MATTER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.D.L. (TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court affirmed termination of an incarcerated father's parental rights, distinguishing cases where termination rested solely on incarceration. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence both the child's best interest and at least one enumerated parental-fault factor, and terminations are upheld on substantial evidence. Matter of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 795, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 129, 132-33 (2000); NRS 128.105; 118 Nev. at 744-45, 58 P.3d at 185-86. Best interest. Under NRS 128.109(2), where a child has resided outside the home for fourteen of any twenty consecutive months, the best interest is presumed served by termination. 118 Nev. at 745, 58 P.3d at 186. The children had been in their third placement in foster care for nineteen consecutive months, and Richard failed to rebut the presumption; his violent felony convictions, pending federal charges, inability to manage anger, and the children's lack of any strong bond with him coupled with their well-integrated foster placement (NRS 128.108) supported the best-interest finding. Parental fault. The court upheld findings of parental unfitness and failure of parental adjustment. Under NRS 128.106(6), a felony conviction may evidence unfitness if the nature of the crime indicates the parent's unfitness to provide adequate care; it is the nature of the crime that matters. Matter of Q.L.R., 118 Nev. 602, 608 n.12, 54 P.3d 56, 59 n.12 (2002). Richard's two violent domestic-violence convictions against close family members, his continued failure to control his temper, and his refusal to accept responsibility supported unfitness (and, alternatively, serious risk of injury under NRS 128.105(2)(e)). 118 Nev. at 746-47, 58 P.3d at 186-87. On failure of parental adjustment (NRS 128.0126; NRS 128.109(1)(b)), the court reaffirmed that incarceration standing alone is insufficient (citing J.L.N.), but held the district court did not rely solely on incarceration: it found Richard failed to change his violent behavior between his first arrest and the children's removal despite the State's reasonable efforts, and it is the nature of his offenses and the danger he posed - not merely the duration of confinement - that was determinative. The court affirmed. 118 Nev. at 747-48, 58 P.3d at 187-88.

In plain language

Richard was the father of two young children, K.D.L. and S.P.K. The children came to the state's attention after a severe domestic violence incident in which Richard beat the children's mother badly enough to fracture her jaw, with one child having witnessed the attack. Both parents also had substance abuse problems. The children were made wards of the state, and a reunification case plan was set up requiring Richard to complete anger management, parenting classes, drug assessment, and other steps. The children were briefly returned to the parents, but then Richard committed a second act of domestic violence - this time against his own mother, using a deadly weapon - which violated his probation and led to a prison sentence of up to ten years. The children went back into foster care, where they bonded with a foster family that wanted to adopt them. The child welfare agency petitioned to terminate Richard's parental rights, and the district court granted the petition. Richard appealed, arguing there was no clear and convincing evidence that termination served the children's best interest or that he was at fault. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It distinguished this case from two recent decisions (Q.L.R. and J.L.N.) where terminations were reversed because they rested solely on the fact of incarceration. Here, the district court did not rely only on Richard's imprisonment. Instead, it relied on the violent nature of his crimes, his repeated failure to control his temper (including belligerence in the courtroom and blaming his child for his violence against his mother), his failure to change his behavior even after the case plan, and the risk he posed to the children. The court also upheld the best-interest finding: Richard had not overcome the statutory presumption favoring termination after the children spent well over a year in foster care, the children had formed no strong bond with him and were well integrated with a foster family wishing to adopt them. The court affirmed the termination.