MONDAY VS. CHRISTIAN (CHILD CUSTODY)

Statutes cited

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's child custody decision for abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007); see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (a decision regarding parenting time is a custody determination). The court will affirm factual findings supported by substantial evidence, "which is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. Review is deferential, but the court does not defer "to legal error or to findings so conclusory they may mask legal error." Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). The governing framework: the sole consideration in a custody determination is the best interest of the child. NRS 125C.0035(1); Davis, 131 Nev. at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143. A court may modify physical custody only where the movant shows "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification." Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). The order "must tie the child's best interest, as informed by specific, relevant findings respecting the [best interest factors] and any other relevant factors, to the custody determination made." Davis, 131 Nev. at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143; see also NRS 125C.0035(4) (court "shall consider and set forth its specific findings" concerning the best interest factors). Specific findings and an adequate explanation are "crucial to enforce or modify a custody order and for appellate review." Davis, 131 Nev. at 452, 352 P.3d at 1143. Without them, the appellate court cannot determine whether the determination was appropriate. Id.; cf. Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 868 (2024) (affirming where the district court supported its parenting time order with explicit findings pursuant to NRS 125C.0035(4)). Applying that framework, the court concluded the order was "facially insufficient to support its custody determination, or to allow meaningful appellate review of the court's reasons for its decisions concerning the parties' parenting time." Although the district court noted the testimony regarding the child's ongoing issues (autism evaluation and three-days-per-week speech therapy) and Christian's alleged alcohol consumption, the order did not contain findings resolving those issues and the court failed to engage in discussion or analysis of the best interest factors as required by NRS 125C.0035(4) and Davis. The court further noted, per footnote, that the evidentiary hearing transcript showed no oral best-interest findings either. Accordingly, the court could not determine whether the decision was appropriate. The court noted in footnote that the parties had stipulated to primary physical custody for Monday, see EDCR 5.601(e), but had not stipulated to the parenting time schedule. On remand, the court directed the district court to fully and properly address the best interest factors under NRS 125C.0035(4) and tie its parenting time determination to the child's best interest. Davis, 131 Nev. at 451, 352 P.3d at 1143. Pending remand, the court left the current custody arrangement in place, subject to modification to comport with current circumstances. Davis, 131 Nev. at 455, 352 P.3d at 1146. On child support, Monday argued the award lacked substantial evidence support. The court reversed the support award as a necessary consequence of reversing the parenting time decision, because the support figure incorporated the costs associated with transporting the child for Christian's Philadelphia parenting time. See NAC 425.150(1)(e) (permitting adjustment based on findings concerning "[t]he cost of transportation of the child to and from visitation"). On remand, the district court was directed to re-evaluate child support after further consideration of the parties' parenting time requests, a proper analysis of the NRS 125C.0035(4) best interest factors, and additional review of transportation costs if it elects to grant out-of-state parenting time. See Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 867 (holding "that the district court may not impose transportation costs separately without determining the impact on the overall child support obligation").

In plain language

Lawana Monday and Maurice Christian share one child, born in 2020. An earlier court order gave both parents joint legal and physical custody, set their parenting schedule by agreement, and reflected their agreement that neither parent would pay the other monthly child support. Christian later asked the court to change the arrangement. He had moved to Philadelphia and wanted the child to travel there for extended parenting time. Monday opposed, saying Christian had not exercised parenting time in over a year and that she was raising the child on her own. She also asked the court to change the child support order. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court issued a written order. The parties agreed (stipulated) that Monday would have primary physical custody. The court gave Christian out-of-state parenting time during summer breaks and on alternating holidays. The court also set Christian's child support at $700 per month — lower than the $933 the standard formula would produce — because the court factored in the cost of transporting the child to Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on a problem with how the district court explained its decision. Under Nevada law, when a court decides parenting time, it must make specific findings about what is in the child's best interest, using a list of factors set out in the statute. Here, the district court noted the parents' testimony — including Monday's worries about the child's possible autism and three-days-a-week speech therapy, her concern that Christian had rarely exercised parenting time, and her concern about Christian's alcohol use — but the court's order did not resolve those issues or work through the best-interest factors. Because the order lacked those findings, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell whether the parenting time decision was appropriate, and it could not meaningfully review the decision. The appellate court reversed and sent the case back, directing the district court to fully address the best-interest factors and to connect its parenting time decision to the child's best interest. In the meantime, the current custody arrangement stays in place, subject to changes the district court may make. The Court of Appeals also reversed the child support award. Because that award was tied to the transportation costs of Christian's out-of-state parenting time, and the parenting time decision was being reversed, the support figure had to be reconsidered too. On remand, the district court was directed to re-evaluate child support after addressing the parenting time requests, properly analyzing the best-interest factors, and reviewing transportation costs if it again grants out-of-state parenting time.