MASON VS. MASON (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court affirmed denial of a relocation petition under the Schwartz framework. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 107 Nev. 378, 383, 812 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1991). The district court found the threshold good-faith factor was not met, in part because of the custodial parent's long, documented history of frustrating the noncustodial parent's visitation and bonding, and alternatively analyzed all five Schwartz factors, finding that the moving parent's frustration of the parental relationship would continue from a distance, rendering any alternate visitation inadequate. The court elaborated on its jurisprudence, holding that frustration of the non-moving parent's parental relationship may be part of the calculus of the final Schwartz factor - whether, assuming the other factors are considered, reasonable alternate visitation is available - and is not confined to the threshold good-faith inquiry addressed in Jones v. Jones, 110 Nev. 1253, 1261, 885 P.2d 563, 569 (1994). The court reaffirmed that disruption of a noncustodial parent's visitation schedule, standing alone, is an insufficient basis to deny removal, Gandee v. Gandee, 111 Nev. 754, 895 P.2d 1285 (1995), and that the proper focus is whether the proposed substitute schedule adequately maintains, fosters, and preserves the parent-child relationship. The court held the district court's findings - that the good-faith showing was not made and that reasonable substitute visitation was unavailable - were supported by substantial evidence, citing Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 971 P.2d 822 (1998), and McGuinness v. McGuinness, 114 Nev. 1431, 970 P.2d 1074 (1998), and found no error in the refusal to modify child support.

In plain language

After the parties divorced, the mother had primary custody of their son, Ryan, and the father had visitation. The relationship between the parents was highly contentious, and the mother had a long, documented history of interfering with the father's visitation and his bond with his son. In 1997 the mother asked the district court for permission to move the child to Florida. After an extensive hearing, the district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed. Nevada evaluates relocation requests using the framework from Schwartz v. Schwartz, which requires the moving parent to show a good-faith reason for the move and then weighs several factors, focusing on whether reasonable substitute visitation is available. The district court found the mother had not shown a good-faith basis for the move, in part because of her history of frustrating the father's relationship with Ryan, and separately found that no reasonable alternate visitation plan would work because she would continue to undermine the father's relationship from long distance. The Supreme Court used the case to clarify its relocation law. It held that a parent's propensity to frustrate the other parent's relationship with the child is not only relevant to the threshold good-faith question, but may also be considered as part of the final Schwartz factor - whether reasonable, adequate alternate visitation is available. The Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings both that the move lacked a good-faith basis and that adequate substitute visitation was not available, so the denial of relocation was proper. It found no error in the refusal to modify child support.