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MURPHY VS. MURPHY (DIVORCE PROPERTY & ALIMONY)

64 Nev. 440, 183 P.2d 632 (1947) · 3477 · Nevada Supreme Court · July 30, 1947

Disposition:Affirmed. ("It is the decision and order of this court that the said ruling and order of the district court, made and entered October 4, 1946, be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.")Other Family Law

Posture Appeal by the defendant former husband from an order of the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County (Maestretti, J.), construing the alimony provision of the parties' 1943 divorce decree to require $150 per month, and from the denial of his motion for a new trial.

Key holdings

- A motion for a new trial does not lie to review a ruling on a motion that culminates in an order; such an order is reviewable only on appeal upon a bill of exceptions. - A court of general jurisdiction may construe its own judgments and decrees at any time, and an order construing (as distinct from modifying) a decree is not barred by the six-month limit of District Court Rule XLV. - Provisions of a divorce decree adopting a stipulation are construed fairly and reasonably and to carry out the parties' intent, alimony being keyed to the payor's ability to pay. - Under de minimis non curat lex, a one-day, trivial reversion in military rank did not trigger a contingent reduction in alimony.

Practitioner summary

Appeal from an order construing the alimony provision of a 1943 divorce decree, and from denial of a "motion for new trial." Held: (1) A motion for new trial does not lie to review proceedings on a motion culminating in an order (following Harper v. Hildreth, 99 Cal. 265, 33 P. 1103); the attempted new-trial motion below and the appeal from its denial were without legal effect. (2) The order construed rather than modified the decree; a court of general jurisdiction may construe its judgments at any time, so District Court Rule XLV's six-month limit on modification did not apply (distinguishing Aseltine v. District Court, 57 Nev. 269, 62 P.2d 701). (3) On the merits, the husband's one-day reversion to lieutenant colonel, immediately followed by promotion to colonel and costing him about $1.30, did not trigger the contingent $50-per-month reduction; agreements are construed fairly and reasonably and as the parties reasonably intended, alimony being keyed to the payor's ability to pay, and the maxim de minimis non curat lex applied. Affirmed.

In plain language

In a 1943 divorce, the decree adopted the parties' stipulation: the husband would pay the wife $150 per month in support, but if he "revert[ed] to his regular army rank of Lieutenant Colonel," the payment would drop to $100. In 1946 the Army, in a single order, reduced the husband from brigadier general to lieutenant colonel for one day and, the very next day, promoted him to colonel. The wife asked the court to construe the decree as still requiring $150 per month. The trial court agreed, and the husband appealed, arguing the court had improperly modified the decree. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court merely construed (interpreted) its own decree, which a court may do at any time, so the six-month limit on modifying decrees did not apply. On the merits, a one-day reversion that cost the husband only about $1.30 was too trivial to trigger the reduction: agreements are read fairly and reasonably and to carry out what the parties intended, alimony was keyed to the husband's income and ability to pay, and under the maxim that "the law cares not for small things" (de minimis), the token reversion did not justify cutting the wife's support. The court also held that no motion for a new trial lies from an order made on a motion.

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