MURPHY VS. MURPHY (CHILD CUSTODY)

Key holdings

Practitioner summary

The plaintiff wife appealed from a July 10, 1947 order (amended July 18, 1947) modifying a September 9, 1946 divorce decree by transferring custody of the parties' two minor children to the defendant husband, and from the denial of her motion for a new trial. The husband's appearance and waiver in the 1946 proceeding had been procured in reliance on a signed custody agreement and the wife's telegram assuring that his terms would be 'agreed to and signed before decree is granted'; at trial she testified she signed the agreement reluctantly, and the decree as drafted by her counsel and signed unread by the judge recited disapproval of an agreement that, as the trial judge later stated on the record, was never presented to or considered by the court. The court (Brown, D.J.) affirmed: district courts have inherent power to set aside judgments procured by extrinsic fraud (Lauer v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 62 Nev. 78), which exists where a party's conduct prevents a real trial upon the issues, including keeping the adversary from court by false promises (Landon v. Landon; Howard v. Howard; Stafford v. Stafford; Rogers v. Mulkey); the husband's motion complied with District Court Rule XLV's six-month window; whether fraud was committed and whether modification served the children's welfare were fact questions for the trial court; the trial court enjoys wide latitude in custody matters (Black v. Black; Elsman v. Elsman); and, the evidence being voluminous, conflicting, and reflecting materially changed circumstances (both parties had remarried - the wife to the former husband of the husband's new wife), the orders were supported by substantial evidence and would not be disturbed (Miller v. Miller). Affirmed.

In plain language

A wife divorced her husband in Reno in September 1946 on grounds of extreme cruelty. Days before, the couple had signed an agreement giving the husband custody of their two children, and the wife wired him assurances that 'your terms have been agreed to and signed before decree is granted' - which is why he signed an appearance and waiver instead of contesting the case. At trial, however, she testified she had signed the agreement reluctantly, and the decree - drafted by her lawyer and signed by the judge without reading it - recited that the court 'disapproved' the agreement and awarded her sole custody. The judge later stated on the record that the agreement had never actually been presented to him and that he had signed the findings 'as a matter of habit.' Within the six-month window allowed by court rule, the husband moved to modify. After a full hearing, the district court struck the custody portion of the decree and awarded custody of both children to the father, with the mother to have them two weeks each year. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. District courts have inherent power to set aside judgments procured by extrinsic fraud - fraud that prevents a real trial of the issues, such as inducing a party to stay out of court with false assurances. Although the supreme court admitted it might itself have left the young boy with his mother, the evidence was in substantial conflict, custody determinations are entrusted to the trial court's wide latitude, and the record supported the modification.