MATTER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO CARRON (TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The power to terminate parental rights is an 'awesome' power that the court scrutinizes carefully. Champagne v. Welfare Division, 100 Nev. 640, 645, 691 P.2d 849, 853 (1984). Termination requires both jurisdictional (parental fault) and dispositional (best-interest) grounds, each established by clear and convincing evidence, and termination orders based on substantial evidence will be upheld. Kobinski v. State, 103 Nev. 293, 296, 783 P.2d 895, 897 (1987). The court held that a district court may consider a father's pre-birth conduct as one factor in the abandonment inquiry. NRS 128.105 sets out the grounds for termination and requires only one. Abandonment under NRS 128.012(1) is 'any conduct' evincing a settled purpose to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child; parental intent is the decisive factor, shown by the facts of each case. Smith v. Smith, 102 Nev. 263, 266, 720 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1986). Giving the statutory term 'any conduct' its plain meaning, the court held it encompasses a father's actions during the mother's pregnancy. The court declined to hold that pre-birth conduct alone justifies termination, but held it can serve, at least in part, as the basis for finding jurisdictional or dispositional grounds under NRS 128.105, consistent with the general trend in other jurisdictions. Here, the district court found abandonment (relying on Shawn's conduct throughout the pregnancy and his failure to assert parental rights until after the termination petition was filed), as well as risk of serious injury, token efforts, and unfitness (history of drug use, mental illness, and domestic abuse). The dispositional inquiry under Champagne asks whether under no reasonable circumstances the child's best interest can be served by sustaining the parental tie. 100 Nev. at 652, 691 P.2d at 858. Finding the termination supported by substantial evidence, the court affirmed.

In plain language

Veronica Carron became pregnant while living with her boyfriend, Shawn Whitney, and his family in New Jersey. After learning she was pregnant, Veronica ended the relationship, moved to Las Vegas, and arranged for the baby to be adopted. During the pregnancy, Shawn was told he was the putative father and that his consent to the adoption was needed, but he did little to assert his rights and at one point said he would support whatever Veronica decided. After the baby, Symantha, was born in 1996, she was placed with Teresa Pinney, who petitioned to terminate Shawn's parental rights. Only after that petition was filed did Shawn seek custody or visitation. DNA testing confirmed Shawn was the biological father, but the district court terminated his parental rights. The question on appeal was whether a court can consider a father's conduct during the mother's pregnancy (before the child was born) as evidence that he intended to abandon the child. The Supreme Court held that it can. Under Nevada's abandonment statute (NRS 128.012), a court may consider 'any conduct' by a parent that shows a settled purpose to give up all parental claims, and the Court held that 'any conduct' includes a father's actions during the pregnancy. The Court was careful to say that pre-birth conduct alone does not justify termination, but it can serve, at least in part, as a basis for finding grounds to terminate. Here, the district court found several grounds: abandonment, risk of serious injury, and only token efforts, and also found Shawn unfit due to drug use and other issues. Because there was substantial evidence supporting the termination (both the fault-type grounds and that termination served Symantha's best interest), the Supreme Court affirmed.