MARTIN VS. MARTIN (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Jurisdiction. The court first addressed appellate jurisdiction. It held that the order denying modification of the divorce decree was reviewable as a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8), citing Burton v. Burton, 99 Nev. 698, 700-01, 669 P.2d 703, 705 (1983), because the underlying motion was based on changed factual circumstances rather than an attack on the original decree. As to the attorney fees portion, although orders awarding attorney fees are generally appealable as special orders after final judgment under Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000), the order here did not fix any amount and merely directed supplemental filings. Citing Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 346-47, 301 P.3d 850, 852-53 (2013), the court held that only orders "finally and completely" resolving a claim are appealable, and accordingly dismissed that portion for lack of jurisdiction. Modification of decree. Reviewing for abuse of discretion under Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004) (quoting Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998)), the court affirmed the denial of Michael's motion. Michael cited no authority below or on appeal that would relieve him of his decree-imposed insurance obligation. The court invoked Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006), and Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 761, 616 P.2d 395, 397 (1980), for the rule that "[a] decree of divorce cannot be modified ... except as provided by rule or statute." Denial of Michael's fee request likewise was not an abuse of discretion under Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 967, 194 P.3d 96, 106 (2008). Parenting coordinator. Michael argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to cite Harrison v. Harrison, 132 Nev. 564, 376 P.3d 173 (2016), or other controlling authority. The court held the argument waived under Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981), for not being raised below. On the merits, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard from Harrison, 132 Nev. at 572, 376 P.3d at 178, the court found the parties' inability to communicate or make decisions amicably warranted appointment, consistent with Harrison's recognition of the benefit of parenting coordinators "in particularly contentious cases," id. at 571-72, 376 P.3d at 178. The court further noted that Michael's challenge was largely directed at hypothetical future decisions of the coordinator, citing Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 337, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018), for the proposition that mere appointment of a parenting coordinator is not an improper delegation of decision-making authority. Due process. The court rejected Michael's due process argument in a footnote, citing J.D. Constr., Inc. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377-78, 240 P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010), because Michael had notice and a meaningful opportunity to oppose Danielle's request. Reassignment. The court declined to direct reassignment on remand, citing Wickliffe v. Sunrise Hosp., Inc., 104 Nev. 777, 783, 766 P.2d 1322, 1326-27 (1988), and NRS 1.230. Michael had not shown the judge "cannot fairly deal with the matters involved" or held "actual bias or prejudice." Mootness of stay. Given the disposition, the court denied as moot Michael's motion to stay the parenting-coordinator appointment.

In plain language

Michael and Danielle Martin divorced in 2017. Their divorce decree required Michael to provide health insurance for the parties' three minor children. After the divorce, the parties continued to fight over custody, child support, and healthcare and financial decisions about the children. By 2020, Danielle had primary physical custody and primary legal custody for healthcare decisions, and she added the children to her current husband's insurance plan. Michael then asked the district court to change the divorce decree so he could drop the children from his insurance. Danielle opposed that request and asked the court to appoint a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral person who helps divorced parents work through ongoing disputes. The district court sided with Danielle: it refused to let Michael drop the children from his insurance, ordered the parties to submit a proposed order appointing a parenting coordinator, denied Michael's request for attorney fees, and granted Danielle's request for fees (with the dollar amount to be set later). Michael appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the parts of the district court's order that denied his motion and appointed a parenting coordinator. The court explained that Michael did not cite any legal rule that would let him out of his insurance obligation, so the district court was within its discretion to deny the change. On the parenting coordinator issue, the court said Michael had not raised his objection in the lower court and so had given up the argument; in any event, the record showed the parties could not communicate well enough to make decisions on their own, which is exactly the situation a parenting coordinator is meant to address. The Supreme Court did not reach the attorney-fee award. Because the district court had only said Danielle would get fees but had not yet decided how much, that part of the order was not final, and the appellate court said it lacked jurisdiction to review it. That portion of the appeal was dismissed. Finally, the Supreme Court declined Michael's request to send the case back to a different judge, finding no showing that Judge Almase could not fairly handle the matter or held bias against either party.