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MORRIS VS. MORRIS (DIVORCE)

86 Nev. 45, 464 P.2d 471 (1970) · 5910 · Nevada Supreme Court · January 26, 1970

Disposition:Affirmed.Divorce, Property & Alimony

Posture The plaintiff husband appealed from a district court order granting the defendant wife's NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside a default decree of divorce. The motion was made promptly upon learning the default judgment had been entered and was accompanied by an answer containing a meritorious defense and a counterclaim on property and support. The district court found the wife's failure to appear in time resulted from excusable neglect of her attorney.

Key holdings

- The underlying policy in default matters is to encourage trial upon the merits. - An attorney's failure to timely appear due to a secretary's miscalculation of the answer deadline may constitute excusable neglect under NRCP 60(b)(1). - The intraoffice practice of delegating case calendaring to a trusted secretary is not per se neglect, and an understandable calendaring error falls short of inexcusable neglect. - A trial court's decision to set aside a default so a case may be tried on the merits will not be overturned absent a showing in the record warranting reversal, particularly where no third-party rights have intervened.

Practitioner summary

The sole question was whether the district court permissibly concluded that the defendant wife's failure to appear in time was due to excusable neglect under NRCP 60(b)(1), where the motion to set aside the default divorce decree was promptly made, accompanied by an answer with a meritorious defense and a counterclaim raising property and support issues. The court did not hesitate to affirm. The error arose when a secretary at the retained firm, following the firm's usual calendaring procedure, computed the answer deadline from the date the power of attorney was executed (January 9) rather than the date of service of summons (January 3), noting January 29 as the last day; defense counsel learned on January 28 that a decree had been entered four days earlier and moved to set it aside the next day. Emphasizing the policy of encouraging trial upon the merits, the court relied on its default jurisprudence collected in Hotel Last Frontier v. Frontier Properties, 79 Nev. 150, 380 P.2d 293 (1963); see also Blakeney v. Fremont Hotel, 77 Nev. 191, 360 P.2d 1039 (1961); Adams v. Lawson, 84 Nev. 687, 448 P.2d 695 (1968). The court held that the intraoffice practice of delegating calendaring to a trusted secretary is not per se neglect, that her fault was understandable, and that her conduct fell short of 'inexcusable neglect,' words carrying the implication of offensive action. No third-party rights had intervened, and nothing in the record warranted overturning the trial court.

In plain language

This case concerns a default divorce decree that was set aside. The wife was served with the divorce papers in Belgium on January 3, 1969. Her copy of the summons and a power of attorney (signed January 9, 1969) were sent to a Nevada law firm hired to represent her. Following the firm's usual practice, a secretary noted the deadline to answer on the office calendar, but she mistakenly used the date the power of attorney was signed rather than the date of service to calculate the deadline, and wrote down January 29, 1969. On January 28, the wife's attorney phoned the husband's attorney to say he would be filing an answer, only to learn the case had already been heard and a divorce decree entered four days earlier. The next day, the attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, attaching an answer with a meritorious defense and a counterclaim raising property and support issues. The district court granted the motion and set aside the default. The husband appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It reiterated the strong policy favoring trial on the merits and held that the failure to appear on time was due to the excusable neglect of the wife's attorney's office. Delegating the calendaring of cases to a trusted secretary is not neglect in itself, and the secretary's calculation error in this instance was understandable and fell short of inexcusable neglect. No third-party rights had intervened, and nothing in the record justified overturning the trial court's decision to allow a trial on the merits.

This summary is independently verified against the source opinion. It is an informational research aid, not legal advice, and no substitute for reading the decision.