MARQUART VS. MARQUART (FAMILY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: The Court of Appeals reviews district court alimony decisions for an abuse of discretion, citing Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian, 139 Nev. 247, 252, 534 P.3d 700, 705 (2023), and will "not disturb the district court's rulings if they are supported by substantial evidence, which is that which a sensible person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Changed circumstances: Under NRS 125.150(11)(b), "[t]he spouse who is ordered to pay the alimony may, upon changed circumstances, file a motion to modify the order," and under NRS 125.150(8) the district court may modify periodic alimony payments upon a finding of changed circumstances. The court may analyze any relevant factors, including changes in the payor's income (Davitian-Kostanian), and under NRS 125.150(12), "a change of 20 percent or more in the gross monthly income of a spouse who is ordered to pay alimony shall be deemed to constitute changed circumstances requiring a review for modification of the payments." Here, the district court found Ronald's monthly income had "barely changed" ($8,599 currently versus $8,620 at entry of the decree) and thus that he did not demonstrate changed circumstances warranting modification of the monthly payments. Ronald did not challenge these findings on appeal, and the court noted it will not second-guess a district court's resolution of factual issues involving conflicting evidence when supported by substantial evidence, citing Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 152, 161 P.3d 239, 244 (2007). Record deficiency: Ronald filed a certificate stating he was not requesting transcripts, despite a supreme court notice specifically citing NRAP 9 that instructed him to file either a rough draft transcript request form or a certificate that no transcripts were requested. Because he did not provide the transcript of the relevant hearing as required by NRAP 9(a)(1), (2), the court applied the presumption from Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), that "we necessarily presume that the missing [documents] support[ ] the district court's decision," and concluded substantial evidence supports the findings on Ronald's income and the ultimate ruling. Forfeiture: Ronald's appellate argument that a new vehicle payment justified modification was not raised in his motion below, and he did not assert he raised it at any other point in the district court proceedings. The court declined to consider it, citing Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012) ("An appellate court is not particularly well-suited to make factual determinations in the first instance."), and Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (issues not argued below are deemed forfeited and will not be considered on appeal). Military disability benefits: The court rejected Ronald's contention that consideration of his military disability benefits violated NRS 125.165, relying on Oshiro v. Oshiro, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 59, 579 P.3d 1024, 1031 (2025), which holds that "NRS 125.165 prohibits a court from directly dividing military disability benefits for alimony purposes, but by its plain language, it does not prohibit a court from considering the existence or value of those benefits as part of a holistic review of the divorcing couple's financial circumstances and capacity to pay alimony." Although Oshiro postdated the district court's ruling, the panel explained it may still use the supreme court's later interpretation of a statute to determine whether the district court's legal conclusions were correct, citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 n.12 (1994) (a court's interpretation of a statute "is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law") and Davidson v. Davidson, 132 Nev. 709, 713, 382 P.3d 880, 883 (2016).

In plain language

Ronald and Vernieta Marquart, who married in 2000, divorced through a joint petition that included a clause requiring Ronald to pay Vernieta a set amount of alimony (court-ordered support payments to a former spouse) on the first of each month. The district court entered a divorce decree in August 2024 ordering alimony as the parties had agreed. In January 2025, Vernieta filed a motion alleging Ronald had failed to pay alimony as ordered and asking the court to enforce the decree. Ronald responded with his own request asking the court to reduce his alimony obligations. After a hearing, the district court gave Ronald partial relief - it limited his alimony obligation to 12 years after entry of the divorce decree - but otherwise denied his request. Ronald appealed. The Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed, meaning the district court's decision stands. Ronald's main argument was that his income had dropped since the divorce, so his alimony should be reduced. But the district court had found his monthly income had "barely changed" - it was $8,599 at the time of the hearing compared to $8,620 when the divorce decree was entered - so he had not shown the kind of changed circumstances that would justify lowering the monthly payments. Ronald did not challenge those specific findings on appeal. He also did not provide the appellate court with a transcript of the district court hearing; in fact, he filed a certificate stating he was not requesting transcripts. Under Nevada's appellate rules, it is the appellant's job to supply the transcripts needed to review the appeal, and when the transcript is missing, the appellate court presumes the missing record supports the lower court's decision. Ronald also raised a new argument on appeal - that his alimony is too high because he now has a vehicle payment - but because he did not present that argument to the district court first, the appellate court would not consider it. Finally, Ronald argued the district court violated a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, by considering income he receives from military disability benefits. The Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Oshiro v. Oshiro, which held that the statute bars a court from directly dividing military disability benefits for alimony purposes but does not bar a court from considering those benefits as part of a broader look at the couple's finances and ability to pay. Although Oshiro was decided after the district court ruled, the Court of Appeals explained that a later judicial interpretation of a statute can still be used to evaluate whether the district court's legal conclusions were correct.