Major v. State

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

This appeal presented an issue of first impression in Nevada: whether a district court has jurisdiction to impose restitution to the State for the cost of child care in a child abuse case where a family court has already imposed a support obligation on the defendant for the costs of supporting the child. The court concluded that the district court has jurisdiction to impose such restitution but must offset the restitution amount by the amount of the support obligation imposed by the family court. On jurisdiction, the court rejected Major's characterization of the restitution order as an improper modification or review of the family court's support order. Family courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting the familial unit, including child support, NRS 3.223(1); Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. __, __, 251 P.3d 163, 169 (2011), and family court judges "are district court judges with authority to preside over matters outside the family court division's jurisdiction." Landreth, 127 Nev. at __, 251 P.3d at 164. Although district courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify actions of other district courts, Rohlfing v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 106 Nev. 902, 906, 803 P.2d 659, 662 (1990), the restitution order did not constitute a review or modification of the family court's support obligation. The court reasoned that the power to grant restitution to crime victims is statutory, not inherent to a district court. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 10, 974 P.2d 133, 134 (1999) (quoting State v. Davison, 809 P.2d 1374, 1375 (Wash. 1991)). NRS 176.033(1)(c) authorizes a sentencing court to award restitution to crime victims upon a criminal conviction, and limits the power to award restitution to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. Conversely, statutes circumscribe a family court's authority to award child support: under NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080, the support obligation is calculated based on the parent's gross monthly income or a minimum payment of $100, an amount presumed sufficient to meet the basic needs of the child, NRS 125B.080(5). The purpose of child support is to prevent the child from experiencing the effects of poverty and becoming a charge of the State, Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 798, 812, 102 P.3d 41, 50 (2004), and there is no statutory authority for increasing the amount where the support obligation arose from a criminal act. Restitution, by contrast, compensates a victim for costs arising from the defendant's criminal act. Martinez v. State, 120 Nev. 200, 202-03, 88 P.3d 825, 827 (2004). While the State is a "victim" for restitution purposes only in limited circumstances, see Igbinovia v. State, 111 Nev. 699, 706-07, 895 P.2d 1304, 1308-09 (1995) (police department not entitled to restitution as a victim for the cost of setting up a drug transaction), the court has held the State was a victim where a defendant was convicted of abusing his children and the State incurred expenses for their medical and foster care. Roe v. State, 112 Nev. 733, 735, 917 P.2d 959, 960 (1996). Because the support obligation and restitution arose from the same occurrence and compensated for overlapping expenditures, the court noted with approval the district court's $700 offset, and held that the district court had jurisdiction to award restitution to the extent its order did not overlap with the existing support obligation. On sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the settled framework: although sentencing courts must "rely on reliable and accurate evidence in setting restitution," a defendant is not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 13, 974 P.2d 133, 185 (1999). "[S]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence, this court will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). Peeks's testimony that the cost-of-care rate was based on the total cost of running Kids Kottage was sufficient; Major made no showing that a federal reimbursement was actually received; and the district court appears to have imposed a continuing obligation on Social Services to notify the court of any reimbursement to permit revision of the restitution order. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.

In plain language

After Larry Major was arrested in 2012 for child abuse, the State placed his daughter in the custody of Washoe County Social Services, which housed her at a facility called Kids Kottage for about seven months. Two different courts then got involved in the question of who pays for her care. First, a family court ordered Major to pay child support of $100 per month directly to Social Services. Later, after Major pleaded guilty to one felony count of child abuse, the criminal court (the district court) was asked to order restitution - a payment a convicted defendant makes to compensate a crime victim for costs caused by the crime. Social Services asked for $20,362.07, based on the rate it charges other agencies for care at Kids Kottage. Major objected. His main argument was that because the family court had already told him what to pay for his daughter's care, the criminal court had no authority - no "jurisdiction" - to order a much larger payment for the same thing. The district court disagreed and ordered restitution of $19,662.07, which was the amount Social Services sought minus a $700 credit for what Major owed under the family court's support order over the seven months. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the two orders serve different purposes and come from different sources of authority. Family courts handle child support, which is calculated from a parent's income and is designed to keep a child out of poverty. But only a criminal sentencing court has the statutory power to award restitution to a crime victim - and the family court had no power to compensate the State for the costs Major's criminal acts imposed on it. Because the two obligations overlapped for the same seven months of care, however, the court noted with approval that the district court subtracted the $700 support obligation from the restitution figure. The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to award restitution to the extent its order did not overlap with the existing family court support obligation. Major also argued that the restitution amount was not properly proven, in part because Social Services might have received federal reimbursement of up to 56 percent of the cost of care for eligible children. A Social Services fiscal compliance officer, Ida Peeks, testified about how the rate was calculated but did not know whether Major's daughter qualified for that reimbursement or whether any was received. The Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient, noting that Major made no showing that a reimbursement was actually received and that the district court required Social Services to notify it if a reimbursement came in, so the restitution order could be revised. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.