MARTINEZ VS. MARTINEZ (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review. Child support determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion under Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2004), but questions of law - including statutory and regulatory interpretation - are reviewed de novo, Moseley v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 654, 662, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2008). Regulations are interpreted as statutes are. Silver State Elec. Supply Co. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Tax'n, 123 Nev. 80, 85, 157 P.3d 710, 713 (2007). Custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion, Hayes v. Gallacher, 115 Nev. 1, 4, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1999), with factual findings requiring substantial evidence, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 150, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). Transportation costs and NAC 425.150. Initial child support is set under guidelines promulgated pursuant to NRS 425.620 and NRS 125B.080(1), with the formula in NAC 425.140. NAC 425.150 governs deviations from the base obligation "based on the specific needs of the child and the economic circumstances of the parties," and lists eight enumerated factors, including, at NAC 425.150(1)(e), "[t]he cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation." Reading NAC 425.150 as a whole and giving each phrase effect (JED Prop. v. Coastline RE Holdings NV Corp., 131 Nev. 91, 94, 343 P.3d 1239, 1240-41 (2015); Young v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 136 Nev. 584, 586, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020)), the Court held that because transportation costs are expressly listed among the deviation factors, they "cannot be imposed outside that regulatory scheme." A district court may not separately allocate transportation costs without determining the impact on the overall child support obligation. The Court cited persuasive authority from Tibor v. Tibor, 623 N.W.2d 12, 18-19 (N.D. 2001), and Bowers v. Bowers, 956 S.W.2d 496, 499-500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Distinguishing Matkulak. The Court rejected Paul's reliance on Matkulak v. Davis, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 516 P.3d 667, 670-71 (2022), and the court of appeals' application of it in Solinger v. Solinger, No. 84832-COA, 2023 WL 3031655 (Nev. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2023). Matkulak addressed only whether expenses already separately ordered (childcare, extracurricular activities, health insurance) could additionally support an upward deviation - i.e., be counted twice. Matkulak does not authorize courts to bypass NAC 425.150 by separately ordering transportation costs without considering them within the overall support calculus. Reasonableness requirement. NAC 425.150 deviations must be reasonable in light of the child's specific needs and the parties' economic circumstances. The Court relied on Herz v. Gabler-Herz, 107 Nev. 117, 119, 808 P.2d 1, 1 (1991) ("fair and equitable"), and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 37, 222 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2010), for the principle that child support orders must be "adequate to the child's needs, fair to both parents, and set at levels that can be met without impoverishing the obligor parent." The district court's order, premised solely on Jennifer's relocation roughly five years earlier and silent on the parties' finances and the existing support obligation, did not satisfy that framework. The Court reversed and remanded for express findings under NAC 425.150 regarding reasonable transportation costs. The Court noted that "one party's insistence on a particular mode of transportation might be considered when allocating transportation costs." Visitation modification and due process. The Court affirmed the modification under NRS 125C.0045(1)(b) and NRS Chapter 125C generally, with best-interest findings made under NRS 125C.0035(4). Citing Martin v. Martin, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 520 P.3d 813, 817 (2022), the Court applied abuse-of-discretion review to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions. Because Jennifer did not include any purported visitation agreement in the record, the Court applied the presumption of Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007), that the missing portion supports the district court's decision. The Court reaffirmed that procedural due process requires "notice and an opportunity to be heard," Collie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007), and distinguished Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1020, 922 P.2d 541, 544 (1996), because Jennifer herself placed visitation in issue, testified about it, and presented evidence. The Court cited Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 4, 501 P.3d 980, 982 (2022), in confirming the district court's authority to fashion visitation consistent with the child's best interest. Substantial evidence and remaining issues. Substantial evidence under Ellis v. Carucci supported a standard out-of-state visitation schedule, including doctor notes regarding Paul's capacity to parent and Paul's hearing testimony. The Court declined to consider attorney-fee arguments not cogently briefed, citing Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 329 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). It denied Paul's request for NRAP 38 sanctions, applying Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 95, 787 P.2d 777, 781 (1990), because Jennifer's transportation-cost argument was meritorious.

In plain language

Paul and Jennifer Martinez divorced in California in 2015 and share a child, L.M. Jennifer received primary physical custody, and the parents shared joint legal custody. Jennifer later moved with the child to Nevada with court permission, and the case eventually transferred to Nevada courts. After further disputes, the Nevada district court increased Paul's visitation time and ordered Jennifer to pay all the costs of transporting L.M. to and from visits with Paul, reasoning that because Jennifer was the parent who moved away from California, she should bear those costs. Jennifer challenged two parts of that ruling: the order making her pay 100% of travel costs, and the decision to expand Paul's visitation beyond what the parties had specifically asked the court to address. On the travel-cost issue, the Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Jennifer. Nevada has a detailed administrative regulation, NAC 425.150, that lists factors a court must consider before adjusting child support away from the standard formula. One of those factors is the cost of transporting the child for visitation. The Court held that a district court cannot simply impose all travel costs on one parent as a stand-alone order; instead, those costs must be evaluated as part of the overall child support analysis, looking at the child's needs and both parents' financial circumstances. The district court's reliance on the fact that Jennifer had moved years earlier, by itself, was not a proper basis for assigning her all the costs. On the visitation issue, the Court sided with the district court. Although Jennifer argued she did not have fair notice that the court might broadly change the visitation schedule, the Court found she had put visitation squarely before the court (by asking that Paul's visits be supervised), testified at length on the topic, and had the chance to present evidence. The Court also found enough evidence in the record - including doctor notes and Paul's own testimony - to support letting Paul have a standard out-of-state unsupervised visitation schedule. The Court reversed the travel-cost portion of the order and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the NAC 425.150 framework. It affirmed everything else and declined to sanction Jennifer for bringing the appeal.