MESSING VS. CUNNING (FAMILY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court analyzed substantive appealability and standing as separate questions. On appealability, the court reiterated that "[t]he substantive appealability of a district court order is not determined by the issues an appellant raises or seeks to raise on appeal," and that the court "may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule." Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). The court identified the original divorce decree as the final judgment under Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000), and noted that under Alper v. Posin, 77 Nev. 328, 331, 363 P.2d 502, 503 (1961), there can be only one final judgment, so the October 24 order could not itself be appealed as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). The October 24 order qualified, however, as a special order after final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(8) to the extent it again modified Chris's separate property reimbursement, satisfying the test in Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 914, 59 P.3d 1220, 1221 (2002), that such an order "must be an order affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered." To the extent the order directed that all unmodified prior orders remain in effect and closed the case, it was not appealable. See Campos-Garcia v. Johnson, 130 Nev. 610, 612, 331 P.3d 890, 891 (2014); Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851. On standing, the court applied NRAP 3A(a) and Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994), which provides that a party is "aggrieved" when a district court's order "adversely and substantially affects the party's personal right or a right of property." The appealable portion of the October 24 order reduced Chris's award, which did not aggrieve Lisa. The court acknowledged that Lisa might have been aggrieved if she contended the order failed to comply with the Court of Appeals' May 3, 2024, mandate, citing Wheeler Springs Plaza, LLC v. Beemon, 119 Nev. 260, 263-64, 71 P.3d 1258, 1260 (2003), but observed that Lisa "makes no such argument in her docketing statement or response to the motion to dismiss." The court dismissed for lack of standing, expressly declining to address Lisa's substantive claims, and denied Chris's NRAP 38 request for attorney fees and costs.

In plain language

Lisa Messing and Chris Cunning divorced in 2021. Lisa previously appealed the divorce decree and several related orders. The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the lower court's rulings but reversed one piece: it took away an extra $3,500 reimbursement to Chris for two 2000 Honda XR motorcycles and restored the original $115,620 separate-property reimbursement amount from the initial decree. After that appeal ended, the district court entered a new order on October 24, 2024, implementing the Court of Appeals' decision. That order confirmed Chris's reimbursement at $115,620, said all other prior orders remained in effect, and closed the case. Lisa filed a new appeal from that October 24 order. Chris asked the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal, arguing the order was not appealable and that Lisa was really trying to relitigate issues already decided. The Supreme Court explained that whether an order can be appealed depends on whether a statute or court rule authorizes the appeal - not on what issues the appellant wants to raise. The court found that the October 24 order was, in part, a "special order after final judgment" (the divorce decree being the final judgment) because it again modified the amount of Chris's separate property reimbursement. The portions that simply kept earlier orders in effect or closed the case, however, were not appealable. Even so, the court dismissed the appeal because Lisa lacked "standing" - the legal right to appeal. To appeal, a person must be "aggrieved," meaning the order has to hurt their rights or property. The appealable portion of the October 24 order actually reduced the money Chris received, which did not harm Lisa. She might have been able to argue that the district court failed to follow the Court of Appeals' instructions, but she did not make that argument in her filings. Without an injury the court could review, she could not pursue the appeal. The court also denied Chris's request for attorney fees and costs and made no ruling on the merits of Lisa's underlying claims.