MARSON VS. MARSON (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court conducted a sua sponte jurisdictional review under NRAP 3(g) and concluded that the order designated in the notice of appeal - an order denying a motion to enforce or for an order to show cause regarding contempt for nonpayment of alimony - is not substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b). The court reiterated the foundational rule that "this court may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule," citing Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). It found no statute or court rule providing for an appeal from an order regarding the failure to pay alimony. The court further noted that a contempt order is not independently appealable, citing Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 671 (2000). Lacking jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal.

In plain language

Jill Marson asked a Washoe County district court to enforce an alimony obligation against Samuel Marson and to hold him in contempt for not paying. The district court denied that request. Ms. Marson, representing herself, then appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. Before deciding whether the district court got the underlying issue right or wrong, the Supreme Court had to decide a threshold question: does it even have the power (called "jurisdiction") to hear this kind of appeal? In Nevada, a party can appeal to the Supreme Court only if a statute or a court rule specifically allows an appeal from the type of order being challenged. The Supreme Court concluded that no statute or rule allows an appeal from an order about failure to pay alimony of this kind, and that orders dealing with contempt are not separately appealable on their own either. Because the order Ms. Marson tried to appeal is not one the law lets the Supreme Court review on direct appeal, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits of the alimony or contempt dispute.