MINHAS VS. GILL (FAMILY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

**Standard of review.** The court reviews an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment for abuse of discretion, citing *Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC*, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428 P.3d 255, 257 (2018). The court also noted that appellate courts may address the joinder of necessary parties sua sponte, citing *Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian*, 95 Nev. 389, 396, 594 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1979). **Preliminary characterization.** Although the district court's order made no mention of Minhas's NRCP 60(b) request, the court construed the determination that the SMG Trust was not a necessary party and the decision to strike the third-party complaint as a denial of NRCP 60(b) relief, citing *Bd. of Gallery of Hist., Inc. v. Datecs Corp.*, 116 Nev. 286, 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000). The court also declined to apply per se affirmance for record omissions where the record contained information necessary to evaluate the arguments, citing *Johnson v. Johnson*, 93 Nev. 655, 657, 572 P.2d 925, 926 (1977). **Doctrinal framework.** The court applied NRCP 19(a)(1), quoting the rule's text governing required joinder of a person who claims an interest relating to the subject of the action whose absence may impair the person's ability to protect that interest or leave an existing party subject to inconsistent obligations. The court further stated that "If an entity required by NRCP 19 is not joined as a party, a district court should not enter a final order," quoting *Las Vegas Police Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 138 Nev. 632, 636, 515 P.3d 842, 847 (2022). The court drew on the principle that where a third party holds title to property in an action, failure to join that party is fatal to a judgment regarding that property, citing *Gladys Baker Olsen Fam. Tr. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 110 Nev. 548, 554, 874 P.2d 778, 782 (1994) (a trust holding legal title and absolute ownership of the assets at issue is an indispensable party) and *Schwob v. Hemsath*, 98 Nev. 293, 294, 646 P.2d 1212, 1212 (1982) (corporation holding legal title to property in controversy was an indispensable party). The court noted that transferring third-party property without joinder is akin to taking "property from one person and giving it to another without a hearing" and could force relitigation, violating the policy behind NRCP 19, citing *Johnson v. Johnson*, 93 Nev. 655, 658, 572 P.2d 925, 926-27 (1977). **Application.** The court found it undisputed that the SMG Trust—revocable or irrevocable—exists and owns the properties or the sale proceeds at issue, so a third-party trust maintains an interest in the trust assets. The court reasoned that the relationships among the parties did not lessen the trust's interest: while Minhas is the settlor and Gill is a beneficiary of the irrevocable version, the trustee and other named beneficiaries were not parties. The court distinguished *Lopez v. Lopez*, 139 Nev. 533, 539, 541 P.3d 117, 124 (Ct. App. 2023) (trust not a necessary party where the parties were co-settlors, co-trustees, and co-beneficiaries) and *Tsai v. Hsu*, No. 50549, 2010 WL 3270973, at *4-5 (Apr. 29, 2010) (Order of Affirmance) (revocable inter vivos trust not a necessary party where both spouses were co-trustees and already parties, and distribution did not substantially affect nonparties' rights). In a footnote addressing Gill's contention that the properties were sold after the decree, the court observed that the record did not show the district court evaluated those assertions or admitted Gill's exhibits, and noted that even if sold, the proceeds ordinarily remain a trust asset, citing Bogert's The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 822 (2026). **Holding.** The court concluded that joinder of the SMG Trust was necessary for distribution of the trust assets, citing *Olsen Fam. Tr.*, 110 Nev. at 554, 874 P.2d at 782. Because the district court interpreted the trust, declared it revocable, and distributed its assets without joining the trust as a necessary party, the order following the evidentiary hearing is void. The court further recognized that the failure to join the trust impacted the district court's ability to evaluate whether the divorce decree should be set aside under NRCP 60(b), and directed reconsideration of those arguments once the trust is joined.

In plain language

Sandeep Minhas and Monika Gill married in 2008 and divorced in 2020. As part of their divorce, they signed a property settlement agreement (incorporated into the divorce decree) under which Gill was awarded a property in San Jose, California, and the net proceeds from selling a condominium in Fremont, California. A complication surfaced later: those properties were not actually owned by Minhas individually. They were held by the SMG Trust, a trust Minhas had created on October 8, 2017. Neither person mentioned the trust during the divorce, and the trust was never made a party to the divorce proceedings. Matters became more tangled because two different copies of the trust existed, both supposedly signed on the same day. One copy said the trust was *revocable* (meaning it could be undone) and governed by California law. The other copy said the trust was *irrevocable* (meaning it generally could not be undone), added "spendthrift" protections, and said it was governed by Nevada law. Everyone agreed the trust was created on October 8, 2017, and that the two properties were inside it. Minhas asked the court to set aside the divorce decree, arguing that because the trust held title to the properties, he could not personally hand them over to Gill. He first attached the revocable version of the trust to his filings. The parties agreed to bring the trust into the case, and Minhas filed a third-party complaint against the trust. Gill then asked the court to strike that complaint, arguing the trust did not need to be involved because Minhas had already revoked it as to the properties when he signed the settlement agreement, and pointing to California law. Two days before the scheduled hearing, Minhas said he had just found the "original" copy, which was the irrevocable Nevada version, and now argued the decree was void under a court rule because it had given away assets owned by a third party who was never part of the case. At the hearing, Gill argued Minhas should be blocked (by "equitable estoppel," a principle stopping someone from contradicting earlier positions) from relying on the irrevocable version, and acknowledged she had obtained a copy of the trust from Chase Bank showing it as an irrevocable Nevada trust. The district court ruled the trust was revocable, treated the irrevocable version and a related document as unreliable and of "no legal impact," dismissed Minhas's complaint against the trust, found the trust revoked as to the two properties, ordered Minhas to provide an accounting, and confirmed Gill's awards. The court's written order did not directly address Minhas's request to set aside the decree. The Court of Appeals reversed. Its central point: the SMG Trust owned the properties (or the proceeds), so the trust had an interest in the outcome. Under Nevada rules, a party with such an interest in property must be brought into the case before a court divides that property. Because the district court interpreted the trust, declared it revocable, and distributed its assets without first joining the trust as a party, the appellate court held the resulting order was void. The court sent the case back, directing that the trust be joined and that the district court then reconsider whether the divorce decree should be set aside.