MANVILLE VS. MANVILLE (DIVORCE)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court addressed an independent action under NRCP 60(b) to set aside a 1955 divorce decree for fraud. The court distinguished intrinsic from extrinsic fraud. The alleged failure to establish bona fide residence was intrinsic fraud, citing Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, and Confer v. District Court, 49 Nev. 18, 234 P. 688, 236 P. 1097; relief from intrinsic fraud under NRCP 60(b) must be sought within six months of entry. The alleged coercion and threats, had the appellant appeared at trial, would likewise have been intrinsic under Calvert v. Calvert, 61 Nev. 168, 122 P.2d 426, though the court found it unnecessary to decide the effect of her non-appearance. The twin-sister impersonation was extrinsic fraud (Murphy v. Murphy, 65 Nev. 264, 193 P.2d 850; Chamblin v. Chamblin, 55 Nev. 146, 27 P.2d 1061), to which the six-month NRCP 60(b) limitation does not apply because the rule preserves the power to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. However, the court held that the statute of limitations applies to a proceeding to set aside a divorce decree procured by extrinsic fraud, citing Howard v. Howard, 69 Nev. 12, 239 P.2d 584. Because appellant admittedly knew of the impersonation on the day the decree was entered (September 1955) but did not sue until June 1962, the action was time-barred, and the court did not reach laches. The court also confirmed that when the statute-of-limitations defense appears from the complaint itself, a motion to dismiss is proper, citing Nevada-Douglas Consolidated C. Co. v. Berryhill, 58 Nev. 261, 75 P.2d 992. Appellant's tolling argument was rejected because the record did not support it, and the case did not involve a decree void on its face.

In plain language

Marion Manville obtained a Reno divorce from Thomas F. Manville, Jr., in September 1955. Years later she filed an independent lawsuit asking the court to throw out that divorce decree, claiming it had been obtained by fraud. She said Thomas had coerced and threatened her into filing for divorce in Reno without really living there, and that when she refused to go through with the trial, he arranged for her twin sister to impersonate her on the witness stand so the divorce could be granted. The problem for her case was timing. She admitted she learned about the impersonation on the very same day the decree was granted in 1955, and she accepted the benefits of the divorce (alimony, a large lump-sum property payment, and monthly payments). She then remarried, and that marriage later ended. She did not file this suit to undo the divorce until June 1962, roughly six years and nine months after she knew the facts. The Nevada Supreme Court explained the difference between two kinds of fraud. "Intrinsic" fraud (like a false claim of residency, or lies told at a trial the party could have attended) must be attacked within six months under the court rule. "Extrinsic" fraud (fraud that keeps a party from getting a fair trial at all, such as the impersonation here) is not limited by that six-month rule, but it is still subject to the ordinary statute of limitations. Because Marion waited far too long after she knew of the impersonation, her claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Since the time bar was obvious from the face of her own complaint, the trial court was right to dismiss the case, and the Supreme Court affirmed.