MARTINEZ VS. MARTINEZ (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

Standard of review: child-custody determinations, including parenting-time schedules, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 428, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022). Findings supported by substantial evidence - "evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain the judgment" (paraphrasing Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007)) - will not be disturbed, and the court presumes proper exercise of discretion in determining the child's best interest, Flynn v. Flynn, 120 Nev. 436, 440, 92 P.3d 1224, 1226-27 (2004). Jurisdiction/due process: The court distinguished Anastassatos v. Anastassatos, 112 Nev. 317, 320, 913 P.2d 652, 653-54 (1996), where the district court reached substantive issues not addressed in motion practice. Here, "the substantive issue of the parties' parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court," so awarding Paul more time than he requested did not exceed jurisdiction or violate due process. Nor were points of agreement in the parties' proposed timeshares binding: under Rivero, district courts must apply Nevada law when determining whether to modify custody, and NRS 125C.0035(1) makes the child's best interest the governing standard; Jennifer identified no authority prohibiting a different timeshare, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (claims unsupported by cogent argument or relevant authority need not be considered). Discovery/evidentiary hearing: Jennifer's contention that the hearing should not have proceeded due to Paul's alleged nonproduction of medical records failed under Edwards for lack of cogent argument or relevant authority; she cited only the law-of-the-case doctrine and no discovery or evidence rules. The court additionally noted that district courts retain authority to revise interlocutory orders at any time before entry of final judgment, NRCP 54(b). Substantial evidence: The district court "addressed all of the statutory best-interest factors and other relevant considerations," see Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 460, 373 P.3d 878, 882 (2016) (requiring specific findings on all statutory best-interest factors). The appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence and defers to credibility determinations, Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244. Any misapprehension of evidence as to individual findings did not warrant reversal because it could not be said "a different result might reasonably have been reached" but for the error, McClendon v. Collins, 182 Nev. 327, 333, 372 P.3d 492, 495-96 (2016). In a footnote, the court rejected Jennifer's summary invocation of McMonigle v. McMonigle, 110 Nev. 1407, 887 P.2d 742 (2004), citing Nance v. Ferraro, 134 Nev. 152, 153, 418 P.3d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2018), for the proposition that a district court is generally not barred from reviewing facts and evidence underlying prior rulings in deciding whether modification is in the child's best interest. Travel costs/child support: The court agreed with Paul that the order requiring Jennifer to pay all transportation costs for L.M.'s travel to and from California was not an adjustment of child support triggering the findings required by NAC 425.150(1). The district court set support at the regulatory base obligation and separately ordered travel costs because Jennifer was the relocating parent. Under Matkulak v. Davis, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 61, 516 P.3d 667, 671 (2022), expenses ordered separate from the support calculation are removed from consideration for purposes of NAC 425.150(1). Jennifer did not otherwise challenge the child-support determination. Attorney fees: Because no fee/cost award had yet been entered, the challenge to the prevailing-party declaration was premature; "An order awarding attorney fees and costs is substantively appealable as a special order after final judgment." Winston Prods. Co. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006). The panel (Gibbons, Bulla, Westbrook) affirmed.

In plain language

Jennifer and Paul Martinez divorced in California, where Jennifer received primary physical custody of their child, L.M., and permission to move with the child to Nevada. Once the Nevada courts took over the custody case, Paul asked for primary physical custody. Jennifer opposed that request and asked the court to require that Paul's time with the child be supervised until he underwent a neuropsychological evaluation confirming he could care for L.M. without supervision. Both parents also asked the court to change the parenting-time schedule. After a hearing where evidence was presented, the district court kept primary custody with Jennifer but gave Paul more parenting time than before, refused to require supervision, and declared Paul the "prevailing party" - the side that won - for purposes of attorney fees and costs. Jennifer appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals rejected each of Jennifer's arguments. First, she argued the district court went beyond its power and violated her due-process rights by giving Paul more parenting time than he asked for. The court disagreed, explaining that the parenting-time schedule was squarely before the district court because both parties had asked to change it. Even where the parents' proposed schedules overlapped, the district court was not locked into those points of agreement - Nevada law requires courts deciding custody matters to evaluate what is in the child's best interest. Second, Jennifer argued the hearing should not have gone forward because Paul allegedly failed to turn over medical records as previously ordered. The court found she cited no relevant discovery or evidence rules and presented no cogent argument, and noted that district courts may revise their earlier, non-final orders at any time before final judgment. Third, on the merits of the new schedule, the appeals court reviews such decisions only for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it will not second-guess the trial judge unless the decision was outside the bounds of reason. The district court addressed all the statutory best-interest factors, and the appellate court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or revisit credibility calls. Even if the trial court misread some individual pieces of evidence, the appellate court could not say the overall result would reasonably have been different. Fourth, Jennifer argued the district court failed to make required findings before ordering her to pay all costs of transporting L.M. to and from California for Paul's parenting time. The court agreed with Paul that the travel-cost order was not an adjustment of child support - the court set child support at the standard base amount and separately ordered Jennifer to pay travel costs because she was the relocating parent - so the regulation requiring those findings did not apply. Finally, because the district court had only declared Paul a prevailing party and had not yet actually awarded any fees or costs, Jennifer's challenge to any award was premature; such an award can be appealed once it is actually entered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.