, the two parties had reached an agreement on the record: Lovett would have sole legal and physical custody of the child, and Christensen would have no parenting time. The order stated the parties intended this arrangement to be permanent. Based on that agreement, the district court temporarily granted Lovett sole legal and physical custody and encouraged her to seek a remand from the appellate court so a permanent order could be entered. Christensen did not oppose Lovett's request. The Court of Appeals reviewed her unopposed motion and the district court's order and decided that sending the case back to the district court was warranted, so the lower court could enter a new permanent custody order. Lovett had asked that the remand be limited, saying she was not giving up her other arguments on appeal. The court instead concluded that dismissing the appeal was appropriate. The court added a note explaining that its order does not prevent Lovett from appealing the order the district court enters after remand, as long as she is harmed by that order and it is otherwise something that can be appealed.