MILLER VS. POPELKOVA (FAMILY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The court addressed jurisdiction over a prematurely filed notice of appeal in a divorce matter. Construing Popelkova's August 2024 notice of appeal from an unappealable interlocutory order, the court held it "may properly be construed as a challenge to the later-entered divorce decree, the final judgment in this matter," citing Knox v. Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 517, 665 P.2d 267, 269 (1983). The court further found that Popelkova's amended notice of appeal complied with NRAP 3(c)(1), was timely under NRAP 4(a)(1), and challenged a substantively appealable divorce decree under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Citing NRAP 3(a)(2), the court emphasized that procedural missteps short of an untimely notice do not defeat appellate jurisdiction but instead are grounds only for such action as the court deems appropriate. The court rejected Miller's argument that designation as an "amended" rather than new notice of appeal was fatal, holding that "such designation does not render the amended notice of appeal invalid." In a footnote, the court reminded that interlocutory orders may be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment, citing Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). On case management, the court determined that because both parties appeal from the same decree, the cross-appeal in Docket No. 89695 was improperly docketed as a new matter. It directed administrative closure of No. 89695 and transfer of its documents into No. 89247, with cross-appeal briefing to proceed under NRAP 28.1(c). The court set a March 25, 2025, deadline for Popelkova's opening brief and appendix, warning that failure to comply may result in sanctions including dismissal under NRAP 31(d)(1).

In plain language

This order resolves a procedural fight over how a divorce appeal got started. Renata Popelkova first tried to appeal a mid-case order from August 26, 2024 - the kind of order that ordinarily cannot be appealed on its own (an "interlocutory" order means a ruling made before the case is finished). After the divorce decree was entered on October 23, 2024, she filed an amended notice of appeal that covered both the earlier order and the final decree. Her ex-husband, Howard Miller, then filed his own cross-appeal, which the court clerk mistakenly opened as a separate case. Miller asked the Nevada Supreme Court to throw out Popelkova's appeal. He argued that because her first notice was filed too early, the court never had power over it, and she should have filed a brand-new notice of appeal after the divorce decree rather than "amending" the earlier one. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and refused to dismiss. The court explained that Popelkova's premature notice of appeal can be treated as a challenge to the later-entered divorce decree, which is the kind of final judgment that can be appealed. The court also found nothing wrong with her amended notice of appeal: it met the formal requirements, was filed on time, and properly challenged an appealable order. Even if calling it an "amended" notice was technically incorrect, that label alone would not invalidate it. The court also cleaned up a clerical issue: because both spouses are appealing from the same divorce decree, their appeals belong in a single case, not two. The clerk was directed to close Docket No. 89695 and move everything into Docket No. 89247. Popelkova was given until March 25, 2025, to file her opening brief and appendix, with normal cross-appeal briefing rules to follow.