MATLEY VS. MATLEY (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)
101 Nev. 281, 701 P.2d 749 (1985) · 15632 · Nevada Supreme Court · June 21, 1985
Disposition:Reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court reversed the award to the wife of one-half of the principal of the time certificate of deposit, holding the husband entitled to the entire principal, and affirmed the remainder of the district court's judgment.Divorce, Property & AlimonyPosture Appeal from a district court divorce judgment. The district court found the parties' antenuptial agreement valid but held that one-half of a time certificate of deposit purchased by the husband with his separate property was a gift of principal to the wife, awarding her one-half of both principal and interest. The husband appealed that determination. The Nevada Supreme Court, per curiam, reviewed the finding of a gift in light of the antenuptial agreement.
Key holdings
Practitioner summary
Per Curiam. The husband challenged a finding that one-half of a time certificate of deposit (TCD), purchased with his separate property, was a gift to the wife. The parties' antenuptial agreement - found valid by the trial court and unchallenged as unconscionable, fraudulent, or the product of nondisclosure or duress - provided that separate funds contributed to jointly or commonly held property were returnable on divorce and that it would be conclusively presumed the contributing party did not intend a gift. The court held that, absent evidence of modification, a valid antenuptial agreement must be enforced as written (Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973)). The TCD - purchased with the principal of the husband's separate note, titled to the parties as tenants in common, and annotated 'under the antenuptial agreement' - fell squarely within the agreement. The husband's contemporaneous notation and testimony showed intent that the wife receive one-half of the interest during marriage and one-half of the principal only if he predeceased her during marriage; there was no evidence of donative intent as to the principal. Applying the standard that a decision may be disturbed where there is no substantial conflict in the evidence on a material point and the decision is manifestly contrary to the evidence (Avery v. Gilliam, 97 Nev. 181, 625 P.2d 1166 (1981)), the court reversed as to the TCD principal and otherwise affirmed.
In plain language
Marshall Matley had just been through a difficult two-year divorce from a prior wife when he decided to marry Dorothy. He insisted they sign an antenuptial (prenuptial) agreement first. That agreement listed each person's separate property and included a key clause: if either spouse used their separate property to buy or improve property the couple held together, the contributing spouse would get that contribution back if they divorced, and it would be 'conclusively presumed' that the contribution was not a gift. After the marriage, Marshall collected on a $100,000 note that was his separate property and used the money to buy a time certificate of deposit (a CD). He put both his and Dorothy's names on it as tenants in common and wrote on the stub that it was 'under the antenuptial agreement.' He also told Dorothy he was giving her 'half of this.' Over time the couple split the CD's interest payments. When they divorced, the trial court decided Marshall's 'half of this' comment meant he had given Dorothy half of the CD's principal, and awarded her half. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Nobody claimed the prenuptial agreement was unfair or obtained by fraud or pressure; the trial court itself found it valid. When a valid antenuptial agreement is not modified by the parties, courts must enforce it exactly as written. This CD was exactly the kind of situation the agreement covered - separate funds used to buy jointly held property. The agreement's clause conclusively presumed no gift, and there was no real evidence Marshall meant to give away half the principal. His note on the stub and his testimony showed he intended the CD to be covered by the agreement (Dorothy would get half the interest, and her name was on it so she would get half the principal only if he died while they were still married). Because the trial court's finding was manifestly contrary to the evidence, Marshall was entitled to the entire principal.
This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.